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INTRODUCTION 
In this book I present an interpretation of the changes which have 
been taking place in Poland since 1989. It is not, however, the history 
of the downfall of communism and the structure of this work has not 
been organized on a chronological basis. The interpretation of 
changes being proposed here fits into the mainstream of institutional 
sociology. When I speak about changes, I refer mostly to the changes 
in the economy, although political changes are also present in my 
analysis. 
In this work I look at three fundamental sources of change. I define 
these as changes within the system, changes outside the system, and 
changes to the system. Changes within the system are the reforms, 
changes outside the system are the diverse forms of adaptation 
mechanisms, consisting of "transgressing" the framework of formal 
rules, while the change to the system is the radical transformation 
initiated by the downfall of communism in 1989-90. 
We are dealing in Poland with the simultaneous existence of those 
three sources of change. Moreover, these sources influence one 
another. We can say that the reforms which never were successful 
and consistent under communism influenced, however, the shape of 
the system. Their influence was visible also in the fact that the 
unsuccessful attempts at reforms accelerated the erosion of the 
system. Changes "outside the system" contributed to that erosion, 
while they also exerted an influence on the changes within the 
system. In this work I indicate how certain new mechanisms, 
initially located in the informal sphere, penetrated into the official 
programs of reforms. Finally, both the changes within the system 
and the changes outside the system have contributed in a certain 
way to the change of the system, that is to its radical 
transformation. 
Since the beginning of the transformation remaining sources of 
dynamics have not, however, disappeared. Within the radical 
transformation of the economy we still hear echoes of earlier reforms. 
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Similarly, the informal adaptation processes, which substituted true 
legitimation under communism, have not disappeared in the 
post-communit period either. However, the functions of those mecha-
nisms are frequently completely different from the original ones. One of 
my theses states that the sources of changes discussed here under 
certain conditions become obstacles to changes. The mechanisms 
which led to the erosion and the downfall of communism often hamper 
further transformation. The dynamics of change and continuity is one 
of the most important subjects of my work. In principle, each of the 
sources of changes analyzed in this book in certain situations becomes 
also an obstacle to the subsequent changes. 
This applies to the reforms, which, after all, apart from modifying 
the shape of the system also lead to the consolidation of its 
fundamental features. Moreover, in the post-communist period certain 
elements of the "reformatory" thinking, inherited from the former 
system, such as the planned, rigid character of changes or the greater 
importance of a passive tolerance than of an active social participation, 
can, after initially aiding the changes, hinder further transformations. 
A similarly equivocal role was played by the informal adaptation 
processes. They modified the communist system and actually led to its 
erosion. However, they can simultaneously impede radical transfor-
mations toward a market economy. An example here would be the 
second economy, the rules of which, although they departed from the 
rigidity of the command economy, were, however, and are distant from 
those of a normal market economy. 
Finally, the systemic breakthrough itself constains not only 
dynamizing elements but also seeds of barriers to changes. The 
dynamics of the ongoing transformation has made it very clear to us 
how enormous is the difference between the logie, mechanisms, and 
social forces of the downfall of the old order and the logie, mechanisms, 
and social forces of the construction of the new order. The difference 
between the downfall of the old system and the formation of the new 
one is fundamental. What served the first aim is often dysfunctional in 
the second. There are many indications of this difference. Among them 
one could certainly mention the dramatic change in the position of 
workers. The main heroes of the downfall of communism, which had 
been achieved through their activeness, have transformed themselves 
into a non-homogenous, differentiated group. The economic interests 
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of this group are often seriously threatened, and its political position is 
weaker not only when compared with the final period of communism, 
but also paradoxically weaker when compared to the communist 
period. An analysis of these paradoxes of change and continuity 
constitutes an important theme in this work. 
Therefore, the basic assumption of the book is the author's 
conviction of the continuity of processes of change. They did not begin 
with the transformation of the political order, although it had a radical 
importance for their acceleration. Analogously, the barriers to changes 
are not a feature specific to communism, for we are dealing with them 
at present as well. 
The acceptance of such an assumption forejudges the character of this 
work. I reject in it the view according to which the change taking place in 
Poland and in the region of Central Europe is a direct transition from 
totalitarianism to democracy. I believe that such a definition of the 
essence of present changes mistakes its ideological vision for the true 
picture. Communism was neither - at least its Polish version 
- a realization of the totalitarian model (though the government had the 
intention of realizing this model), nor at present can we speak about the 
realization of the democratic model. This ideological vision is present in 
some approaches of the "transition to democracy" type, concentrating 
on the study of that transition from the point of view of the model of 
destination. This perspective is, in principle, nonexistent in my work. 
I am trying to substitute it with a different one, according to which the 
processes taking place should be studied without any far-reaching 
assumptions about their direction. Therefore, analyzing the final period 
of communism I suggest an approach other than the totalitarian 
approach, and explaining the present changes I concentrate more on 
their barriers and their hidden logic than on accentuating the democratic 
aim of those changes, which, nevertheless, is socially desirable. 
I have already mentioned that this work is not a historical analysis of 
the downfall of communism and of the changes that have followed. 
This justifies my focusing on selected problems. I have been interested 
in those which relate to the three distinguished sources of change. 
Therefore, it is not chronology, but this distinction, which constitutes 
the basis of the structure of my work. 
In the first chapter I discuss the three principle sources of change and 
the relations between them. 
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In the second chapter I analyze the reforms and their limits. The first 
part of the chapter concerns the limits to economic reform at the close 
of communism. In this part I advance a thesis on the evolution of limits 
to reforms at the close of the communist period. Before the downfall of 
communism, apart from the limitations of a political nature, there have 
emerged limits which I call "civilizational," and which go beyond pure 
politics and concern rather the disputes between more general 
ideologies. 
Apart from that, evidence supporting the thesis on the evolution of 
limits to reforms was the change and the approximation of the 
positions of the communist government and that of the hitherto still 
illegal Solidarity. As early as in the Spring of 1987, both of these 
political forces have strongly emphasized in their programs the 
importance of market reforms, and both, compared to their earlier 
positions, to some degree weakened their support for self-governmental 
options. The empirical analysis of the hitherto published programs, 
which I present in the chapter 2.1, entitles me to advance such a thesis. 
This thesis, it seems, is of crucial importance to the understanding of 
the evolutionary character of the systemic breakthrough in Poland: the 
will to move toward the market was visible among the Polish 
communist elites at least two years before the Round Table talks. 
In the second part of this chapter I will analyze the limits of and 
barriers to the present changes. One of those barriers is the very fact that 
the present transformations are to a certain degree being undertaken as 
a "paradigm of the reform." This, in turn, can cause a certain rigidity of 
changes (their inflexibility). Moreover, it results in the paradox of the 
post-communist transformations mentioned earlier. It consists in the 
fact that the changes, the goal of which is to promote social, economic, 
and political activeness, are implemented "from above," by the elites 
(see, e.g., C. Offe's concept of "political capitalism") expecting a passive 
acceptance of masses rather than their activeness. It is thus an 
inconsistency between the goal to be achieved (activeness and 
flexibility) and the methods for its realization (its rigidity and control 
"from above," which is usually characteristic of reforms). 
The third chapter is devoted to an analysis of extra-systemic informal 
adaptive processes. I discuss them as mechanisms substituting 
legitimation. The first part of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of 
the role of those mechanisms at the close of communism, while in the 
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second part I analyze the problems of legitimation after its downfall. 
The thesis of the whole chapter concerns two crises of legitimation. The 
first one, before the downfall, was a crisis of the lack of legitimacy, 
while the second, after the downfall, is a crisis of the formula for 
legitimation of the first post-communist period. It consists in the fact 
that the post-communist transformations cannot be justified by the 
ethos and the legitimating mechanisms of the first, "workers" 
Solidarity. In other words: the construction of capitalism requires 
a different kind of legitimation than does aiming at the downfall of 
communism. In this work as a whole, the analysis of the first 
post-communist period (1989-90) takes up an important part, because 
that period had its own interesting logic and dynamics. 
Finally, in the fourth chapter I present theses about the dynamics of 
the transformation itself, the dynamics of "the change of the system." 
It is in a sense a summary of many themes of this work, and the general 
thesis concerns the radical evolution of social strategies and structures: 
from the active adaptation during communism, through the passive 
politization of the first post-communist phase to the active 
depolitization in the second phase in 1990-93. 
* * * 
This work sums up a period of several years of studies undertaken by 
the author. Its initial idea, developed at the end of the 1980's, 
underwent a far-reaching modification which was an inevitable 
reflection of the changes taking place. However, during all that time 
I have attempted to fulfil the main goal of my work, namely the 
analysis of mutual permeation of the processes of change and 
continuity, of rejection and adaptation, that is all the things owing to 
which there is so much continuity in changes, and owing to which in the 
continuity there are hidden seeds of changes. 
Two fragments of this work appeared earlier in the form of 
articles. One of them (chapter 2.1) was published in Polish, the 
other (chapter 3.2) - in English. I present them in a modified 
and updated form. 

C H A P T E R 1 
REFORMS, ADAPTATION, AND BREAKTHROUGH: 
CONTINUITY OF CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION 
1.1. SOURCES OF CHANGES IN COMMAND ECONOMIES1 
Can one speak of changes in command economies? Common opinion 
about such economies claims that these entities were rigid, centralized, 
and invariable. Their stability and conservative character were usually 
said to be conditioned by political factors. Sociologists and economists 
have demonstrated that it was the political fear of losing control over 
the economy that led to the relinquishing of economic reforms, the aim 
of which was to grant enterprises a certain independence and 
autonomy. 
The economic system, however, did undergo changes, though 
reforms failed. It is therefore necessary to differentiate between reforms 
and changes. A reform is a specific type of change. In the literature of 
the subject it is distinguished from rapid, revolutionary changes and 
from unintential and spontaneous ones (Lamentowicz 1987). Generally 
speaking, reforms are accepted as a variety of planned change. The 
distinction between reforms and changes is useful in that it allows us to 
refer to the role of each of these mechanisms as to sources of dynamics. 
Obviously, systems do not change exclusively through planned reforms 
or only through spontaneous changes. In this section I would like to go 
further than merely adopt one of the presented points of view. I intend 
to consider the mutual relationship between reforms and spontaneous 
changes. In my opinion this problem had special significance in Poland, 
because we were witness to two parallel processes: that of the failure to 
introduce economic reform and that of changes in the social and 
economic behavior of various social groups. The parallelism of these 
1
 This section of chapter 1 is based on some parts of my article "Industrial enterprise 
during economic reform: factor of stability or change?" The Polish Sociological Bulletin, 
no. 2 (86): 1989, Wrocław: Ossolineum 1990. 
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two processes justifies the thesis that in Poland spontaneous changes 
were more common than planned reforms. More precisely speaking, it 
appears that deviations from the centralized model of management 
took place rather by way of spontaneous changes (so often analyzed by 
economists and sociologists) than through planned reform. Two types 
of such spontaneous changes may be distinguished: 
(1) violent changes characteristic of social riots and revolts - there 
were several of these in post-war Poland; 
(2) "everyday" changes accompanying various adaptation processes 
by way of which people try to modify the centralized system. 
This second type of spontaneous changes is the subject of this 
section. My intention is to reflect on their functions and to answer 
(among others) the following question: Did the adaptation processes 
"from below" always change the system or - maybe paradoxically 
- may they be ascribed a stabilizing function? The differentiation 
between two basic processes - the reforms "from above" and 
the changes "from below" - enables me to ask several questions 
about their relationship and mutual influence. While analyzing 
these issues I will refer to a hypothesis about a certain evolution 
of ideas and reformatory solutions. It seems that certain spontaneous, 
"from below" attempts at changing the system (expressed in the 
increase of "extrasystemic" aspirations and trends towards private 
models of economy) had to a certain degree penetrated into the 
official reformatory propositions. This will be analyzed in the next 
chapter. 
I would like now to elaborate on the thesis that in Poland during the 
last period of communism we were dealing more with changes than 
with reforms. 
At first glance, the systems of real socialism seemed to be rigid, 
centralized entities, unyielding to changes. Such features as a planned 
economy and a nearly complete monopoly in the sphere of politics were 
usually considered basie manifestations of their rigidity. However, the 
"reality of real socialism" to some extent strayed from this portrayal. 
One can say that such depiction referred to the ideological rather than 
the everyday shape of the system (Orzeł 1986). In practice, we saw 
constant dynamics; the centralized methods of management were 
"caked" with networks of informal, adaptive bargaining processes, and 
solutions which "monopolized" other spheres of life often led to 
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impetuous demonopolization. These processes have been frequently 
analyzed by sociologists and economists. 
Can these processes which modify the system be seen as due to 
reforms? Did change always imply a reform, i.e. a planned and 
conscious attempt at introducing changes? To some degree, certainly 
- but not entirely. I would like to defend the thesis that the system 
(together with the sphere of economy management) yielded rather to 
unintentional, spontaneous changes, while planned changes with their 
accompanying ideology, that is economic reforms, usually failed. This 
took place because the system had somehow acquired the ability of 
neutralizing reforms which had become a natural element of Polish 
post-war history. This led to a rather paradoxical situation where 
various spontaneous attempts at changes were more readily noticed 
than planned and effective reforms. The mechanisms of the "second 
economy," for example, the various adaptive strategies of enterprises 
and social groups were formed more readily and seemed to be more 
effective than the officially declared reforms. 
This bespeaks of at least two phenomena. First of all society did not 
stand idly by awaiting reforms but it tried to deal with problems as best 
it could, either through the "second economy," earning money abroad, 
or through other "extrasystemic" and "extrareformatory" methods. 
Secondly, this means that even if the offer and promise of reform were 
finally, consistently carried out, such might be of interest to a much 
smaller group of people. The scale of this "extrasystemic" activity 
should not, of course, be overestimated. It was not equally accessible to 
all. The point, however, is that a certain pattern of social and economic 
behavior was created, and it was neither passive waiting nor active 
pressure for reforms "from above." People tried to solve problems on 
a scale which they saw possible. This process has been a subject of 
interest for sociologists (e.g. Marody 1987) and economists (e.g. 
Bednarski 1985; Gruszecki 1986) who draw attention to the role of 
changes in spheres not controlled by the state. For the moment, let us 
put aside the problem of whether these phenomena stimulated the 
reform or blocked its chances for success. According to the thesis of 
this book, they played both roles: stabilizing and changing. No doubt 
as result of these spontaneous patterns of bahavior, in the long run the 
system underwent certain changes, though the direction of the change 
was often different from what it might have been as result of planned 
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changes based on democratic procedures. I merely want to stress 
the fact that society, that people, to the best of their ability, 
tried to fill in the gap created by the indecision of reformers. 
I am therefore strongly against the opinion that it was the apathy 
and passive attitude of our society that impeded the progress 
of reforms. 
In discussing the relations between reforms and spontaneous 
changes, reference must be made to some attempts at the theoretical 
conceptualization of both types of processes. Some Polish economists 
and sociologists referred in their works to the differentiation 
center/periphery, which constitutes a suitable framework for analyzing 
the relations between reforms and spontaneous changes. As 
illustration I can quote the analyses of K. Kloc and P. Marciniak 
(1988) as well as the works of J. Staniszkis (1987), who while not using 
this term directly, expressed her opinion about the role of changes 
outside the "socialist system of economy" and of those within it. We 
should not overlook a large number of works deriving in some way 
from studies of life styles. The subjects of analyses were alternative 
styles of life, behavior, alternative institutions and their attitude 
towards official ones. Those authors who have investigated the sources 
of the stability of real socialism systems suggest the analysis of 
"stabilizers" which are substitutes for legitimacy. Various adaptive 
processes are enumerated - they were "active," which means that 
adaptation did not only occur in relation to the institutional system, 
but that through various informal measures and deviation from 
official rules, the institutional system itself also underwent changes. 
These processes, therefore, were substitutes for legitimacy and also 
in a sense, substitutes for reforms. They will be analyzed in the 
chapter 3.1. 
To include these spontaneous attempts at changes (not revolutionary 
but "everyday") in the category of adaptation processes may at first 
seem a paradox. Adaptation is usually associated with stability, not 
with change. This paradox reflects the vagueness of the basic function 
of these processes: did they dynamize the system or stabilize it? Did 
they stimulate the process of reform or impeded it (Stark 1992)? In 
discussions on this subject one can easily fall into the trap of seeming 
paradoxes and barren scholasticism. Also in the case of reform one can 
say that their ultimate aim is to reinforce the system through change, 
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but such which takes place within it. Thus, a lot here depends on the 
precision of terminology. Such precision helps to overcome the seeming 
paradox that spontaneous, informal attempts at changes, both 
stabilized the system and, in the long run, changed it (though this may 
not be noticeable at once). This imperceptibility is due to the fact that 
the limits of what was "socialism" and what was not were not precisely 
determined. 
While considering the relations between such spontaneous, adaptive 
attempts at changes "from below" and reforms, it is easy to conclude 
that opinions in this subject widely vary. They range from opinions 
that these spontaneous, "extrasystemic" behaviors were the only 
significant reform existing in Poland, to the stance that they blocked 
reform. The former is to a certain degree present in one of the works 
of T. Gruszecki (1986), where among other matters he wrote: "We 
observe the formation of market mechanisms in various, isolated as 
yet segments of the economy. This process cannot be reversed. 
Everybody is looking for such a mechanism in the state owned sector 
of the economy while they appear elsewhere. This process is the ally 
of households" (p. 46). On the other hand, K. Kloc and P. Marciniak 
(1988), submitted a thesis that equally significant changes occurred 
both at the peripheries and in the core of the system. Still another 
opinion was expressed in the analysis of J. Staniszkis (1987) who 
discussed the dilemma of choice between two types of economic 
reform. One is to "institutionalize" the second economy and controlled 
expansion of the private sector. The second was privatization within 
state-owned sectors of the economy. The author was of the opinion 
that to institutionalize these peripheries would mean the reinforcement 
of "system-supporting structures." It would follow that she considered 
that such measures would block the true privatization of state owned 
sectors. A similar opinion we can find in M. Marody's (1987c) paper, 
in which she stated that the individual strategies could not be 
transformed to the systemic changes. There are also further opinions. 
A. Iwanowska (1988) analyzed the role of the private sector in the state 
economy and she opposes Marody's idea. In my opinion two 
dimension of changes were significant here: the proximity to the "core" 
of the system and the type of changes which occur (e.g. privatization or 
"socialization" through self-management). I will deal with this in detail 
in further parts of this section. 
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Between these stances there is still room for many other, intermediate 
opinions. For instance, quite a sensible hypothesis is that although 
"extrasystemic" and spontaneous changes of the "peripheries" could 
not be seen as a real substitute for state reform of the economic system, 
they did stimulate it and coerced transformations in the state-owned 
sector of the economy.2 Using analogies from the field of sociology of 
organization, one could say that such changes in the environment 
coerced adaptation processes in the state-owned sector, and this in turn 
might lead to transformations in the structure of this sector and to the 
general change of its functioning. This hypothesis is noteworthy 
because it draws attention to the mutual relationship of these two types 
of processes, as well as to the influence of "extrasystemic," 
spontaneous changes on the shape of official reforms. I think that such 
influence cannot be excluded a priori: that is why an attempt at 
complete separation and juxtaposition of processes at the "peripheries" 
and those taking place in the "centre" is risky. 
Among various intermediate stances and opinions yet another 
is worth noting. These processes "from below" can be seen not 
as the reform proper or its substitute, but rather as phenomena 
complementary to it. In my opinion this seems to be the most 
reasonable interpretation. In the last period of communism there 
were many interpretations of various alternative manners of behavior, 
styles of life, work, etc. This in connection with the failure of 
systemic reform caused the impression that these alternative changes 
were substitutes for the reform or maybe even were the reform 
itself. The whole of society, however, could not "step outside" 
the system. Besides, there was no reason to relieve the state of 
its responsibility for solving the problem of real systemic changes. 
The "complementary" stance therefore, is in my view much more 
realistic than the "substitutive" one.3 
2
 For this idea I am indebted to prof. Włodzimierz Brus. We can study this process on 
several levels. Anna Iwanowska (1988) showed how on the technological and 
organizational level the private sector modernizes the state-owned enterprise through the 
process of cooperation. We can also see that some "market" ideas were grafted onto the 
official reform program, though firstly they were located "outside" the state economy 
(see next chapter). 
3
 Introducing the complementary and substitutive approach I refer to the distinction 
of Morawski 1986. See also Iwanowska, Federowicz and Żukowski 1986. 
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However, one might submit a thesis that when there were also no real 
economic and political reforms the "substitutive" function of an 
"extrasystemic" mechanism would ultimately imply the change of the 
system itself, while their "complementary" function would rather 
stabilize the system in an unchanged form. 
Generally speaking, I would be of the opinion that relationships 
between systemic reforms and "extrasystemic," spontaneous attempts 
at changes were multilateral. In my view, these processes became allies 
of systemic reforms rather than their substitutes. In certain 
circumstances however, some of them (e.g. "second economy") 
blocked the reform. 
Why was it that in the last years of communism the scale of these 
"extrasystemic" behaviors had so noticeably increased? The first 
argument draws attention to the role of social activity in dealing with 
situations of crisis when no systemie reform existed. But again there is 
need for a second explanation which answers the question of why the 
state tolerated these alternative mechanisms. There are several answers. 
First of all, the significant fact is that "peripheral" transformations 
might - according to the government - for a certain period of time have 
reduced both the need for reforming the system itself and the social 
pressure towards it. Besides, according to the already quoted J. Sta-
niszkis, these processes might have preserved, and stabilized, the core 
of the system. Let us add still another factor: the state hoped that in this 
way responsibility and costs of the reform would be partially reduced. 
There is still another possible explanation. Tolerance of these 
"extrasystemic" changes and adaptation mechanisms might testify of 
the process of further determining the limits of the system. Tolerance of 
any deviation from official rules implied that the state located it outside 
the system. Perhaps, then, the expansion of these "peripheries" meant 
that the state, while minimalizing the sphere of its monopoly, wanted at 
the same time to have better control over what is left (cf. Kloc and 
Marciniak 1988). This hypothesis is not very probable because the 
process of including something within a "system" and of placing 
something else in "extrasystemic" spheres was never brought to an end 
during communism, despite calls for doctrinal purity which appeared 
from time to time. The next section of this chapter deals with the 
relationships between different sources of changes in post-communist 
times. 
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1.2. THE POST-COMMUNIST PERIOD: LIMITS TO THE 
REFORM PARADIGM AND OTHER SOURCES OF CHANGE 
My thesis is that there are three main sources of the institutional 
(mainly economic) changes: previous reforms, spontaneous processes 
of adaptation, and political breakthrough. Each of these sources of the 
change is also the source of the specific limits to it. Let us start with the 
role of the reforms. 
The history of the communist system in Poland is the history of its 
reforms. Except for the period of Stalinism, which was more a period of 
the forming of the new order, each of the political leaderships started 
with the ideology of change and reform, and none of them put this 
ideology into practice. By reform I mean here a change that is prepared 
by the ruling elite, is planned and fits within the logic of the system. 
Why were reforms so attractive for communist elites and why were they 
never implemented? After the first years of imposed industrialization 
(Morawski 1980) communist economic systems reached the limits of 
their effectiveness (Gomułka 1989, p.l). The need for improving 
economic efficiency became one of the most important factors shaping 
political life under communism. This was why each political leadership 
tried to legitimize itself through the ideology of economic reform, but, 
due to the fact that the reform proposals always called for the 
decentralization of decision making, the reforms collapsed. The fear of 
losing political control over the economy was one of the most 
important reasons. In this way the issue of reform revealed its political 
character. Demand for reform was one of the important slogans of the 
political opposition made up of the revisionists within the elite and later 
also integrating dissent movements. Limits to the reforms were an 
important political issue. But starting from the mid-1980's the very 
notion of reform revealed its limits. After many years of using this 
slogan without implementing it, the slogan itself lost its credibility and 
was perceived more as a propaganda tool than an instrument of 
change. There are data that confirm this phenomenon. In sociological 
research carried out in 1988, it was found that society perceived that the 
power elite was the strongest supporter of the reform. At the same 
moment the prestige of the reform supporters was rather low. As 
a result the reform was not supported by any prestigious group 
(Adamski and Rychard 1989), reflecting the delegitimization of the 
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reform slogan. Reform was supported mainly by the power elite and by 
representatives of some intellectual groups, such as scientists and 
journalists. On the other hand, the groups that could support the 
reform because of their interests, such as representatives of the private 
sector were located low on both the scales of support and of prestige. 
The notion of the economic reform during the last period of communist 
rule seemed to be more an issue for politicians and for intellectuals than 
one for other interests groups. Overintellectualization of the reform is, 
in my opinion, a stable feature of the thinking about Polish reforms. 
My thesis is that, although the reform paradigm generally cannot 
explain ongoing changes, it does have some limited usefulness. The 
post-communist changes repeat some important elements of the reform 
pattern, and this is also the source of limits to these changes. This thesis 
will be elaborated later on, after I discuss the role of other sources of 
change. 
The second source of economic changes are spontaneous adaptation 
processes. By spontaneous processes I mean all the adaptive processes 
through which people were trying to adapt to the centralized system. 
This was to some extent a reciprocal process with society trying to 
adapt itself to the system while also modifying it. Opportunities were 
provided by phenomena such as informal structures in the enterprises, 
bargaining processes between enterprises and their supervisors, visits 
abroad to earn money, and the parallel economy. 
If reform was the change, or attempted change, within the framework 
of the system, these phenomena were often outside the system or, to be 
more precise, outside its official sphere. As a result, the system was 
modified to some extent, becoming less centralized and rigid. 
Despite the disputes on the role of these phenomena, the most 
important thing is that some of the elements of these "extrasystemic" 
mechanisms that were formerly located on the periphery of the system 
also influenced its center. Consequently, the changes outside the system 
influenced the system itself. For example, the ideas of privatization and 
competitive markets were at first present only in the informal activities 
outside the official system but later on penetrated the official reform 
programs, not only those of Solidarity but also to some extent the 
communist reform program of 1987 (which I will analyze in the next 
chapter). Finally, after the political breakthrough of 1989 they became 
the pillars of the Solidarity government's economic program. 
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However, society was sure that these extrasystemic mechanisms 
could not be a substitute for the real reform of the core of the system. In 
the study "Poles 88," respondents were asked about the future they 
wanted for their children. The idea of this question was to analyze the 
popularity of the intrasystemic and extrasystemic life strategies. 
Intrasystemic strategies included a job in a state-sector, work devoted 
to the country and other people, and a political career. Among the 
extrasystemic strategies were emigration, a job in a private sector, work 
that could yield easy gains, and a job in the state-sector with the 
possibility of parallel economy activity. Table 1 shows the popularity of 
these different strategies. 
Table 1. 
Parental preferences of intra and extrasystemic life strategies for the child* 
Intrasystemic Extrasystemic 
Find an enjoyable and lucrative 78.7 Go abroad, earn some money 36.5 
job in the state sector and come back 
Do something for the country 76.5 Find a job in the private 14.5 
and the people sector 
Try to make a political career -66.1 Find a job in the state sector -31.7 
with the possibility of the 
parallel economy work 
Source: Rychard 1989, pp. 422-3. 
* Percentages of net support are "yes" answers minus "no" answers. 
The results show that, for the majority of people, the state-owned 
sector of the economy was the most important frame of reference when 
planning the future of their children. Only a political career was 
completely unpopular during the last year of communism. One can 
argue that after the political and economic breakthrough, this picture 
would be different. It is possible, for example, that the support for work 
in the private sector will be greater. But the reason I have presented 
these data is to show that during the fall of communism, where there 
was no real systemic reform, the expectations toward the state-sector 
were quite great. The extrasystemic strategies, though popular, were 
not perceived as real substitutes for intrasystemic reform. They were 
instead considered to be complementary mechanisms. For example, in 
the whole sample the biggest group (42.4 percent) consisted of those 
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respondents who simultaneously advised their children to find a job in 
the state-sector and also in the private sector, as they probably wanted 
to maximize the opportunities for their children. 
These results are especially interesting in view of the previous data 
showing the erosion of the credibility of the notion of reform. Society 
did not believe in the reforms, but simultaneously it expected a lot from 
the state-owned sector and placed its aspirations mainly on it. These two 
contradictory beliefs combined reflect the scope of social frustration. 
Finally the time for radical reform has come. Did these spontaneous 
adaptation mechanisms survive or not? There is some evidence that 
many of these mechanisms of the active adaptation from the period 
when the system was not modified and people adjusted to it still existed 
during the era of the Balcerowicz plan (Kolarska and Rychard 1990). 
Such phenomena as the parallel economy, corruption, and informal 
networks seem to be more universal rather than connected only with 
the communist system. It is possible that their continued existence can 
create obstacles to the program of economic transformation. The third 
and the most important source of economic change is the political 
breakthrough of 1989-90. Although communists in their last years 
tried to introduce some market measures into the economic system, 
their measures were, as usual, inconsistent, due to the ideological and 
social constraints they faced. This was not the case with the new 
Solidarity government. The ideological bias of a planned economy was 
rejected, and the tremendous social support for the new government 
gave it the greatest chance in post-war Poland for real economic 
change. As a matter of fact, the economic change promoted by the new 
government was a part of a general transformation from the 
communist to the post-communist system. From this point of view, the 
change reveals two most important features. It combines the radical 
character of the economic transformation with evolutionary and 
non-violent political change. The "big bang" approach in the economy 
was necessary because of the depth of the Polish crisis. Poland, with 
a 1989 per capita GNP of about 22 percent of that of the United States 
came only before Romania among the European communist countries 
in terms of living standards. Moreover, this per capita GNP was 
estimated to be equal to just 98 percent of the 1980 GNP (Eastern 
Europe..., 1990, p. 4). On the other hand, the Polish communists rather 
smoothly decided to give up power and maybe this was the reason 
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why political changes were rather evolutionary. This evolutionary 
character of change in which some institutional mechanisms of political 
pluralism are still not developed sometimes is regarded to be not only 
chance for transformation, but also its constraint. I will deal with this 
later on. 
To sum up we have to deal with three sources of changes: 
(1) reforms, which were the attempts at change in the system with 
maintaining its identity, were planned, and were made from above, 
(2) spontaneous processes of adaptation, which were the attempts at 
change outside the system, and 
(3) the political breakthrough, i.e., the change of the system.4 
All of them interacted with each other in the primary phase of 
post-communism. Factors (1) and (2) are the legacy of communism, 
but they are in play now also. According to the thesis of my book, 
each of these three sources of change could also be regarded as 
a limit to change. Each economic reform and transformation tou-
ches upon the problem of the system's identity. Communism in 
Poland never had a clear, well defined identity. This provided some 
opportunities for the reforms: it was very hard to define their limits 
since the limits of the system were not precisely defined. But there 
was one concrete limit, the dominance of the communist party in 
political and economic life, and this was the core of the system's 
identity. Any real reform could not succeed in these conditions. To 
overcome this limit meant a change of the system. If someone still 
wants to defend the thesis that communism is or was reformable, 
such would be possible only in the case where we understand the 
reform as the end of a communism. But what type of identity does 
the post-communist period have, if any? 
4
 The distinction between changes within the system and changes to the system is 
present in the literature (Boskoff 1976, p. 345). A. Kamiński (1988) makes a distinction 
between reform (which is implemented within the system's identity) and revolution 
(which changes this identity). The concept of reform as a change that is radical but still 
fits the system's rules is accepted by Polish scholars (Kowalik 1988; Balcerowicz 1985). In 
this three-element typology I use some distinctions presented in the concept of the 
"fourfold system" (Rychard 1987). I would like also to recall A. Kamiński's (1989; 1992, 
p. 256) concept of the three policies of the communist state toward society: coercion, 
corruption, and reform. However, I do not analyze the policies of the state, but rather 
sources of changes (see also chapter 3.1, pp. 82-3). 
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Post-communism is to some extent a period of no system, neither 
communism, nor any new order. By analogy, it also seems to be at first 
glance the period of no identity. The legacies of previous reforms, 
spontaneous informal strategies, and the political breakthrough have 
been mixed together during this time. But within this mixture we can 
see some logic which created the elements of the systemic identity of the 
post-communist period. 
The collapse of the communist system has provoked one more 
discussion regarding the economic reforms. According to some 
opinions, the source of this collapse lies in the very nature of the 
economic reforms. Attempts at their implementation have eroded the 
centralistic legitimacy of the system (Nee 1992). On the other hand, we 
can say that the collapse of this system resulted not from the reforms 
but from the lack of them. The tragedy of the communist institutional 
system consists of the fact that both opinions are true. A. Kamiński put 
it in such a way: "Thus, the Soviet leadership faces a Catch-22 
situation: both the decision to reform and the decision not to reform 
carry dramatic threats" (Kamiński 1992, p. 336). 
However, even if the economic reforms were unsuccessful, they 
contributed to the final erosion of the system, not because of the 
successes of the reforms but as a result of their failures and rising social 
expectations. It paved the way to the fundamental change of the 
system. 
1.3. CHANGES AND LIMITS TO IT: CONCLUSIONS 
Let me start with one of the theses mentioned above: the sources of 
changes are simultaneously the limits to it. In the case of the reforms we 
can say that their "limiting" role consists of some rigidity and 
inflexibility which is embodied in the reforms' programs. The 
extrasystemic, spontaneous, and adaptive processes can also slow 
transformation. The problem is whether their rules and mechanisms 
are in line with market reform or are spoiling them. I am of the opinion 
that sometimes they do not adapt themselves to the market 
environment but adapt market rules to themselves, modifying them. 
Similarly, many informal processes which survived the collapse of 
communism (and contributed to it) changed their form though their 
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nature remained the same. This is the case of corruption which moved 
from consumer markets to the capital market, but its core features 
survived. Finally, the political breakthrough and its features also has 
some constraining influence. This is the case of the main social actors 
who contributed to the collapse of communism. These were the groups 
of skilled industrial workers working in the big state enterprises. In the 
course of the transformation their structural base will be deeply 
modified, some enterprises will be privatized, some of them can even go 
bankrupt. This is threatening workers interests and may cause some 
groups of to tum against the revolution they helped to achieve. 
All these phenomena will be analyzed in my book. The thesis that 
sources of changes are also the sources of limits to them may be 
understood in two ways. First, it means that some processes 
simultaneously play the dynamizing and stabilizing role. For example, 
the informal mechanisms while helping to fulfil peoples' interests and 
making the system work, simultaneously "implicated" social groups in 
it and stabilized the system. Second, some of these mechanisms at first 
played a dynamizing role and then their "limiting" character came into 
being. This happened to some extent in the case of workers who 
contributed to the collapse of the communism but for whom the 
emerging new order can be dangerous. 
According to the general assumption of my book, there is 
a continuity of changes. The legacy of communism seen from this 
perspective is not only the legacy of stability. Communism has also 
created the sources of its dynamics, which contributed to its collapse 
but finally may endanger further transformation. One distinction is 
very important to me. It is a distinction between the collapse of the old 
system and the emergence of the new one. More than three years of 
post-communism has debunked one "transformational" myth: that the 
collapse of the old regime will instantly result in the creation of a new 
system based on the market and democracy. This view now definitely 
belongs to ideology, not to the scientific description of reality. In reality 
it turned out that we are witnessing a long and complicated 
post-communist period during which neither full market nor full 
democracy are in play. On the contrary, one can see many threats to the 
market and democracy. This justifies the distinction mentioned above. 
The logic and the social forces of the collapse are different than the 
logic and the actors of the creation of a new system. 
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The next myth which was debunked was that post-communism is the 
period of a chaotic mixture of the "old" and "new" elements and that it 
has no internal logic and identity. It is now clear that this mixture is not 
so chaotic and that it has its own dynamics, logie, and identity. This is 
also one of the assumptions which underlies my analysis. 
The study of the role of the three sources of changes and their 
constraints will start with the analysis of the role of reforms. In the next 
chapter I will try to identify the main limits to the communist-led 
reforms and then I will analyze the post-communist reformatory limits. 
C H A P T E R 2 
REFORMS AND THEIR LIMITS 
2.1. LIMITS TO THE ECONOMIC REFORMS 
AT THE CLOSE OF COMMUNISM1 
2.1.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding chapter I advanced the thesis that the system of real 
socialism to a larger degree seemed to be undergoing changes which 
were unintentional, unplanned, and which were the unexpected results 
of planned actions, while the planned changes, with their own ideology 
(e.g. reforms), were usually unsuccessful. They were unsuccessful 
because the system somehow gained an ability to neutralize the 
reforms. The reforms themselves, on the other hand, became an 
element of history so natural, that one could even say that they were an 
instrument of exercising power, and not a method of changing it. On 
the whole this leads to a quite paradoxical thesis that the systems of real 
socialism were undergoing changes rather than reforms. And they were 
undergoing spontaneous rather than planned changes. 
In this chapter I would like to focus on the role of two fundamental, 
as I believe, types of limits to economic reforms: structural limits and 
limits of consciousness. Against the background of this distinction 
I would also like to defend a thesis about a certain evolution of limits to 
reforms. In some way (which is necessarily incomplete) I will try to 
illustrate this thesis empirically. In the following chapter I will present 
an analysis of limits to economic changes in the post-communist 
period. 
1
 1 am indebted to dr. S. Gomułka and dr. G. Skąpska for their comments on this 
chapter. This text was initially published in Społeczeństwo polskie u progu przemian 
(edited by J. Mucha, G. Skąpska, J. Szmatka and I. Uhl), Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1991. It 
is published in this volume with minor changes. This chapter was initially prepared as 
a part of project "Limits to Economic Reforms," directed by S. Gomułka. 
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2.1.2. THE LIMITS OF REFORMS AND THEIR PLACE IN THE SYSTEM 
OF REAL SOCIALISM 
By 
economic reforms I mean the changes which consist in making 
enterprises independent, in basing the rules of their functioning on 
market mechanisms, and in a fundamental limiting of political and 
administrative domination over the whole economic system. 
As it is known, several reforms of this type were attempted in post-war 
Poland. Although they varied in scope and in their degree of radicalism, 
they had one common feature: they were unsuccessful. There are several 
reasons for their failures. Such analysis would exceed the framework of 
this chapter (on this matter see, for example, Kozek 1986). Defining its 
parameters, however, I should list right at the beginning the types of 
sources of the failures (and indirectly - the types of constraints) of 
reforms which will be left outside the scope of this analysis. 
I will not be dealing with problems linked to questions of ownership 
in economy. I mention this because, according to various views, it was 
the ownership structure - in the shape which existed for more than 
forty years - which constituted the major constraints and the source of 
the failures of economic reforms. However, discussing this subject 
would actually require a different type of analysis. Therefore I will 
leave it outside my discussion, realizing that this will restrict my ability 
to inquire into the sources of limits to reforms. 
Since the point of departure in my analyses is the assumption that 
reforms were an element of the system's identity, the problem of limits 
to reforms becomes simultaneously a problem of identity, of limits to 
the essence of that system. The thesis on the difficulty in defining the 
essence, the identity of the system of real socialism in Poland, will play 
an important role in this chapter. That thesis will be my point of 
departure in defining the limits to reforms. 
I am of the opinion that these limits (in the sense of restricting 
boundaries) cannot be defined through scientific analysis.2 Since the 
essence of real socialism was not completely defined, the limits to 
reforms could not be defined either, for we cannot equivocally state, for 
example, that from a certain moment the reform disturbed the identity 
of the system. This is only one part of the truth. If we were to take the 
2
 In this part of analyses I will rely on the concepts included in my paper 1987c. 
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above theses literally, then the fate of unsuccessful economic reforms 
could be explained solely by the lack of consequent reformative will on 
the part of the authorities, or by the social resistance to the reforms. 
These factors undoubtedly played an important role, but, as I believe, 
not the fundamental one. Although it is difficult to speak about 
theoretically defined limits to reforms, the practical constraints to those 
reforms are easily perceptible. I am advancing a thesis, then, on the 
difficulty in demarcating the "theoretical" limits to reforms and on the 
important role of practical constraints. In other words, I mean that the 
system's doctrine and ideology set less clear limits to reforms than did 
the practice of real socialism. By practice I understand above all the 
way of exercising power and leading the economic system. These 
constituted the most serious barriers to reforms in the communist 
period. 
Various frequently analyzed incoherences together formed the 
incoherent identity of the system, in which there were present elements 
of different kinds of logic (Besancon 1981; Kamiński 1983; Rychard 
1983). As I have written elsewhere (Rychard 1983), such a situation 
could be favorable to reforms, since in a situation lacking a single 
coherent identity of the system, this identity cannot be changed by 
reforms.3 
It is true that one "side" of those incoherent principles of identity 
will always be changed, but never all of them as a unit. In this way one 
could say that the susceptibility to the continuous undertaking of 
unsuccessful reforms was an effect of "unfinishing" real socialism. For 
the reforms did not change the rules of the system but rather still 
co-produced them. 
Such a situation of reforms leads to certain dangers. The following 
question arises: if the reforms were in some sense a "normal" way of the 
system's functioning, can they be at the same time a useful instrument 
of change, of throwing the system out of balance? Wiesława Kozek, in 
her analysis of the causes of the failure of Polish economic reforms, 
formulates the thesis that: "The reproduction of reform is an evidence 
of adaptive processes of the state and the society and a method of their 
3
 A. Kamiński wrote about the role of incoherent principles of identity for the chances 
of reformability; he believed that leaving "several institutional elements of a libera] 
project" in the state structure gave chances to reforms, although this chance was smali 
(1988, p. 41). 
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mobilization" (Kozek 1986, p. 59). This thesis reflects well the essence 
of the situation. If this is the case, then the major limitation to reforms 
consisted in an easier absorption of the reform by the system, in its 
"taming" and neutralization. 
21.3. THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO THE SOURCES 
OF REFORMATORY LIMITS 
The widespread in Poland (though not only there) approach to limits to 
reforms and to the analysis of their conditions often ends in the following 
dilemma: whether the authorities or society were the foremost factor in 
either the restriction or the success of economic reforms (see, e.g. Kozek 
1986). Not negating the importance of this dilemma, I would like to 
suggest a different approach, introducing a different typology of limits. 
It seems to me that, above all, two types of limits should be 
distinguished: structural limits and limits of consciousness. By 
structural limits I understand the constraints imposed on reforms by the 
mstitutional structure (starting with the structure of the political 
system, through to the structure of the industry managing system, and 
to the organizational structure of enterprises) and the social structure 
(understood in a dynamic way - as a structure of social behavior rather 
than structure of separate groups and classes). By limits of 
consciousness I understand the constraints imposed by the dominating 
types of thinking, stereotypes, and economic visions of the people in 
power as well as the representatives of various social groups. I will 
attempt to justify this approach below. 
Treating structural limits as one common group, I am following an 
assumption that the functioning of the political system in the post-war 
period introduced important changes to principles regulating not only 
the functioning of institutions (e.g. bureaucratization of management), 
but also of the social structure. There have appeared new types of 
advancement and of impeding social mobility, new sources of 
inequality, and new areas of diminishing the differences. These 
phenomena in the social structure are conditioned in a systemic way, 
therefore it is worthwhile to analyze them together. Moreover, despite 
the obvious possibility of separating the socialist political system and 
defining the boundary between "the authorities and society" (this 
boundary is particularly visible in the periods of revolt and rebellion), 
there are periods and "areas" in the system, where this boundary 
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becomes more fluid and blurred. Just as at the ideological level some of 
the socialist slogans were socially accepted, also at the pragmatical level 
many official solutions became socially rooted, often through various 
informal mechanisms. In effect, the rules which governed the processes 
taking place in the social structure cannot be analyzed without considering 
their institutional conditions, which often constituted the basis and the 
source of various social interests.4 The importance of structural limits 
therefore does not diminish the importance of clearly political limits. On 
the contrary -political preconditions had created the situation in which 
many official solutions were "woven" into the social fabric. 
One could point to still different reasons for the proposed 
distinction. It is the thesis on the evolution of limits to reforms in 
post-war Poland, understood as a constant discovering of new barriers. 
Because all of the barriers always existed, the evolution refers to social 
consciousness rather than reality. We can distinguish, then, a period 
when the barriers to reforms were seen in the personal traits of the 
people in power or in the cómposition of the government (1956-58). Later 
came a period, when the role of structural constraints, understood 
twofold, was discovered (once as a political structure - this phase of 
discussion started clearly in 1980-81). Also the role of social structure 
was noticed, especially the political and economic interests dominating 
within it. It has been shown that although there are correlations 
between them (e.g. Kolarska and Rychard 1982), the lines dividing 
according to political views and the lines dividing according to 
economic interests do not overlap (which was shown by Kolarska 1982; 
1986). Finally, at the end of 1980's, ideological-civilizational5 
constraints, related to different "civilizational orientations," became 
visible. They consisted in, roughly speaking, the dispute as to whether 
Poland should pursue the escaping modernization - and if so, how - or 
give up the race, change its aspirations and choose the "rustic-
-axiological" variant. Also within the modernizational-reformatory 
4
 Here I rely on the concepts introduced by Narojek (1986) and Staniszkis (1984), and 
on my earlier analyses (1987). 
5
 Here I refer to the distinction between the ideological, political, social, and 
intellectual limits, introduced by Gomułka (1987). The interesting typology of the limits 
to the reforms was also presented by Morawski (1988) who distinguished psychological 
determinants, economic policies, institutional mechanisms and finally fundamenta] 
systemic characteristics as determinants for the chances of the economic reforms. 
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variant there were differences going beyond political and economic 
conditions. In the disputes about "privatization" or "socialization" 
there appeared ideological orientations, which point to the role of 
axiological choices. I will elaborate on that later. This evolution of 
limits has three characteristic features: 
(1) each subsequent limit was not reducible to the preceding one. For 
example, limits in the sphere of political structures cannot be 
explained by personal traits, lack of political will or the 
composition of the cabinet in power, and the "ideological-
-civilizational" limits are not reducible to different political and 
economic interests, therefore they differ from political and 
economic views; 
(2) all of them always existed, and discovering new ones did not mean 
transgressing the old ones; 
(3) in effect of the evolution and mutual overlapping of limits and their 
irreducibility, unexpected alliances could form. For example, one 
could find advocates of the "rustic-axiological" orientation among 
the representatives of the authorities as well as among the 
representatives of the opposition or independent circles. One could 
say that the discovery of every new limit - from the political will, 
through personal and institutional-structural limits, to the dispute 
between the "civilizational" orientations - was at the same time 
a discovery of increasingly wider barriers facing reform. Reform 
was not only an internal matter of the power apparatus anymore 
(personal limits). Neither was it only a subject of the 
government-society dispute (structural limits). It became also 
a subject of the dispute between orientations dividing 
political-economic alliances. 
This process was already visible at the end of the communist period. 
The dispute over the variant of development, crossing the then-existing 
political divisions, was something new in the communist period. 
Although it was obscured by the basic political division between the 
authorities and the rest of society, nevertheless it was already visible. 
I am pointing this out because the dispute between separate 
civilizational orientations became fully visible after the collapse of 
communism. It is reflected in the differences between the pro-market 
and pro-West option and the rather national, less "market" option. As 
it is known, these disputes divide the post-Solidarity alliance. The result 
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of that is, to some degree, a dispersion of the existing political scene. 
This is not a subject of analysis in this book. I would like to stress, 
however, the fact that the first indications of deeper divisions between 
ideological-civilizational orientations were already visible at the close 
of communism. 
The fact that the limits to reform cannot be seen only in the above 
constraints, was caused, in my opinion, by the more clearly 
apprehended costs of the reform. The political discussion about the 
reform created a kind of illusion that a willingness to change 
a conservative structure is enough to carry out the reform. This created 
a myth of a homogeneous society being in favor of the reform. In 
a situation when the problem of the inevitable costs of modernization 
arose, the homogeneity of society became less clear. The dispute was 
also reflected in the governmental structure. 
Was the evolution of limits to reforms an indication of some 
cumulation of experiences? Were we, in other words - to refer to the 
concept introduced by T. Gruszecki (1987), who believed that 
reformatory thinking changes in our country in "leaps" - at that time 
in a new "leap"? Did this bring us closer to a possibility of true 
realization of reform? My answer would be no. Adding new barriers did 
not remove the old ones. In fact, all of those barriers existed in parallel, 
and the passing time and experiences did not create new barriers, but 
rather revealed the existence of emerging ones. It was a process of social 
learning - by the government and by society. Initially it was assumed 
that the reform is only a question of the politicians' will, subsequently 
the role of structural constraints was noticed, and finally the 
significance of civilizational orientations, irreducible to politics and 
economics, was discovered. 
Having justified the distinction between structural limits and limits 
of consciousness by the thesis on the evolution of limits, I will now turn 
to a discussion concerning the institutional constraints. 
2.1.4. INSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO REFORMS 
I will start by discussing these limits at the macro level. The problem 
concerns the role of the political system in the process of promoting 
and implementing economic reforms. Its significance for the success or 
failure of reforms was widely known. I have already mentioned the 
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frequently arising conflict between the struggle to retain power and the 
struggle for effectiveness, which has been analyzed elsewhere. Both 
airns, co-existing in the political system, contributed to the meanders of 
the fate of Polish economic reforms.6 Here, however, I would like to 
discuss the role of the structures of the political system. By the political 
system I mean a set of institutions and rules designed to retain power 
and to make central decisions. The limits of this chapter do not allow 
for a detailed analysis of the system's construction and functioning. 
However, I would like briefly to point out those characteristics of the 
construction and functioning of the political system which I perceive as 
the most important for defining reformatory limits. 
First of all, we should discuss two problems: the degree of the 
system's uniformity and the role of the communist party within that 
system. Positions concerning the first problem oscillate from 
approaches stressing homogeneity to those which expose its internal 
diversity. Other dimensions related to this problem are the dimension 
of formality-informality of the system and the dimension of the degree 
of its influence on the real economic processes. It is worthwhile to note 
the concepts according to which the communist political system was 
not fully uniform, to a large degree was based on informalities, and had 
a minor influence on the economy. In effect - some say - since there is 
no single center of power, the reforms cannot be made "from above". 
Since the informal processes play a significant role, reforms cannot be 
introduced by acting upon formal structures (this was one of the 
positions discussed by W. Kozek in her analysis, 1986). Although in my 
earlier analyses I myself pointed out the role of "social entanglement" 
and the entrenchment of the basic systemic choices, I do not agree with 
these theses. These processes did not result in a loss of an essential part 
of power over the economy by the political system, which consisted in 
the control of personal politics (the mechanism of party nomenklatura) 
and a control through the ability to impede various initiatives. It is true 
that under real socialism the role of hidden lobbies functioning within 
6
 At the end of 1980's we had first indications of transgressing this limit. 
Ineffectiveness of the system already endangered the reproduction of the power elite. 
Thus, possibly reaching the limit to reproduction of political system was, at the same time, 
the first indication of transgressing the major political limit, namely the reluctance to 
decrease the range of control. The government became interested in the reform to an 
increasingly higher degree because of its interest in the reproduction of the system. 
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the industrial system and exerting pressure on the politicians was 
increasing. It is also true that there have formed informal rules of 
action. But we should not forget that the mechanisms generating this 
informal adaptive behavior were the government and the formal 
structure. If their rules would be changed, new types of adaptive 
behavior could form. 
Informality and partial formalization should not be taken, then, for 
indications of a loss of power. A good example is the activity of the 
Polish Workers' Party in the economy. The Party, though not fully 
formalized, played an important role. Moreover, I believe that, in 
accordance with earlier discussion, this partial formalization could 
become a chance for, and not only a barrier to, the reform. Thus, 
I would say that the Party retained a significant amount of power 
within the state and the economy, but simultaneously - because of its 
partial formalization - the scope of its power seemed to be susceptible 
to changes. This interpretation of "partial formalization" of the Party's 
role in some sense had its confirmation in the communist regime's 
decision to negotiate with the opposition in 1989, which resulted in the 
change of the political order and in the initiation of systemic 
transformation. This partial formalization, however, resulted also in 
arbitrary decisions and interference in the economic life, impeding and 
warping the reforms. The point is that at the end of 1980's it seemed 
impossible to obtain an approval for the fundamental political and 
social forces for a clear definition of the role of the Party in the 
economy. In this situation its real role depended on the structure of 
power and interests in the country and outside its borders. The fact that 
the role of the party in its doctrine was not fully formalized later helped 
this structure move in the "pro-reformatory" direction. It provided the 
so-called "reformationists" with a possibility to act, although their 
actions were highly limited by the existing political system of power. 
The fundamental problem concerning institutional constraints 
consisted of the relations between the political and the economic 
system, in particular - the relationships between the shape of the 
political system (how democratic it was) and the level of economic 
effectiveness. Let us briefly discuss those relations with respect to the 
models for "managerial" and self-governmental reforms. Neither of 
the two models establishes decisive principles concerning the shape of 
the political system. Both can be implemented in either an autocratic or 
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democratic system. Polish realities were such that reforms of both 
managerial and self-governmental type were introduced within the 
unchanged political system. In the case of the managerial variant, it 
caused a quick failure of the reforms, because the political system 
retained full control over management. Under the self-governmental 
variant it was to some degree a sign of substitution of political 
democracy by economic democracy (Morawski 1986). On the whole, 
this could produce a counter-effect in the economic effectiveness.7 I rely 
here on the thesis by W. Morawski (1986a) on the double-sided 
politization of an enterprise: from above and from below (by 
self-governments). Thus, both variants hampered effectiveness: under 
the managerial model the reform was easily neutralized (see Osiatyński, 
Pańków, Fedorowicz 1985), and under the self-governmental model 
mechanisms of "negotiational rationality" would be introduced in the 
economy excessively, which in turn had to clash with the remaining 
mechanisms of "politization from above". Their conflict, in turn, is 
unfavorable to economic rationality. 
The source of flaws of both alternatives was the lack of democracy in 
the political sphere. This is related to the dispute discussed earlier, 
which can be reduced to the following question: whether in difficult 
economic conditions, when introduction of reform means certain social 
costs, it is easier to implement these kinds of decisions in a system 
of democratized political power or in an autocratic system? The 
advocates of the first option say that it gives a possibility of mobilizing 
social support or at least provides the society with "something in return" 
for the costs they have to bear - it provides political democratization. Its 
opponents, on the other hand, claim that simultaneous democratization 
and unpopular decision can result in chaos and can increase resistance 
against those decisions. In my opinion, this judgement is based on the 
illusion that in a difficult economic situation an autocratic government 
is able to provide stability. In the meantime, sociological analyses 
indicate that under difficult economic conditions, systems without 
political legitimization have greater tendencies to destabilization than 
do politically legitimized systems (cf. Lipset 1963). In short: under such 
conditions democracy seems to be a more stabilizing factor than 
7
 This is a classical controversy in social sciences. One of the most significant is the 
discussion by W. Brus and S. Gomułka (see Bruss 1975; 1980; Gomułka 1977). 
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autocracy, which provides delusive guarantees. Polish society divided 
its sentiments more or less equally between a judgement that 
democracy is propitious to effectiveness, and a judgement that the two 
matters are independent of one another. The belief that democracy 
bears little economic cost had a very low popularity. A very low 
popularity gained the belief that democracy is some kind of an 
economic costs (Kolarska and Rychard 1982). Although the research 
showed, in fact, that trust in government - and not in a democratic way 
of electing it - played a crucial role in government's appraisal, in over 
40 years of communism in Poland this trust could not be built through 
the system of autocratic political power. 
We can see, then, that depending on the option chosen, totally 
opposing models - democratic or autocratic - could be treated as limits to 
reforms. Curiously enough, these two variants could be possible both 
among the advocates of orientation toward modernization (i.e. 
reformatory) and among those of conservative orientation, both of 
which did, in fact, appear. 
One should not forget that in the Polish situation the success of 
reforms depended in a specific way on democratization. Because of the 
delegalization of Solidarity under martial law, the reform was being 
implemented in a period of a suppressed - but not resolved - political 
conflict. Social support or at least acceptance were crucial to its success. 
In mobilizing support the government encountered barriers which it 
could not overcome. That is why the subsequent attempts at 
communist-led reforms failed. 
2.1.5. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE LIMITS TO REFORMS 
The unclear support for reforms, ascertained in many studies and 
consisting in a clearer acceptance of general slogans rather than specific 
mechanisms, can be a point of departure in this part of analyses. This 
consisted also in a more frequent support for reformatory slogans 
among groups with a critical attitude toward the government, which in 
turn, as stated elsewhere (Adamski, Jasiewicz and Rychard 1986), 
created structural problems with mobilization of a pro-reformatory 
lobby. In addition, during the last communist period there appeared 
the "civilizational" division mentioned above, not completely reducible 
to economic nor to political divisions. All those factors complicated the 
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generał picture of economic orientations in the social structure. Going 
from "the top," among the representatives of the government we had 
groups against the reform (for doctrinal or pragmatic reasons), next 
there were pragmatists supporting the reform, more and more clearly 
visible groups of people trying to act economically "outside the 
system" (emigration, sector of Polonia, second economy), smali groups 
trying to support the reform within the system (mainly self-government 
activists), and finally - large groups of people increasingly endangered 
by the prospect of costs of the reform (with ideological support in some 
independent circles). Using sociological studies limited to public 
opinion analysis alone, it was impossible to estimate the number of 
People within each group. 
One can advance the thesis that the movement of limits to reforms did 
not indicate increased pro-reformatory consciousness but rather a clearer 
polarization of that consciousness. Referring to the thesis by L. Kolarska 
(1986) on the increased role of "anti-egalitarian" orientation in 1980-84, 
I would say that during the last communist period the "pro-egalitarian" 
orientation was growing in strength as well. One could infer that the 
proportions were more or less equal, and the changes consisted in 
a greater crystallization of views within each of those orientations. 
What were the sources of those various economic orientations? It is 
sometimes said that Polish society is excessively attached to its moral 
values, and that it lost the way of thinking in categories of interests. The 
opponents to this position argue that the role of economic interests is 
increasing, and that interests often lie at the basis of this type of 
behavior, which we would be inclined to define as motivated by values 
(Kolarska 1987). However, I believe that in the final years of 
commmunism in Poland, one could not presume that the sources of 
economic behavior (pro- or anti-reformatory) were in economic interests. 
As the researchers referring to the school of "property rights" (e.g. 
Staniszkis) indicate, in Poland there was a lack of structural conditions 
for creating economic interests (by which we understand actions 
concerning the sphere of production, not the sphere of distribution). 
This, however, does not demonstrate - in my opinion - that basing 
economic behavior on values rather than interests will always result in 
"anti-reformatory," "anti-effective" actions. I believe that a substantial 
part of pro-development and pro-effective economic behavior had at its 
basis values rather than economic interests. Perhaps, then, it was also 
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the case that what appeared to be caused by interests, was in reality 
concealing values. 
Such interpretation seems convincing when we look at observations 
made by sociologists about the role of axiological motives in moving 
toward the private sector (e.g. Koralewicz 1985), pointing to the 
importance of autonomy and independence. Some observations cannot 
be explained by referring to interests only.8 
The expression "civilizational orientations," used to name two 
options, pro- and anti-reformatory, becomes clearer after the above 
discussion. The differences between the two orientations are not only 
differences of economic interests, but rather the differences of 
worldview orientations, often based on axiological, not economic, 
choices. Thus I believe that at the end of the 1980's, the economic 
orientations of Polish society not only were irreducible to political 
dmsions, but they also could not be perceived within a framework of 
different economic interests. 
As mentioned earlier, sociological research is used primarily to 
document theses about the degree of support or rejection of particular 
reformatory options. It seems to me, however, that it would be more 
interesting to use the research from the fields of the sociology of 
organization or the sociology of social structure rather than using 
public opinion analyses. Thus I believe that for the comprehension of 
limits to reforms there were many interesting conclusions coming from 
studies of management or the studies of social mobility. On their basis 
one could advance the thesis that the processes of social mobility in 
post-war Poland were one of the more crucial pro-reformatory factors. 
The industrial and educational advancement of a large segment of 
population undoubtedly was a fundamental issue here. In 1945-56 
reforms were impossible not only because of stalinism. There was a lack 
of industrial labor force, weakened by the war and the post-war 
repressions. After 1956 there were, however, skilled workers educated 
in post-war Poland. In addition, the aspirations of the more 
"industrialized" workers became visible. 
The analyses of processes of mobility, however, point also to serious 
obstacles hampering the reforms. I have in mind mainly the disruption 
See studies on self-government (Rychard 1987). 
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of the relationship between labor input and qualifications on one side, 
and the possibility of attaining a "good" social position on the other. 
These constraints worked in two directions. First, they often made an 
advancement in the formal structure hindered or unattractive for some 
groups (e.g. people who were not members of the party). Second, they 
introduced a mechanism of selection based on criteria of political 
loyalty rather than on substantial criteria for other groups (mainly 
managing groups, through the mechanism of nomenklatura) (see e.g. 
Wesołowski and Mach 1986). 
On the basis of these and other analyses one could advance the thesis 
that the processes of mobility had a pro-reformatory character 
regarding the working class to a certain period, although at the end of 
communism, mobility "outside the system" was becoming increasingly 
visible (Wesołowski and Mach 1986). With regard to the management, 
constraints (the mechanism of nomenklatura) turned out to be more 
important. However, despite the functioning of this mechanism, which 
was indicated by other studies (Kostecki 1979; Drążkiewicz and 
Rychard 1981), the management in industrial organizations was 
strongly professionally oriented and educated, despite the functioning 
the nomenklatura. 
On the whole then, despite certain constraints, one could see in the 
social structure a chance rather than a barrier to reform. However - as 
will be indicated by analyses in the chapters concerning reforms and 
changes in the post-communist period - these chances had their limits. 
The cost of radical economic transformations was particularly high in 
the case of some groups of workers who made a major contribution 
toward the subversion of communism, but now have to pay the high 
costs of economic transformation. 
As mentioned before, economic actions could take place either 
within the framework of the state economy system, or in various 
"extrasystemic" spheres. The latter - of the second economy and 
private sector type - were (and still are) decisive for the fate of reforms. 
M. Marody (1987) argued that actions in the sphere of private "smali" 
initiative were an indication of a split between the private and the 
public spheres, and that they were not translatable into institutional 
activity. My opinion is slightly different. These actions (to a large 
degree informal, if we stick to the example of the second economy) were 
not an indication of the separation of the private and public spheres, 
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but rather a mechanism obliterating those differences and adjusting 
both spheres to one another. It remained an open question whether 
they stabilized the most flagrant irrationalities. In other words - do 
they constitute a peculiar substitute of the inefficient system or the 
seeds of change? 
At the end of 1980's it seemed that the stabilizing functions of those 
mechanisms prevailed, although the system stabilized by them was 
already somewhat different, a bit more adjusted to people's aspirations. 
However, the institutionalization of those mechanisms could not 
constitute a path leading to reform, nor could the enlargement of the 
size of various "extrasystemic" enclaves, like the private sector or the 
Polonia sector, etc. do so. Without a fundamental change in the state 
sector of the economy, the essence of the system remained the same. 
The mechanisms described here indicate that the social structure 
always creates spontaneous regulators of behavior and ways of 
adapting to a difficult situation. The reform could consist neither in 
their simple liquidation, nor in an equally non-reflective copying in the 
official structure, but in making the use of initiative and creativity. It 
was simply unrealistic within the institutional structure of that time. 
And it still remains an open problem as to what degree it is possible in 
the post-communist institutional structure. I will deal with this problem 
in the next chapter. 
2.1.6. THE DILEMMAS OF THE REFORMATORY IDEAS: BARRIERS 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND IDEOLOGTCAL-CIVILIZATIONAL BARRIERS 
These barriers are linked to the specified "ideological-civilizational" 
orientations. Therefore, my analyses will make it possible to illustrate 
empirically the thesis about the evolution of limits. Let it be reminded 
that, according to this thesis, at the end of the 1980's, those limits which 
were irreducible to the constraints resulting from political and 
economic interests, were becoming more and more important. There are 
many different results of empirical studies, which point to the role of 
extra-political and extra-economic limits to reforms, i.e. "civili-
zational" constraints. I have in mind here the idea of J. Staniszkis 
(1986) based on empirical studies, about the "deeper" structures of 
thinking about economics. According to this idea, the acceptance of the 
option of "economizing" economics was not related to political 
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affiliations. Similar results were obtained in another study, "Poles '84," 
where it was shown that there existed two ways of "rejecting" the 
existing system: in the narrowly political dimension and in the 
political-economic dimension, irreducible to thinking in the categories 
of power only (Kolarska and Rychard 1986). This thesis can also be 
explained by the role of value systems in thinking about the economy. 
Finally, the increasingly understood importance of this type of limits 
was tied to the general discussion on the subject of whether Poland 
should pursue of the run-away train of civilization or go in a totally 
different direction and on foot. Different positions in this dispute also 
overcame barriers in the strictly political and economic disputes. 
The discussion below is based on a comparison of four programs of 
the restructuring of the economy: governmental; that of the official 
trade unions; Solidarity's; and one reflected in the recommendations of 
the western financial institutions. A common feature of these programs 
is that they were published at approximately the same time, in 1987. 
The question arises as to whether the analysis of the reform programs 
of that time has a solely historical value. I believe that it does not. It 
enables us to notice some phenomena, which after the downfall of 
communism became more visible. I have in mind, for example, the 
evolution of the approach to the ąuestion of self-governments, present 
both in the program of reforms prepared by the communist 
government and in the one prepared by the then still illegal Solidarity. 
I think that at the end of the communist period new dividing lines were 
becoming visible; their importance has increased considerably in the 
post-communist period. 
Analyzing each of the four options, we have a chance to identify 
political limits: every one of those programs represents a group with 
different interests. At the same time, if we look at all of them 
together, we can discern what was common to all, or what was jointly 
concealed. These elements could already be caused by extra-political 
conditions. Such analyses - the results of which I am presenting here 
- also enable us to see how the structural limits were as well as the 
limits of consciousness perceived by the authors of particular reform 
programs. 
A comparison of various programs and ideologies, including 
proposals of reforms, can be done in at least two ways. First, they can 
be of interest as suggestions of certain practical actions seen as 
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desirable. Secondly, they can be of interest as an articulation of a vision 
of the social world, politics and economics, without regard to the 
intention of their authors. In this case, we are interested in the 
programs as indicators of a certain social philosophy and ideology. We 
can inquire about some hidden principles included in them or about the 
interests represented by them. This second type of analyses is of greater 
interest to me, which does not mean that I will set aside the practical 
realm of particular programs. 
Discussing each of the programs I will pay attention to three main 
groups of problems: (1) the vision of the economy; (2) the vision of the 
relationship politics/economy; and (3) the vision of the social forces 
which could be the addressee of a given program, of promoting and 
hampering forces. In each of these points I will try to find the limits to 
reforms visible in a given program. After presenting short 
characteristics of each of the programs I will give general conclusions 
concerning all of them. 
THE GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAM9 
This program underwent an evolution of a sort. In 1981 some matters, 
in particular in the sphere of the relationship politics/economy, were 
accentuated differently than this was done in "The Theses of the 
Second Stage of Reforms". Let us begin, however, with the basic vision 
of the economy. The main driving force of its development was 
supposed to be initia the, the leading slogan in the theses. As it has been 
indicated (Kolarska-Bobińska 1987), the slogan was limited to the 
economic sphere, actually ignoring the socio-political conditions for 
initiative (see also Kamiński 1988). In the economic vision of the 
governmental program, what was striking was the accentuation of the 
problematic of economic equilibrium as one of the main goals, e.g. 
theses 2 and 6: "The common element of all diagnosis is the assumption 
that there Will be no success of reform without equilibrium, just as there 
will be no equilibrium without the reform" - wrote the authors. The 
costs of attaining this equilibrium were strongly accentuated; in April 
these costs were being hidden behind a quite enigmatic phrase about 
' In the analysis of this program I rely on two basic documents: "Kierunki reformy 
gospodarczej," 1981 and "Tezy w sprawie drugiego etapu reformy gospodarczej" 
(propozycje do dyskusji), Rzeczpospolita, April 1987. 
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the need for undertaking a "price-income operation" (thesis 3), but in 
the autumn of 1987 they were discussed in a more straightforward 
manner. 
The assumptions and proposals concerning the relations between 
Politics and the economy (both at the macro and the enterprise level) 
mcluded in the governmental program, were very interesting as far as 
the limits to reforms are concerned. The program proposed (in one of 
its variants) the substantial enlargement of the possibility of the 
economic self-organizing" of society, consisting in giving up the 
domination of the state administration in the creation of enterprises 
(thesis 120). 
Surprisingly, these deep possibilities of changes were actually 
Proposed without referring to the role of the communist party in the 
economy. On this issue the position of the government underwent 
evolution in 1981-87. The "Directions of the Economic Reform" 
(1981) addressed the issue of changing the role of the party in the 
economy (in principle it was supposed to act only through its members, 
not as an institution), but in the April 1987 theses nothing was said on 
that matter, except for some generalities. The reading also gave the 
impression that the party did not exist in the country and in the 
economy. This could mean two options: a quiet desire to continue the 
status quo or a revolutionary assumption that the communist party 
does not have a significant role to play in economics (in the 
institutional sense).10 The above-mentioned proposals of serious 
changes in the way of creating enterprises made the first option 
unlikely. It probably was not a desire for quite continuation, but at the 
same time there was no visible possibility of a revolutionary change - it 
would rather be something of a "quiet change" type. 
A hypothesis comes to mind that the governmental proposals could 
mean the opening of the path to the transformation of relations 
between politics and the economy, including the diminishing of the 
Party's role, but for ideological reasons this was not openly declared. 
The incomplete formalization of the party's role, resulting from 
the incoherence in the identity of the system supported the 
10
 I would like to stress that I mean exactly the institutional role of the Workers' Party 
in the structure of the system, and not its ideological role which the Theses accepted by 
referring to the decrees of the 10th Congress of the Party. 
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pro-reformatory orientation on this issue. This incomplete 
formalization, as I mentioned before, was sometimes viewed only in 
a critical manner. Meanwhile, since the role of the party in the economy 
was not guaranteed in a formal way, no formal rules had to be broken 
in order to change it, because they did not exist. It would suffice to add 
new mechanisms, decreasing this role in practice. However, as it is 
known, none of the communist attempts to reform the economy made 
use of this apparent option. Despite the lack of formal barriers, the real 
shape of the power system disallowed true reforms. The positive result 
of the incomplete formalization consisted in the fact that it could create 
favorable conditions for the initiation of negotiations with the political 
opposition - which started two years later. 
The vision of society included in the governmental program was not 
clearly outlined. Although in effect it was supposed to gain (which was 
vaguely defined), first it had to bear the costs of reforms. The program 
also took into consideration a probability of conflicts caused by the 
economic reform, resulting from a clash between the economic 
rationality and the interests of particular socio-professional groups 
(thesis 2). It discussed only generally the issue of unemployment, calling 
it a problem of people "temporarily without jobs" (thesis 102). On the 
whole, the program did not include a precisely defined social addressee, 
whose support would be sought by the authors. It did not say to whom 
in particular would the proposed changes be attractive, and which 
group would mainly bear the costs. It is difficult to infer, in which parts 
of the social structure the authors expected major resistance or social 
support. 
THE SOLIDARITY PROGRAM11 
This was a comprehensive economic program. It stressed different 
issues, but also in this program we can see an evolution of 
orientations. 
This document was sharper in tone, and accentuated serious 
civilizational danger for Poland. Its approach to the economic order 
and forces driving the economy was somewhat different, but there were 
also some similar points. The basic postulate was the release of natural 
11
 This analysis is based on the document "Stanowisko NSZZ Solidarność w sprawie 
przebudowy gospodarki polskiej," Warszawa 1987. 
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forces of economic activity and initiative. While the governmental 
Program stressed the importance of balance, the program of Solidarity 
emphasized social dynamism in the economic sphere. Multiple sectors 
of the economy and the role of the private sector and market 
mechanisms were stressed in particular. It was exactly on this issue 
where we see an evolution of position. While in 1980-81 there were 
already two conflicting tendencies within Solidarity: seeing a remedy for 
the economy in socialization (self-governmental) and in privatization, 
in the following period a greater emphasis was put on the socializing 
processes. Meanwhile, after a few years, an emphasis in the analyzed 
Program was put on the private sector and market mechanisms 
~ retaining to some degree the questions of self-governments. 
In the sphere of relations between politics and economics, the 
solidarity program stressed the relationships between the improvement 
of the state of the economy and democratization, pointing to the role of 
self-organization in economic activity, to the ability to create 
extra-material motivation through democratization, and to its 
importance for the western creditors. Since the communist party was 
Perceived as a constraint to reform, the program included a postulate 
to get rid of the nomenklatura. 
One of the most crucial features of this document concerned the 
politics-economy relations. I have in mind its internal contradiction 
between exposing the need for depolitization of the economy (the role 
°f market mechanisms), separating politics from the economy at the 
level of enterprise, and the emphasis on the development of 
self-governments. The authors of this program did not seem to notice 
that self-government is also a form of politization but "from below," in 
contrast to the governmentally-led politization "from above" (which 
was pointed out by Morawski 1986a). This contradiction would 
disappear, if it was shown that self-governments were centers of 
economic rationality, which was indicated by some fragmentary 
conclusions of sociological studies. 
The vision of society in this program was that of a dynamic and 
self-organizing society. The authors directed their program particularly 
to the young generation of Poles. Also in this program, the proposed 
vision of "economization" of the economy included social costs. 
Although it did not see the danger of unempłoyment, some 15 percent 
of workers were supposed to move to the sector of services. 
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PROGRAM OF THE TRADE UNIONS12 
It was not really a program of economic reforms, but rather the 
position of the official, non-Solidarity trade unions on the question of 
"the theses of the second stage of the reform." Despite this limitation it 
had comprehensive ambitions. 
What distinguished it from the two preceding programs the most, 
was the generality of the language used, the relatively smali number of 
specifics, but in turn a large number of slogans. A strong emphasis was 
put on the need to restructure the economy in order to make up for 
Poland's civilizational decline. Restructurization was supposed to 
decrease the pressure on the capital-absorbing areas, e.g. mining, and 
lead to development of new market sectors. According to the program, 
aiming at weakening the pressure from industrial branches was 
necessary (pp. 12-3), as was the stabilization of food prices. The 
program included obvious inconsistencies and contradictions. On one 
hand, emphasis was put on the need for restructurization (in, for 
example, mining), on the*other - nothing was said about the costs or 
the problems, which this could cause for the union (except for a general 
declaration of a firm defence of the interests of workers in the 
companies undergoing liquidation). The program criticized the 
pressures of industrial branches despite the fact that the union structure 
itself strengthened them. The food was supposed to be inexpensive and 
available, but the same should hold concerning housing, cars, and 
personal computers (p. 9). Implementation of this program (even if it 
would be possible), would cause serious internal conflicts both within 
the unions - separating "the top from the bottom" - and between 
specific unions and federations. There was no indication in the 
program that this was expected. 
It seems that it was the adding of new accents of "civilizational 
acceleration" to the traditional picture of official unions as a force 
concentrating on the sphere of distribution and claims, which 
introduced these contradictions. An example is also the attitude to the 
private sector, which on the one hand is supported (p. 12), and on the 
other is perceived as a privileged sector, which should be subjected to 
limitations (p. 10). 
12
 Its analysis is based on the document "Alternatywna koncepcja realizacji założeń 
reformy gospodarczej. Punkt widzenia," Warszawa: OPZZ, March 1987. 
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As to the politics-economy relations, the program accepted the status 
quo, expressing a fear that continuation of the economic policy of that 
time, criticized by the unions would lead to "attempts to negate 
socialism and the role of the Party" (p. 3). Interestingly, the program 
did not formulate any vision of relations between the unions and the 
self-government (the word "self-government" did not appear in it at 
all). Along with a declaration of support for the principle of one-person 
management, would it mean that the unions favored rather the 
"managerial-union" model? 
A few times the program defined the social addressee of the union 
proposals. It considered the poorest strata of society and the retired. 
Their relatively high membership in the structures of non-Solidarity 
trade unions was probably one of the reasons. One could also find signs 
of "anti-wealth" orientation. We read: "It is necessary to increase taxes 
(up to confiscation) on fortunes which do not have any legal grounds" 
(p. 10). This tone was well known in Poland. But it is difficult to 
reconcile it with the need for the civilizational acceleration declared by 
the unions. The addressees of the program (mainly the poor and 
underprivileged) was not the one who would implement this program, 
what more - some of the addressees could be in opposition to that 
program. This was another inconsequence in the position of unions. 
In sum, I would not hesitate to define many formulations of the 
program as demagogical. These are: the acceleration of development, 
but without wealth (for example, as the source of capital), inexpensive 
food and availability of housing, along with the civilizational race, the 
need for restructurization stressed stronger than in other programs, 
and the emphatic protection of workers. Thus there were clear union 
and "anti-union" elements. In the search of new identity, the unions 
decided to combine many contradictory options. 
THE POSITIONS OF WESTERN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REGARDING THE 
REFORMS13 
This is not an analysis of a reformatory program, since none of these 
institutions has formulated one. But being interested in Poland's 
13
 Based on the lecture by prof. W. Trzeciakowski "Stanowisko MFW wobec 
problemów wychodzenia Polski z kryzysu," presented during the OW PTS Conference, 
June 5-6, 1987, entitled "Społeczne problemy zmian w gospodarce polskiej," on my 
commentary to a speech by prof. Trzeciakowski presented during the same conference, 
on the work by Gomułka (1987). 
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regaining the position of a credible borrower, they formulated their 
recommendations as goals to be attained by the economy, and not as 
means, although they clearly favored the ideas of market reform. 
Recommendations of financial institutions implicated mainly the need 
for "hard" economic measures, tied to making the enterprises 
independent, but not to the "socialization" of those enterprises. 
Political conditions, when they were expressed, were understood as 
political rather than economic democracy. 
However, from those recommendations we can deduce two models 
for the introduction of socially costly modernizational changes: under 
the cover of an autocratic government and under democracy. This 
does not mean that both models are included in them. If any of the 
two is, it is rather the prodemocratic one mentioned in the reports 
done by political institutions (e.g. the US Congress). I would just like 
to say that from the point of view of western capital interests it did 
not seem to matter whether the chosen path would be democratic or 
autocratic. 
It is worth consideration which social forces could be interested in 
the autocratic variant and what unexpected alliances it could cause. 
This variant, of a strong political authority with an internally 
independent economy, though it would require substantial changes in 
the politicians' approach to economy, could, however, support 
consolidation of the political status quo. Paradoxically, the interests of 
financial institutions and of the communist governmental elites could 
turn out to be objectively concurrent: the economy would become more 
"market-type" (which was the desire of the western capital), and the 
political system would not undergo significant changes (which was the 
desire of the government of that time).14 A possible social antagonism 
formed as a result of this variant would mean that also at the other side 
of a probable conflict we would encounter a quite unexpected alliance. 
The following citation indicates the alliance I have in mind: " Polish 
trade unions - whether those based on Solidarity or the new official 
unions - gave a firm negative opinion on the majority of moves which 
will probably be recommended by I M F " (February 27, 1985) (Jan 
Vanous, cit. after Gomułka 1986). Attaining social support in this 
14
 I am indebted to J. Wertenstein-Żuławski for this remark. 
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variant was illusory; on the contrary, it could integrate the hitherto 
existing opponents. 
This process became visible in the period of economic changes 
introduced after the collapse of communism. As many analyses and the 
course of some strikes in 1991-93 indicate, frequently the Solidarity 
and non-Solidarity (OPZZ) trade unions cooperate against the 
economic changes advocated by the Solidarity governments. These 
facts confirm the thesis advanced in this chapter that already at the 
close of the communist period the attitude toward reforms divided both 
political groups: the Solidarity and the non-Solidarity. Thus the 
disputes over reforms could not be reduced only to the differences 
between political groups. 
In sum, although the recommendations of western financial 
institutions were an objective reformatory factor, they defined neither 
the character of this reform, nor the political conditions necessary to its 
implementation. 
* * * 
Let us now move to the analysis of features of those programs and 
to the presentation of general conclusions resulting from those 
features. 
First of all, the ability to compare few reformatory concepts formed 
more or less simultaneously was a precedence of a sort in the post-war 
history of Poland. For the first time, four socio-political forces 
presented their positions regarding one ąuestion - in this case the 
economy. This in itself constituted, in my opinion, crossing some limits 
to reforms and indicated a pluralization of political life.15 
Interesting is the fact that in principle all of these forces presented 
comprehensive concepts about changes in the economy. Although 
they represented different "functional" sectors of society, i.e. the 
government, trade unions, independent social movements, and western 
financial institutions, they all focused on a comprehensive analysis, 
not limited to the specifics of their role in the socio-organizational 
15
 An example was the session of Polish Sociological Association "Social Problems of 
Change in Polish Economy," where these four concepts were presented, although in 
a more "individual" version, and not as a presentation of the documents discussed here. 
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"division of labor." These concepts, despite significant differences, had 
many common features, among which the conviction about the need for 
the restructurization of Polish economy and about the ability to do it by 
the means of reform can be considered to be the most important ones. 
These concepts functioned to greater or lesser degree in public 
discussion. I would like to advance a thesis, that each of those 
institutions presented itself in its program in such way that it modified 
somewhat its hitherto existing picture in the eyes of society and its 
partners. It is not certain whether this was their intention, but the 
results are visible. Thus, the government strongly emphasized efficiency 
and initiative, proposing changes which would modify its role in the 
economy (although in April 1987 this was not openly declared yet). 
Solidarity presented a program, which included an emphasis put on 
self-governments together with, much clearer than before, 
market-privatizational accents. The pro-communist trade unions, 
commonly viewed as a somewhat "artificially" radical product, added 
to their program equally radical postulates of acceleration and 
participation in the civilizational race (in order to attain a different type 
of legitimation). Only western financial institutions remained in 
concordance with their social picture, but they did need to change their 
image - the interests of capital were justified and well defined. 
The evolution of reformatory programs, consisting among others in 
an increased emphasis on privatization, indicates the way in which 
directed and planned changes, as well as extrasystemic and 
intrasystemic changes, were entwined. In 1982-87 privatization was 
mainly an extrasystemic phenomenon. Its appearance in reformatory 
programs meant cooption of formerly "extrasystemic" mechanisms by 
institutionalized ideologies (here: programs). 
From this point of view the most interesting is the strong emphasis 
put on changes in the ownership structure. This is particularly visible in 
the governmental program. Although the term "privatization" was not 
used in the program, there is no doubt that this was the general 
direction of the proposed changes. The Solidarity program too put 
more emphasis on the ąuestion of privatization compared with the 
position of the union in the 1980-81 disputes. Thus the beginnings of 
further changes and the chances for agreement between a part of the 
communist elites and part of the Solidarity movement are visible when we 
compare these programs. To some extent the general features of changes 
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which took place in the Polish economic system in the 1990's are 
embodied in these programs. This also shows that political limits were 
not so important at the close of communism, as the communist 
government and Solidarity were quite close to each other in their 
visions of the future economic system. 
However, in 1987 communists probably assumed that this would be 
"their" privatization. The idea of privatization embodied in the 
governmental program was the "privatization from above." Stress was 
Put on transforming state enterprises into stock companies and there 
were no ideas as to how "average" citizens could create private 
enterprises. This may shed some light on later disputes on 
"privatization by nomenklatura." 
The fact that the programs were in a way "anti-programs," could be 
useful in public discussion and could indicate a negotiational attitude 
of the forces behind those programs. Therefore it could favour 
breaking anti-reformatory limits, since the authors of given programs 
turned out to be flexible. This phenomenon caused however the 
creation of many internal inconsistencies within each of the programs, 
as indicated above. These inconsistencies were also an unavoidable 
result of the fact that the programs articulated the positions of larger 
groups and institutions. This had to lead to compromises which 
Produced either dull or internally contradictory formulations. Thus 
a more negotiational attitude resulted, as always, in identity problems 
both before the forces being represented by a given institution and 
before its partners. In effect, this could have led to alliances between 
representatives of various "parts" of different programs. 
Consequently, the governmental and the Solidarity programs seemed 
to come close to one another in accenting the "marketizing" option. 
Although both sides discussed self-governments, the option of 
"socialization" was emphasized somewhat more weakly. This aspect 
was also visible in the program of the unions, where self-governments 
are not mentioned at all. There was no disagreement on this point with 
recommendations of western financial institutions. Clearly then, 
self-governments were loosing their institutional support.16 Possibilities 
16
 The increasing role of market-privatizational option could be perceived as dysfunctional 
for the government system. Perhaps in 1987 the communist government believed that it will 
be able to use a variant of this option which would not reąuire intrasystemic changes, but 
rather the creation of certain "niches" next to the system (see also Staniszkis, 1987). 
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of alliances appeared also in other spheres - for example in the above 
mentioned convergence of interests of the western capital and of the 
conservative part of government in the case of the "effective-
-autocratic" variant, where at the opposite side there would be some 
convergence of the positions of Solidarity and of new unions. Let me 
add to that the possibility of the above mentioned alliances within the 
group advocating "acceleration" and within the group advocating the 
"simplistic-rustic" variant (e.g. some circles in the government and 
some independent groups), and the thesis on the irreducibility of 
disputes over the models of reforms to disputes resulting from different 
political and economic orientations will become much clearer.17 
Summing up the preceding discussion one can say that this 
irreducibility is associated with: 
(1) the role of "civilizational" orientations in thinking about reforms, 
with the orientations being irreducible to politics and economics; 
(2) the role of values and axiology as sources of economic motivation; 
(3) the internal contradiction within the programs resulting from the 
change of their image and their need for representing differentiated 
groups; 
(4) possibilities of seemingly paradoxical alliances mentioned above. 
The possibility of the creation of four models for changes, indicating 
these complicated lines of division, is on the whole functional for the 
reforms overall, since it allows for reaching the "deeper" limits which 
would remain undiscovered if it was not for the public articulation of 
different stands. This alone seems to be a crossing over of one barrier: 
that of knowledge and consciousness. 
2.1.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A comparison of different programs of reforms, demonstrating the 
creation of many tangent points between these programs (with 
preservation of equally important differences) illustrates a more 
general process. I have in mind the following dilemma: were the 
spontaneous processes of mutual adjustments, in the course of which 
the initial programs of reforms undergo modifications, a pro-
17
 Compare with the analogy of the West, where frequently the socialists introduced 
privatization. 
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-reformatory or anti-reformatory factor? Could they result in 
a coherent program of reforms or, rather, in the course of mutual 
compromises would the reforms neutralize themselves and become, as 
before, "tamed?" 
Going back to the dilemma sketched above, which can be reduced to 
the following question: whether the mechanisms of mutual 
compromises and agreements are overall a pro-reformatory or an 
anti-reformatory factor, I would answer in this manner: 
The answer to this ąuestion varies depending on what will be 
considered the most serious obstacle to the reform. If we regard as the 
main obstacle the socio-political conflict of late 80's, then the chances 
of compromises of various kind were a pro-reformatory factor, since 
they could contribute to the weakening of the level of conflict. But if we 
regard the lack of cohesive and radical program to be the main 
obstacle, then the mechanisms of agreements and compromises, 
hampering the creation of such program (since the essence of 
compromises is the neutralization of radicalism), would be an 
anti-reformatory factor. 
It seems that the specific case of Poland consisted in the coexistence 
of both obstacles, which created structural limits to the economic 
reform. We were dealing with a conflict, and its resolving required 
compromises, and those compromises were dysfunctional as far as 
coherence and radicalization of the reform are considered. This did not, 
however, change the fact that at the end of 1980's in Poland both 
a radical reform and solution to the conflict were needed. The point is 
that the subsequent course of events has confirmed that not the reform 
(and so a change within the system) but rather a radical transformation 
the whole system is possible. Only this transformation could make 
solving of the socio-political conflict possible. In some sense then, the 
postulates of reform (and thus the changes within the framework of the 
hitherto existing system) and solving the conflict were mutually 
exclusive. 
The problem also consists in the fact that the evolution of boundaries 
of limits to reforms has yet another dimension. Already in the 1980's, 
smaller and smaller part of society was still interested in the reform. 
I do claim that the state of social apathy could be a barrier to the 
reform. I believe that in some sense it is the opposite. The communist 
offer of reform came too late. More and more social groups, not 
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perceiving any chances for reforming the system, started to manage their 
problems on their own, in a way "apart from" the system (second 
economy, emigration, temporary work abroad). To those people and to 
the groups being formed the reform was not what they waited for any 
more. In this way we return to the dilemma outlined in the introduction 
to this chapter. Although as a result of these actions the specific reform did 
not receive support, the sum of spontaneous mechanism has transformed the 
system in the long run. Actions undertaken by the people were therefore 
a faulty substitute of real reform. The point is whether the 
transformations which took place as a result of those actions have 
facilitated a radical reconstruction of the economy in the post-communist 
period, or have they constituted a blockade to this reconstruction. The 
analysis of this problem will be undertaken in the next chapter. 
Studies on the limits to economic reforms at the close of 
communism, take as their point of departure the obvious fact that the 
main blockade to the real reform was the hitherto existing political 
system. Attempts to change the situation, begun in 1987 (through, for 
example, public discussions over different programs of reforms), were 
the first step to a radical change. Its realization, begun in 1989, could 
not be undertaken under communism, even most liberalized. 
2.2. LIMITS TO THE ECONOMIC CHANGES 
DURING POST-COMMUNISM18 
2.2.1. INTRODUCTION 
After the collapse of communism in 1989 it seemed at first glance that 
there were no limits, was no communism, and that economic changes 
were much more radical than the traditional "reform." But this is only 
18
 I am indebted to Stanisław Gomułka who gave me invaluable help providing 
constructive critiques and comments in all stages of my work on this study. This chapter 
was prepared for the project "Limits to Economic Transformation" headed by 
S. Gomułka and has never been published before. 
This chapter was written during my stay in the Department of Sociology, the 
University of Chicago (Ford Foundation Fellowship Program), corrected during stay at 
the Polish Studies Center Department of Sociology (Indiana University) and finally 
revised after that. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of these Institutions and 
express my thanks to them. 
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half of the truth. There are still many limits to the ongoing changes 
though they have changed their character compared to the "limits 
under communism." It would be also an oversimplification to say that 
there is no communism at all in Poland. One can see many communist 
legacies at the level of the social structure, and in the social 
consciousness and social organization. Perhaps these are not legacies of 
communism per se, but rather permanent features of the society that 
cannot be changed as rapidly as the formal structure. Last, but not 
least, the general direction of the ongoing economic changes has some 
similar points with the goals of the communist-led reforms, though the 
latter were never implemented. 
All these reasons make it appropriate to analyze the limits to the 
economic changes being currently implemented now in Poland. The 
first Solidarity government proposed to draw a "thick line" in order to 
make a clear demarcation between the past and the present. Such 
a thick line can be easily understood as a political willingness to reject 
the former communist order and to mobilize people by means of an 
attractive vision of the future, but the socio-technical aim of such an 
idea is one thing, and the correctness of the description of the social 
reality implicated in it another. In reality there is no single thick line 
distinguishing between the past and present. There are rather many 
thin lines and networks linking the old and the new order, and not all of 
them were destroyed by the political breakthrough of the 1989-90. In 
Post-communist reality we can find both legacies of communism and 
former reform ideas. 
This is why it still seems reasonable to speak about limits to 
economic transformation. But this transformation is much more 
general and radical than reform and this is the reason why I prefer the 
term change. This change toward a market economy faces many 
constraints which I will try to analyze in this chapter. 
The preceeding chapter has described the limits to the economic 
reforms under communism. As a matter of fact, these reforms had to 
collapse because the most important limit to them was communism 
itself. From this point of view the real reform started after the political 
breakthrough of 1989. However, this change was the change of the 
system, not the change in the system, as "normal" reforms were. On the 
other hand, some features of this change, as mentioned above, its 
planned, designed character, and a centralistic way of implementation, 
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resembled some characteristics of a reform. I think that it is quite 
reasonable to adopt a third thesis: radical political breakthrough 
enabled the promotion of real economic reform. Transformation 
started with the radical change of the political elite. However, the 
economic structure with the dominance of state ownership, the 
artificial price system, etc, remained the same at the beginning. The 
process of changing it took the form of the economic reform being 
implemented in the "friendly" political environment or even promoted 
by the politicians, the reverse of the situation during communist era. 
The radical reform - or change - being implemented in the 
post-communist period is facing its limits, too. Some of them already 
emerged during the last communist attempts at reforms. I have in mind 
here the deeper, non-political limits described in the preceding chapter. 
In other words, non-communist reform has inherited some 
"communist" limits to it. This will be analyzed in the chapter. . 
When I speak about change and limits to it I have in mind the limits 
to the program of economic transformation the implementation of 
which started in January, 1990. This program has had two main goals: 
the stabilization of the economic situation, with the reduction of the 
near hyperinflation as one of the most important tasks; and a general 
systemic transformation of the Polish economy toward a market 
economy. Both goals, and, respectively, both stages of this economic 
program have their specific limits. The most obvious one, which is 
common to both, is the intellectual limit: nobody knows how the 
transformation from a communist to a market economy should be 
achieved. According to Balcerowicz (1990), who is the main architect of 
the economic transformation, the future model, i.e. the market 
economy, seems to be clearer than the way in which it can be achieved. 
The main goal of the stabilization stage was to reduce inflation by 
eliminating government subsidies, devaluating the Polish zloty, liberalizing 
prices, and imposing controls on wages. The second stage of the economic 
program is devoted to the general restructuring of the economic system. 
The privatization of Polish state-owned enterprises is its main element and 
this is supposed to improve the competitiveness and the performance of 
the Polish economy. As a result, the spirit of entrepreneurship should be 
the main driving force of the economy (Balcerowicz 1990, 1990a). 
In the first months of the implementation of the stabilization plan, 
monthly inflation rate decreased from the 78.6 percent in January 1990 
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to 3.4 percent in June 1990 (Rzeczpospolita, 30 July 1990). But the 
volume of sales of industrial production in the first six months 
comparing with the first six months of 1989 was lower by 28 percent 
{Rzeczpospolita 30 July 1990) and real wages dropped by 36 percent 
between January and May 1990 (Wstępna informacja..., 1990). The 
previously unknown phenomenon of unemployment emerged, grew 
quite fast and reached 4.2 percent outside of agriculture (Rzeczpospolita, 
30 July 1990). Three years later at the beginning of 1993, inflation was 
still present though controlled, the first signs of overcoming the recession 
had emerged, and the rate of unemployment had exceeded 12 percent. 
Some recession was planned as a tool of restructurization but the 
majority of the state enterprises at the beginning of the program's 
implementation reacted in a rather passive way to the demand 
constraints: a "wait and see" strategy seemed to be predominant (Czas 
recesji, 1990). But generally, the main goals of the "stabilization stage" 
of the program were fulfilled. Then the second stage, that of structural 
changes, was to have come. 
Although my analysis is mainly devoted to the first stage of 
Post-communism, which covers also the first stage of the economic 
Program (1989-90), I will also present some hypotheses on the 
constraints in the transition from the first to the second stage of 
a program. 
The starting point of my analyses is one of the theses of the previous 
chapter, that during the process of the evolution of the communist 
system, and also during the transitory period of post-communism, new 
limits and constraints were discovered. Each stage of development 
Produced its own limits. It is an open question whether this evolution of 
limits is the evolution of reality or rather the evolution of the 
Perception of limits. Nevertheless, different elements were considered 
to be the main obstacle to the economic reforms in the middle of the 
1950's, during the 1970's, during the decade of 1980's and also now, in 
the transitory period of post-communism. Although the main aim of 
my analysis is the description of the "post-communist limits," I will 
also be comparing them with the "old" communist limits. Moreover, 
I would also like to repeat the thesis that the characteristic feature of 
the evolution of the limits to transformation is that the new limits did 
not replace the old ones. Rather, each period creates its own limits, 
which combine with at least some of the previous limits to the reforms. 
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Limits to economic change differ not only in time, they are also 
socially differentiated. For many years, the ruling elite attributed 
obstacles to the reforms to the attitudes of society, while the latter 
considered the ruling elite to be one of the most important barriers to 
real economic transformation. We can ask: how does this social 
perception of limits look now? 
We can see that limits to economic changes were changing and 
flexible both during communism and post-communism. This flexibility 
of limits to changes reflects the flexibility and the unclear nature of the 
system's identity. Never, even during the darkest communist period, 
was it clear what was socialist and what could be labeled as 
"antisocialist." These definitions were the elements of a political game, 
and they could be changed very easily. 
From this point of view, the post-communist situation is even more 
unclear. It is not known what is the identity of this transitory period. 
On the other hand, the nature of the future model is described by the 
concepts of market economy, parliamentary democracy and civil 
society.19 These seemed to be precise enough to mobilize people 
against communism, but after its collapse their motivating capacity 
decreased. As a result, real limits are discovered in everyday economic 
and political practice, and they can differ from day to day. This is 
why it is so difficult to analyze these limits during the ongoing 
process. 
The main period which is covered by my analysis is the spring 1989 
- autumn 1990 phase of economic change, which was an element of 
a broader systemic transformation which started with the Round Table 
Agreement (spring 1989). This is the period of the primary stage of 
post-communism; the old system collapsed and the beginnings of a new 
one were created. The choice of this period can be justified by the fact 
that during that time the decisive changes in the Polish economic 
system took place. It was the first non-communist government of 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki which implemented the crucial measures of the 
stabilization plan. Three subsequent governments, those of Jan K. Bie­
lecki, of Jan Olszewski, and of Hanna Suchocka, have continued the 
general line of this policy and were still trying to implement the second 
19
 See "Uchwała programowa II Zjazdu delegatów NSZZ Solidarność (projekt)," 
Gazeta Wyborcza 23 March 1990. 
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stage of the program, that of structural changes. I will also refer to 
these problems of the transition from the first to the second stage of 
the program. 
According to the main thesis of my paper, limits to the economic 
changes result both from the past and from the logic of the ongoing 
transition. The next section is devoted to the analysis of ideological, 
political, and social limits resulting from communist legacies and from 
the dynamic of the transition itself. 
2-2.2. THE OLD AND NEW LIMITS TO THE ECONOMIC CHANGES 
IN THE EARLY 1990'S 
TYPOLOGY O F L I M I T S 
Any typology of limits to economic change should recognize both the 
sources of limits which were presented in the first chapter, and the types 
of the limits, which will be presented in this part. But first of all, it is 
necessary to answer the following question: limits to what? This means: 
what types of economic changes are the objects of the limits? 
Poland is moving toward a market economy of the West European 
type. This is to be achieved through the so-called "Balcerowicz plan," 
which began to be implemented at the beginning of 1990. This plan was 
Probably only one of the possible ways toward a market economy, 
although no other complex and detailed programs were prepared. As 
I mentioned in the introduction, the general ideas of this program were 
continued during 1991 and even in 1992 by the Olszewski government, 
without Balcerowicz as a Deputy Prime Minister. Thus it is important 
to distinguish between the goal, the market economy, and the way to 
achieve it, the economic program of the government. Both of these 
Phenomena can face, or create, their own limits, limits to the goal of 
a market economy and limits to the way charted by the "Balcerowicz 
plan." Of course, many of the limits to the economic program of 
a given government are the universal limits facing every transition to 
a market economy, but some of the limits result from the specific way 
chosen to achieve this goal and may not be important if some other way 
to the world market economy is chosen. In spite of these two types of 
limits, a third one is also possible: We can consider some elements of 
the economic program to be the limits to achieving a market economy. 
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In that case, the very way to a market economy would be the limit to it 
("the way as a limit to the goal"). This seems to be rather speculative at 
the first glance, though in practice it is not. As I will try to show, some 
elements of the program can be analyzed in that way, especially from 
the sociological point of view. 
The distinctions presented above are in my opinion very important, 
though sometimes it is very difficult to draw them into an analysis of 
economic life. I would like to stress that in order to understand the 
ongoing changes in Poland we should not be too preoccupied with the 
economic program. We should also watch more general problems from 
a perspective in which the present program is just a step, though a very 
important one. This kind of analysis is also a way of avoiding the 
danger of the analysis becoming outdated, which is a real danger in 
a period of fast changes. 
The next part of my analysis will be devoted to a more detailed 
presentation of the different types of limits according to their typology. 
Constructing this typology means for me a typology of the sources of 
limits, a typology of the objects to limits and, finally, the typology of 
limits in their narrow sense. The first two typologies were presented in 
the first chapter. Let it be remembered that I there have proposed 
a thesis that the three main sources of changes are also generating 
barriers to changes. Thus, it is possible to consider reforms, adaptation 
processes, and political breakthrough not only as sources of changes, 
but also as limits to them. 
Concerning limits in a narrow sense, I propose to divide them into 
four categories: intellectual, ideological, political, and social.20 All these 
can be regarded as potential constraints to the economic 
transformation. Table 1 presents the typology of limits (see p. 61). 
Underlying my analysis is the general thesis that there is an evolution 
of limits. There was a period during which the barriers to economic 
changes were located mainly in the personal characteristics and 
composition of the political elites, but starting in the 1980's, the role of 
structural constraints could be perceived. These constraints were of two 
kinds. First of all there was the role of the political structure with the 
dominant role of the communist party that made crucial economic 
20
 The role of the intellectual and ideological limits to the transformation was stressed 
by S. Gomułka. 
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Table 1. 
The analytical typology of the limits to economic change in Poland 
SOURCES OF LIMITS: TYPES OF LIMITS: OBJECTS OF LIMITS: 
Previous reforms Intellectual Limits to the market (limits 
to the goal) 
Spontaneous adaptive 
Processes 
Ideological Limits to the program 
(limits to the measures) 
Type of political 
breakthrough 
Political 
Social 
The program as a limit 
(the way as a limit to 
the goal) 
reforms impossible. The role of the social structure was also important. 
According to many analyses, (Narojek 1986; Staniszkis 1985; Rychard 
1987) the patterns of social behavior, the informal ways through which 
people were incorporated into the system, made the system's change 
difficult. Also, some welfare mechanisms were deeply rooted in the 
social structure and consciousness. The structure of Polish industry 
Produced its own social structure. Strong branch lobbies, with strong 
groups of workers and enterprises, proved to be one of the most 
important political institutions (Morawski 1986, p. 133). On the other 
hand, according to the results of many sociological studies the majority 
of the population rejected the communist system in the political and 
economic area. During the elections of 1989, they also rejected it in 
practice. This internal inconsistency between structural cooption on the 
one hand, and ideologicai, or even behavioral, rejection on the other 
creates many tensions in the system and may be the source of the limits 
to the transformation. As per my thesis, after the collapse of 
communism we see more clearly this type of limits, a matter always 
Present though masked by the predominant role of the political limits. 
Resulting from the thesis on evolution there is the thesis on the 
change in the character of the limits. Some of the previous limits have 
now become a chance for economic change. This is the case with the 
Political situation, though some features of it can still create limits to 
transformation. On the other hand, some of the previous factors 
Promoting change are now constraints. This could be the case with 
crucial social groups' attitudes and behavior. During the communist 
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period the majority of society rejected the political order. Sometimes 
the slogans of democracy were popular ways of expressing protest 
against communist rule. Also the slogan of the market was used in 
a way that created the myth of a free market economy (Kolarska-
-Bobińska 1990). Will the support for them survive the conditions of 
the painful economic program and the difficulties with the beginnings 
of the democracy? This is the crucial problem for contemporary 
Poland. 
INTELLECTUAL AND IDEOLOGICAL LIMITS 
The most important ideological limitation to the ongoing changes 
toward the market economy is the problem of the incongruence 
between the legacy of Solidarity and the direction of these changes. 
Solidarity is still in the process of changing its identity from a symbol of 
the national will toward a set of heterogeneous units. The trade union is 
one of the most important of these units, but there is the problem of the 
rest of the "Solidarities," of their separate identities. 
Until the autumn of 1990 the lack of institutionalization caused the 
overideologization of economic disputes and this was another limit to 
economic transformation. Such ideological labeling was more popular, 
but these labels were sometimes used in a very peculiar way. The first 
Solidarity government (and following governments too) was sometimes 
described as neoliberal, and at other times as too leftist. The ideological 
labeling process was a way through which political actors tried to 
structure the social space. The danger of this phenomenon was that in 
a country in which these labels were artificial and not deeply rooted in 
any serious tradition they could at the same time limit the flexibility of 
the actors. There was one factor counteracting this process. This was 
the pragmatic and ideologically free orientation of the first 
non-communist government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and its economic 
group. This government was trying to avoid ideological labeling and to 
present itself as a force trying to promote a normal economic system, 
without any ideological bias. This was a very interesting phenomenon 
in a country in which formerly everything was so strongly ideologically 
biased. The notion of a social market economy was used by Prime 
Minister Mazowiecki in his Sejm presentation in January, 1990, but 
without any elaboration. One can assume that constructing this notion 
was a way of compromising between certain traditions of Solidarity 
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and the demands of the program. Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz 
said in June 1990: "Privatization does not mean Poland's transition to 
wild capitalism in its 19th century version" (Balcerowicz 1990b). The 
notions of a market or normal economy were used more frequently 
than was the notion of capitalism. 
I am of the opinion that the need for ideological labeling and 
ideological vision was greater among the politicians opposing the 
government than within society. The pragmatic orientation of the 
government fit social attitudes quite well, because people were fed up 
with ideological visions. This was the real end of the era of ideology in 
Poland. Attempts at the ideologization of economic disputes can be 
regarded from this point of view as obstacles to transformation. They 
resulted from Poland's peculiar political structure and from the lack of 
Political pluralism. Mazowiecki's government successfully avoided these 
traps, and its strategy met social expectations. A pragmatic strategy in 
defining the future goal was also a way of decreasing the tensions that 
resulted from the inconsistency between the workers' legacy and the 
transformation. Using the word "capitalism" would be much more 
counterproductive from this point of view than the word "market." 
The liberal government of J.K. Bielecki was more "ideological" in 
a "market" sense while, on the other hand, Olszewski's government 
was sometimes rejecting some market slogans. But paradoxically, both 
of them were continuing the main line of the reform. 
One of the important ideological limits to the economic 
transformation was the lack of real programmatic differences between 
the political parties and the domination of "overideologization" in 
economic disputes. This was present in the first phase of 
post-communism, before the emergence of a multi-party system, but 
continued after that. Even today, three years after the collapse of 
communism, many analyses point out that the differences in economic 
Programs between political parties are not very clear. They are 
substituted by ideological differences. Sometimes some of them resemble 
the general options of a "civilizational" character: between pro-western 
and more autarchical orientations. These types of divisions had already 
emerged in the communist era and were analyzed in the preceding 
chapter. 
These types of limits result from the political breakthrough in which 
many legacies of the past still exist. The legacy of the Solidarity 
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tradition, with a strong bargaining power for the workers, is also a case 
in point. These are, in my opinion, the constraints to the general 
direction to the market economy. Part of the ideological and 
intellectual constraints result from the legacies of the former reform 
paradigm. The non-violent and evolutionary character of the changes 
reflected the obvious similarities between them and the previous 
reforms. The changes were implemented "from above" and the role of 
society was rather passive; this is also similar to the communist-led 
reforms. We should also add here some similarities in the general 
direction of the post-communist changes and previous reforms and 
some continuities in terms of individuals in important positions. 
Taking all these into account, it is hard to say that the reform paradigm 
was not working in Poland, at least in the first phase of 
post-communism. In reality, changes revealed many features of the 
reform, but they were implemented in a more radical way and in 
a completely different political environment. None the less, many 
reform features can be regarded as the limits to the ongoing 
transformation. 
The program of the transformation (especially the first phase of it, 
during Mazowiecki's government till the end of 1990) was the result of 
work done by people who during the communist era were well known 
reformers of that economy. Such continuities and legacies of the reform 
paradigm can be an obstacle from the intellectual point of view, but in 
order to answer this question conclusively, an economic analysis 
should be undertaken. From the sociological point of view we can only 
ask whether it is possible for such one-time reformers to conceive and 
carry out a truly radical transformation. 
This character of the reform could result in the overintellectualization 
of the transformation by raising issues to a level that is too scientific 
and thus well beyond the practical problems of private businessmen, 
managers, and so on. From this standpoint, with some overs-
implification we can say that the methodology of change rejecting 
communism is to some extent similar to the previous methodology of 
constructing communism. The ąuestion could be summed up as: is it 
possible to reject the planned economy in a planned way? This way of 
transforming the economic system was analysed by Claus Offe, who 
used the term "political capitalism." He writes: "In contrast to its 
western pendant, the market economy that is emerging in Eastern 
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Europe will be, if it in fact emerges, 'political capitalism.' It is 
a capitalism designed, organized and set into motion by the reform 
elites" (Offe 1991, p. 17). This is precisely the picture of the Polish 
transformation at the beginning of the 1990's. 
The carry-over of individuals from the previous reform efforts could 
also account for the inflexibility of the current program. There are two 
additional reasons for this inflexibility. First, the government in 
1989-90 was building its identity through opposition to the identity of 
the previous communist governments and their way of undertaking 
reforms. Those governments were effective in the process of creating 
communist but not in the process of reforming it. They were 
inconsistent and ideological, and social constraints neutralized their 
reforms. This was not the case with the first non-communist 
government. Consistency and perfection seemed to be very high in the 
consciousness of the Polish reformers. The second reason for some 
inflexibility stemmed from the electoral success of 1989. The new 
Political elite was the child of this electoral success, and it had no 
Practice in coping with problems and difficulties of the type they faced. 
Paradoxically, in such a situation the willingness to use some former 
communist strategies to deal with difficulties can occur. Scapegoating, 
artificial unity, and ignoring the difficulties could be such strategies. To 
adopt these strategies would be very unfortunate, because Polish 
society understands the meaning of such signs very well. Whenever 
a situation was getting better according to the state's propaganda, it 
was a sign that in reality it was getting worse. 
Also, Solidarity, which in 1980 protested against the pathologies of 
socialism but not against socialism itself, was and still is a slave to the 
reform paradigm to some extent. Ten years later, it started to promote 
radical systemie transformation and reject socialism. Was it possible 
for Solidarity to do so without any tensions and conflicts with its own 
tradition and social base? Until the middle of 1990 Solidarity was ąuite 
succesful in doing this, when it became necessary to institutionalize the 
social divisions resulting from these tensions. I will refer to this later on. 
We can hypothesize that the reform paradigm is to some extent the 
limit to the change. Reform as limit to change, this is one of the 
Paradoxes. 
The voices proclaiming the acceleration and radicalization of the 
political changes in Poland started getting louder since the middle of 
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1990. They resulted in the presidendial elections of December 1990, and 
then in the emergence of new governments (Bielecki, Olszewski, and 
Suchocka). These were the first steps toward the institutionalization of 
the internal splits within the Solidarity movement. With it we reached 
the end of the first phase of post-communism in the autumn of 1990. 
But to what extent did these processes accelerate or constrain economic 
change? I shall referring to this question in the next paragraphs. 
POLITICAL LIMITS 
In the first half of 1990 political limits resulted from the peculiar 
political structure that existed in Poland during that time. Although it 
has changed since that time, it is still far from being clear and still 
a constraint to economic transformation. It is very difficult to write 
about this type of limits in the middle of the process of political 
transformation. The peculiarity of the existing political structure 
results from the type of political breakthrough that has occurred and 
may impose some constraints on the economic transformation. 
The Round Table Agreement of the spring 1989 resulted in the June 
elections and in the formation of a government in which Solidarity had 
the majority. Still, some important areas were controlled by former 
communist politicians. This was a very peculiar situation: both sides 
of the political contract signed at the Round Table had their 
representations in position of power. However, the communists 
practically disappeared in a political sense and Solidarity had not 
appeared as a political organization. 
The first stage of post-communism was the period of a peculiar 
dichotomy, in which there was an undefined Solidarity movement on 
the one side, and, after the formal dissolution of the Communist Party, 
an empty space on the other one. I will refer to in subchapter 3.2 while 
describing the post-communist legitimacy crisis. This peculiar political 
structure influenced the politization of the economic disputes. In 
a situation where there was no well established political orientation, 
economic issues could be one of the most important instruments of 
political struggle. Paradoxically, this would be a continuity of the 
mechanism that was in play during the communist era. But during the 
first stage of post-communism (till the middle of 1990), criticism of the 
economic program of the government was not as strong as the criticism 
of its political program. It seems that it was a success of the economic 
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group within the government that it has managed to stay, at least to 
some extent, outside the political and ideological struggles. 
However, in the long run the lack of real political pluralism and the 
lack of an alternative economic program could result in 
a generalization and totalization of the critique. Lacking such an 
alternative, the only way of disagreeing would be to criticize the 
government's entire program. It is important to notice that according 
to the surveys, the opinion that the government's program was our last 
chance was held by 18.9 percent of those surveyed and the opinion that 
it was one of the possible ways of improving the economy was 
supported by 20.3 percent ("Społeczna ocena..." 1990). Thus, public 
opinion did not support the non-alternative way of thinking. The 
Problem is that there was no (and still there is no) other alternative that 
has been elaborated, and this could be a real limit to the 
transformations that arises from the political structure. 
The first sign of the end of this phase of post-communism was the 
moment in which this peculiar dichotomous political structure began to 
be transformed. It happened in the middle of 1990 when the first 
Political divisions in the Solidarity movement were institutionalized 
and then during 1991 when the first elements of a pluralistic political 
system emerged (among them the Democratic Union headed by T. Ma­
zowiecki and the Center Alliance: two groups which emerged more on 
the basis of their attitude to L. Wałęsa, than on the basis of a program). 
Finally, following the Parliamentary elections of November 1991 there 
were about 30 political parties in Parliament and many of them having 
only a few MP's. 
This process reflects the evolution from peculiar dichotomy to 
Peculiar pluralism. These are different phenomena but both of them 
can constraint the economic transformation. And, paradoxically, the 
Peculiar form of the present pluralism is to some extent the legacy of 
the peculiar dichotomy of the first half of 1990. This is one more reason 
why this first post-communist phase was so important. 
First, the political parties which have emerged represent to a greater 
extent the divisions in the political elite itself than in society. Splits 
between the reformers and trade unionists, between market and 
non-market orientations, and finally between losers and winners in the 
''transitory game," were not fully institutionalized. What was mainly 
institutionalized were the personal connections and affiliations. As 
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a result, the political scene is very unclear. Those who are left-oriented 
in the economic sense could be at the same time right-oriented in the 
political sense (Grabowska 1992). 
Second, although there were three governments, and two of them 
contradictory at a first glance (Bielecki's and 01szewski's), all of them 
were continuing the main direction of stabilization measures and none 
of them to date have succeeded in passing to the second stage of the 
program (that of restructuring the economy). The only important 
difference between two of them was that while Bielecki was openly 
using market slogans, Olszewski was sometimes criticizing while 
simultaneousely implementing them (which made his position more 
difficult from the sociotechnical point of view). 
These two phenomena show how the legacy of the first stage, represented 
by the peculiarities of the political structure, the lack of programatic 
disputes, and the lack of real representation is still functioning. 
Although the direction toward pluralism is the most probable, it is 
not the only one possible. A new post-communist autocracy can also be 
imagined. Such an autocracy could be associated either with a market 
or with an anti-market orientation (Kolarska-Bobińska and Rychard 
1990a). Thus right-wing or left-wing autocracies are possible scenarios 
for the future, but it is very hard to say whether an economic 
transformation would be possible under a right-wing autocracy. I want 
to emphasize that the political vacuum of the first stage of 
post-communism and the peculiar pluralism of 1991/92 can still be filled 
with different structures. Their shape will depend mostly on the popular 
support given to them. This brings us to the problem of social limits. 
THE SOCIAL LIMITS TO THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
Social limits can be analyzed on the level of structure and on the level of 
consciousness. The importance of this distinction can be justified by the 
following thesis: in 1990 there was a discrepancy between the high popular 
support for the ongoing transformation on the level of consciousness and 
between the structural conditions, possibilities, and interests that could 
activate this support. This general thesis underpins my further analyses. 
The economic views of Polish society are by no mean clear and 
consistent. Many views and beliefs are still politically and ideologically 
loaded and it is very hard to estimate the support for general market 
slogans. Still, support for the market seems to be more a support for 
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a general and ideal type of an order than a support for the concrete 
solutions (Kolarska-Bobińska 1990). As I wrote before, the 
government in 1990 tended to present the market economy as the 
normal economy, without any ideological bias. The day on which this 
tendency becomes popular within society will be the day of overcoming 
one of the important limits to economic transformation. Of course, 
after general acceptance of the idea of the market, is the question of 
what type of market will arise - but this is the next step. 
In spite of this unclear but visible and conscious support, there is the 
Problem of the structural constraints embodied in the Polish system. 
According to many researchers the level of cooption in the structure of 
the communist organizational system was quite high. The same people 
who rejected communism at the level of their responses to 
questionnaires played their petty everyday games trying to gain as 
much as possible. I will analyze these strategies in the next chapter. I am 
not talking about the nomenklatura group, although this, too is also 
a problem. I mainly have in mind the hidden nomenklatura group, 
which is quite large. At the level of institutions this group can be 
identified as industrial lobbies whose interests are oriented toward 
a preservation of the industrial structure of the communist economy. 
These are not only the interests of the managers, these are also the 
interests of large numbers of workers (Celiński 1989), whose vested 
interests would be threatened in case of bankruptcy or the restructuring 
of the Polish economy. In my opinion, these lobbies are still more 
Powerful than the economic program of the government. At the 
beginning of the implementation of the program, recession was greater 
in light industry, where output fell by 40 percent in 1990 as opposed to 
a 15-20 percent fall in heavy industry (Polish stabilization..., 1990), 
where the strongest lobbies exist. It would be a misunderstanding to call 
the representatives of these interests pro-communists. In many of these 
cases their enterprises were the origin of the Solidarity movement. This 
reflects the tensions inside the Solidarity movement I described before. 
Despite these large structural interests, which could be limits to the 
economic transformation, there are also at play smali, everyday 
networks of interests, of informal bargaining processes, of relations 
between supervisors and subordinates that also could be destroyed by 
the market program. These represent the legacy of the former 
spontaneous processes of adaptation. 
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The next limit to the goal of the market is the nature of Polish 
solidarity. This is the result of the past communist years. Several years 
ago, the leading Polish sociologist Stefan Nowak wrote an article in 
which he posed a thesis that Poles are integrated on two extreme levels: 
on the level of national and religious symbols and on the level of the 
microstructures. The communication between these two levels is very 
weak (Nowak 1979, p. 160). The world of institutions placed in 
between these two extreme levels was perceived as alien. According to 
Nowak, only through informalities was it possible to adapt to this 
hostile world. According to the views of Elżbieta and Jacek Tarkowski, 
at the level of microstructures there is a struggle between the smali 
groups that are integrated internally but agressive toward one another 
(Tarkowska, Tarkowski 1990). 
These are pictures of society as a set of competing smali groups, who 
sometimes refer to such values as the Nation or Church and who are 
surrounded by hostile institutions that become domesticated only when 
corrupted. How does this correspond to a picture of society in which the 
leading role is played by a movement called Solidarity? I think that Polish 
solidarity, as a feature of the social structure and not as a movement, has 
some peculiar characteristics. First of all, this is more the solidarity of 
protest against something than solidarity for something. The prevailing 
role of the integrative function of protest was frequently noticed by 
students of Polish reality. Secondly, there still exists solidarity on the two 
extreme levels: macro and micro. The mezzo level, that of social groups 
and organizations is an integrating force only during protests. This level 
is the crucial one for the creation of a market economy and 
parliamentary democracy. The weakness of this mezzo-integration, the 
weakness of the institutional traditions of the associations, the difficulties 
in the creation of organizations from below can be regarded as one of the 
more important constraints to the economic transformation. This means 
that potential interests can emerge only on the micro level, since the 
macro level is dominated by moral values and there are no mezzo 
interests to serve, as the instrument of integration (Rychard 1987a, 
p. 100). This pattern of social integration was enough to destroy the 
communist regime, but it has not been sufficient to create a market 
economy. Finally, three years after the implementation of the program, 
some new tendencies in social self-organization have emerged. They will 
be analyzed in the last chapter of the book. 
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I have described above the limits to the goal of a market 
transformation resulting from the incompatibilities between social 
consciousness and social structure. The way to the objective, i.e. the 
economic program of government, faces similar limits. 
I would like to start with the phenomenon of the social support for 
the politico-economic establishment in the decisive first half of 1990. It 
is quite interesting to see what the relations were between the economic 
performance and the support for individual political figures during the 
first months of the implementation of the economic program. As the 
data in figure 1 show, the social support for the Balcerowicz plan 
decreased as the inflation rate decreased, and as real wages decreased. 
On the other hand, support for Prime Minister Mazowiecki was rather 
stable.21 
Sources of the economic data: (1) Real wages (August 1989 = 100): Polish 
stabilization program after two months (material for Economic Council of Government), 
(2) Monthly inflation rates: Rzeczpospolita, 30 July 1990. Report of the Central 
Statistical Office. 
21
 Support for Balcerowicz's program and for Tadeusz Mazowiecki is net support. 
Sources of these data: results of the CBOS surveys published in Serwis informacyjny..., 
1990, no. 8. 
Figure 1. Relation between economic performance and social support 
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Below the highest and slowly decreasing line representing the 
support for Prime Minister Mazowiecki there is a jungle of lines 
representing the changing economic performance and changing 
support for the economic program of Deputy Prime Minister 
Balcerowicz. This is the first impression. 
But behind this first impression there is a certain logic, let 
us say social logic, underlying these results. We see that overcoming 
the inflation did not increase support for the economic program. 
This support, beginning from January, was decreasing, and the 
fall of real wages is correlated with it. This does not mean, of 
course, that the decrease of the inflation rate is the cause of 
the decrease of the support for the program. It means, in my 
opinion, that the gains resulting from the overcoming of inflation 
were perceived as less important than loses caused by the lowering 
of real wages, and, possibly, by unemployment and recession, which 
are not included in the chart. For the popular perception of the 
economic performance the "individual" perspective was of much 
more importance than the systemie one (represented by the inflation 
rate). 
Another important feature of the data presented in figure 1 is that 
there was a weaker connection between the support for T. Mazo-
wiecki and the economic performance than between the support for 
the economic program and the economic performance. Support for 
Mazowiecki was also much higher than support for the economic 
program. This means, in my opinion, that there were two 
dimensions of support. The first one, strongly connected with 
economic performance, was the support, or the weakening of this 
support, resulting from threatened economic interests. This support, 
based on economic interest, was represented by the support for the 
Balcerowicz program. The second source of support was that based 
on moral values, symbols of Solidarity's success, and represented by 
the support for Mazowiecki. This type of support could absorb the 
possible social unrest caused by threatened economic interests as was 
the case during the first months of the implementation of the 
economic program. 
This dual nature of popular support seems to be the crucial feature of 
the first phase of transformation. There is a question how long this 
moral type of support could last without any support based on 
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economic interests or sometimes even in spite of these threatened 
interests. We see that this moral support was slowly decreasing, but 
interest based support was not increasing. This tendency could be 
dangerous if not stopped. The increase of the role of the interest based 
support would mean the real beginning of the second phase of 
post-communism. Some answers to this question will be presented in 
the last chapter of my book. 
The two types of support described above are characteristic of the 
two stages of the economic program: stabilization and reconstruction. 
Moral-based support was sufficient during the first stage, while 
during the second one interests were to stimulate economic 
restructuring. The transition from the first to the second stage 
engenders many tensions and these can be regarded as limits to the 
economic change caused by the type of the program. Below I present 
some of the possible tensions. 
There are two contradictory philosophies of social change embodied 
in the government program. The philosophy of the first stage, 
stabilization, was negative and "from above." Inflation had to be 
overcome and wages decreased, and these goals were to be achieved 
by central decisions rather than by spontaneous social activity 
(Rychard 1991). The philosophy of the second stage is completely 
different. It is positive and "from below." The economy should 
be restructured and the activity of the private business sector is 
to be crucial. "We create the economic system of the resourceful 
(entrepreneurial) people" said the Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz 
in the first public announcement of the need for the second stage 
of the program in April, 1990 (Balcerowicz 1990). These two 
contradictory philosophies were presumably necessary, but the 
transition from one to another cannot be easy. 
These philosophies require two different types of social behavior. 
The first one requires a passive personality, which will adapt to the 
Program and tolerate it. This was the nature of the moral-based 
support that was described above. This type of support was very 
effective in the first stage of the economic program, but is not sufficient 
during the next stage. This is supposed to be a stage in which an active 
society should enter the arena of economic life. It has to be a society 
that bases its activity not only on values but first of all on its interests. 
At least two problems arise here. 
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The first one is the ąuestion whether society can be easily transferred 
from the passive to the active state. The assumption that society can 
change itself easily is not justified. It was in the era of communist rule 
when the political elite believed that society can be easily molded. Such 
comparison is, of course, a great oversimplification, but it reflects, in 
my opinion, some elements of the reform paradigm in the designing 
of the present changes. 
The second problem is that according to many opinions there are 
structural limits to the activity of society. The process of 
demonopolization of the economy is starting very slowely, and 
privatization is the long range program. It is still simply very hard for 
people to implement the government's appeal to go and be 
entrepreneurial. The assumption that many of the unemployed will 
become the new class of entrepreneurs (Balcerowicz 1990a) turned out 
to be rather optimistic due to the fact that many private businesses were 
the victims of the recession and that the majority of the unemployed are 
not entrepreneurial in a psychological sense. 
During the first stage of the implementation of the economic 
program there was a consistency between the philosophy of the 
program, the type of popular support and structural conditions. In the 
second stage of the program, an inconsistency among these three 
elements can occur; the active philosophy can collide with the passive 
support and with the weakness of the structural possibilities of 
economic activity. 
After two years of the economic transformation the general popular 
support for changes remained unclear. According to the data gathered 
in September 1991 the results of the Balcerowicz plan for Poland were 
as good as bad in the opinion of 43 percent of the respondents of 
a national sample and more bad than good in the opinion of 35 percent 
of them (Przemiany gospodarcze..., 1991). On the other hand, the 
support for J.K. Bielecki, J. Olszewski, and H. Suchocka as Prime 
Ministers was lower than the exceptionally high support for the first 
non-communist Prime Minister, T.Mazowiecki. After two years the 
general, moral based support for transformation resulting from the 
rejection of communism has declined. This is a normal phenomenon. 
The support for the economic program (represented by the 
acceptance of the Balcerowicz plan) is still differentiated. The question 
arises as to whether this differentiated support is based on interests. 
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There are some signs that interests-based support is emerging very 
slowly (in 1991 the Balcerowicz plan was accepted mainly by groups 
located higher in the social structure) but these are only the first signs. 
The crucial factor here is the restructuring of the economy through 
Pnvatization, which will create real interests. This process is starting 
very slowly. 
As a matter of fact, there is a possibility of the development of active 
economic behavior based on interests, but the problem is that it could 
be directed rather against the economic program. As I wrote with 
L. Kolarska-Bobińska, the success of the economic program depends 
on the functioning of the enterprises and individuals according to its 
rules. But Polish society well knows how to ignore any inconvenient 
rules. This is the reason why through the mechanisms of corruption, the 
second economy and the black market, many rules of the program can 
be avoided (Kolarska-Bobińska and Rychard 1990). Also some wait 
and see passive strategies of the enterprises seem to reflect this 
phenomenon. This limit to the economic transformation results from 
the legacy of spontaneous adaptive processes, which are the universal 
and stable feature of any society. 
Other empirical results also show some peculiarities of the social 
support for the program in early 1990 and after. In early 1990 it was 
rather the program of the young, not the poor and educated persons 
working in the state-owned sector and being members of Solidarity 
("Społeczna ocena..." 1990). We can hypothesize that the support 
for the program was located more in the groups of the intelligentsia 
than in others. Could this mean the continuity of the process 
described earlier, while analyzing the communist-led reforms, that 
the transformation in the beginning of 1990 was more the issue of 
intellectual-political support and not the support given by interests 
groups? From that point of view, the situation would be quite 
similar: both communist-led reforms and the present transformation 
would be promoted mainly by their political supporters. The 
essential difference was in the scope of this support and its 
character. It was much greater in 1990 and based on the moral 
conviction of its necessity, while previous communist-led reforms 
were supported because of political loyalty. 
However, other data show that there are some important changes in 
the social support for the changes as compared between 1988 (the last 
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year of communism) and the end of 1990. In 1988, as I noted earlier, the 
authorities and intelligentsia were perceived to be the most important 
supporters of the economic reform. At the end of 1990 authorities were 
still highly located (although these are completely different authorities, 
non-communist) and - what is more important - the representatives of 
the private sector are perceived to be also one of the main supporters of 
the reform (which was not case two years earlier). This shows some 
beginnings of interest-based support. 
These data inform us also that the support for the economic 
transformation is diversified and the differences among groups are 
quite high. This could mean that there will be no national consensus on 
the program and that its implementation will cause many social 
conflicts. 
* * * 
The future of the Polish economic transformation is very unclear. It is 
facing many limits and some of these limits are created by the 
transformation itself. This is a normal process in which spontaneous 
and directed mechanisms interweave. Each day shows us new 
challenges and limits, but the most important difference between this 
period and the communist one is that now, in spite of many difficulties, 
society can feel that the general direction of change is consistent with its 
aspirations. This is a major opportunity for the transformation. The 
problem is how to nurture this belief and not to waste it. 
Polish society was always very capable of avoiding and neutralizing 
official measures which were not in accord with to its values and 
interests. These "everyday reforms" took the form of the adaptive 
behavior. They still last and can modify the transformation. Their 
sources lie in the communist era when people were trying to substitute 
real reform and real legitimacy by individual adaptation strategies. The 
next chapter is dealing with these phenomena. 
C H A P T E R 3 
ADAPTIVE PROCESSES AND CRISIS 
OF LEGITIMACY 
3.1. BEYOND LEGITIMACY: ADAPTIVE PROCESSES 
DURING THE DECLINE OF COMMUNISM1 
3.1.1. ACTIVE ADAPTATION 
A significant part of literature devoted to the systems and societies of 
"real socialism" contains, in my opinion, a serious gap. It is dominated 
by a picture of systems rejected by society "en masse," the history of 
which was a continuous sequence of rebellions and conflicts. The 
causes and the course of those conflicts have been discerned far more 
successfully than what has happened in the periods between them. The 
assessment presented above has been intentionally exaggerated in order 
to outline the purpose of this chapter more clearly. I am going to search 
in it for an answer to the question why did people "join" amonocentric 
system imposed from above (and often rejected). 
What are the advantages of studying the adaptation processes during 
the decline of communism? They were a substitute for legitimation. 
Although the degree of legitimacy of the system after the downfall of 
communism has risen considerably, there have remained certain 
Problems with legitimation, which sometimes allow us to speak about 
a new form of crisis of legitimation. There have also remained various 
forms of adaptative actions. Discussing these phenomena in the 
subsequent chapters I will therefore refer directly to the concepts and 
conclusions of this chapter. The concept presented here is, in an 
indirect way, a discussion with the totalitarian approach as a way of 
explaining the communist reality. I am proposing here a competitive 
1
 The initial version of this chapter was a part of a project "Crisis in Soviet Systems," 
coordinated by Z. Młynar. This chapter is being published for the first time. Some of its 
Preliminary ideas are included in my article "Konflikt i przystosowanie: dwie koncepcje 
ł a d u społecznego w Polsce" in M. Marody and A. Sulek (eds), Rzeczywistość polska 
i sposoby radzenia sobie z nią, Warsaw University, 1987. 
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model of explanation, which accentuates the role of the internal 
dynamics of the former system and its ability to meet with "social 
entrenchment." 
I will present here an outline of a theoretical concept, which could 
explain the sources, forms and conventions of the people's "joining" 
the functioning of this type of institutional system with the example of 
Poland at the end of the 1980's. Thus it is an attempt to answer the 
question about the mechanism stabilizing a monocentric system. 
Empirical studies clearly show that, although the institutional system 
was evaluated rather low, there was, however, something that caused 
this evaluation to be differentiated (positive aspects were perceived as 
well), and which, above all, caused the negative opinion in a "symbolic 
sphere" (i.e. manifested by attitudes) to result less often than it would 
be expected in contesting behavior. 
Hence the main purpose of the work presented here is to identify the 
cementing and stabilizing factors. I should, however, point out at the 
beginning what will not be the subject of this analysis, although it had 
a certain stabilizing effect. I will leave outside this analysis the role of 
Poland's position in the Warsaw Pact, and (in principle) the role of 
repressions and the fears of those repressions. Many people could say: 
what, in that case, is there left to be analyzed and studied, since those 
were the main factors stabilizing the system? Perhaps this is true. But 
I am interested in those stabilizers, which the system had worked out in 
Poland during its history of over 40 years - those which did not consist 
in repressions. This chapter will aim at proving their existence, 
understanding their sources, and showing their functions. 
I will start the analyses with an introductory outline of concepts of 
active adaptation as the most general conceptual framework, in which 
I will analyze the sources of stability. Next I will undertake a discussion 
(theoretical and empirical) with the concepts of legitimation as a way of 
explaining stability. In my conception, rejecting violence as the main 
stabilizer, I similarly ąuestion (or similarly point out significant 
limitations of) the concept of legitimation in explaining the sources of 
stability. In the following part I will attempt to analyze more 
thoroughly the forms of "active adaptation," with a special 
consideration given to the role of values and interests, as well as to the 
role of informal mechanisms. Next I will present an outline of a concept 
generalizing mechanisms of active adaptation, i.e. the concept of 
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a "fourfold system." In the last chapter of this book I will refer to this 
concept, analyzing its usefulness in the description of post-communist 
reality. Naturally, analyzing the adaptation processes, I will also 
discuss the "conditions of moving" from the state of peace to a state of 
social uprising, from adaptation to revolt. Some adaptation 
mechanisms can also be analyzed as initially stabilizing, but secondarily 
and indirectly destabilizing. Theses on that matter will be presented in 
the last part of the chapter. 
In a discussion about adaptive processes, it sometimes seems that 
these are processes in which passive individuals or groups adapt to the 
requirements of their partners (in our case, to the requirements of an 
mstitutional system). I propose a different concept, according to which 
adaptation is understood as an active process, in the course of which 
not only an individual or a group is undergoing transformation, but 
also the "system" is modified by those who are adapting2 (Rychard and 
Sterniczuk 1985, pp. 16-9). I will be interested mainly in those 
adaptation processes which, although they did not always consist in 
aiming at general values of the type of democracy, they caused certain 
modifications of institutional systems. As a result, the real needs and 
values of individuals did not have to be realized solely in the private 
sphere. A specific feature of those adaptive processes was the fact that 
a majority of them occurred not in the people-people, but in the 
People-system relations. People's partners in those processes were not 
2
 The processes of a spontaneous modification of the system in the course of adaptive 
actions in Poland were described most thoroughly in the conception of Jadwiga 
Staniszkis (e.g. 1976), who analyzed these phenomena on the level of industrial 
organizations (see also Beksiak 1982, p. 110). Activism as a feature of some individual or 
collective adaptive processes is also emphasized in the works of Koralewicz-Zębik (1983), 
Turski (1985), Sułek (1984), Narojek (1986). The adaptive processes would consist, 
therefore, in a creation of possibilities to realize personal or group goals and aspirations 
within the structure of the existing system. This phenomenon has been described by 
Koralewicz-Zębik (1985) and Wnuk-Lipiński (1985) as a process of "taming" the hostile 
society created from above into a friendly society (mainly - according to the authors 
- through democratization, although they also clearly point to the role of a private sphere 
and smali groups). In foreign literature we could point to the already classical work of 
Selznick (1966) or the work of Crozier and Friedberg (1982). The proposal presented here 
Would belong to the trend of this type of analyses. In Polish literature see also Sterniczuk 
(1984). From among recent works we could also list Marody's (1988) concept of 
'collective sense," or a comprehensive analysis of the functioning of Polish society under 
real socialism (Marody [ed.] 1991). 
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other groups of people (most often), but institutional structures. This 
is a result of structural solutions in the sphere of politics, which gave 
the state structure a certain omnipotence and limited "horizontal" 
relations. W. Narojek (1986) calls this process "putting human 
interaction under state control." This does not mean that horizontal 
relations did not exist. They were important, especially in the periods 
of open phases of conflict (e.g. 1980-81). This only means that I see 
the importance of people-system relations as an indication of identity 
of this type of order, and that I am analyzing adaptation processes 
taking place at this level. The domination of vertical relations over the 
horizontal ones has, moreover, a fundamental significance for the 
forms of adaptative processes. For this means that they always require 
a reference to the system, that these processes and mechanisms exist 
only as long as we discuss them along with their relation to the system. 
Concerning this matter we can see a fundamental difference between 
these processes during the communist and the post-communist periods. 
As the analyses ia the last chapter will show, in the so-called second 
phase of post-communism adaptive processes had mainly a horizontal 
character, and concerned the relations between people (individuals and 
groups), not between people and the institutional system. 
When I am writing about a system, I have in mind a set of 
institutionalized rules of behavior, which mostly have a form of 
specific organizations functioning in the political, economic, 
administrative, and other spheres. Among those rules and 
organizations, the most important was undoubtedly the part which 
referred to the rules of exercising power (therefore, the system 
in a political sense), although analyzing the adaptation processes 
I will often discuss those which existed in the economic sphere 
as well. 
We can view the period of almost 45 years from the end of the 
Second World War as a dramatic time, during which both sides - i.e. 
the "system" and the society - tried to adapt to each other. This means 
that the representatives of government tried to shape the society 
according to their doctrinal and ideological goals, and society, not 
wanting to give up its traditions, culture, and value systems, tried - in 
various ways - t o "adapt" the system to its expectations. I do not mean 
to suggest here that this was a game of two eąual partners: the 
superiority of force and means of influence on the side of the 
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government seems to be obvious. But in this case it is even more 
worthwhile to take into consideration the limited effectiveness of those 
actions of the government in Poland, which were supposed to "build 
socialism." There are various indicators of this limited effectiveness, 
but as the most important among them one could recognize certain 
structural features (e.g. the fundamental significance of private 
ownership of land in agriculture, the role of the Catholic Church in 
Public life) and certain social processes (the continuity of serious 
political conflicts and rebellions directed against methods of governing, 
a certain pluralization of social life). These two sides had not, of course, 
equal possibilities of activity. The system of power, controlling the 
economy and other spheres of life, had at its command as mechanisms 
of influence mainly the control of processes of work and employment 
and the control of political activity, thus making the behavior of classes 
and social strata dependent on the ideal preferred by the doctrine and 
ideology. However, society did not lack influence. The point is that its 
influence was being realized not within the formal structure of the 
system, but usually in spite of it, or "next to it." It often took a shape of 
outbursts of discontent, usually combined with strikes in the state 
industry system. As a result of these open conflicts, some elements of 
the system were undergoing change and started to suit social 
aspirations better. However, usually after those periods there was 
a "comeback:" changes were hampered, and sometimes the structural 
methods were becoming even more "repressive" than they were before 
the moment of outburst. In spite of that, the system was somewhat 
"different" than before the outbreak of conflict, although the degree 
and scope of this difference are not easy to define. 
Apart from violent struggles for change, there were also other, more 
"hidden" mechanisms of adapting "the system to the people." These 
mechanisms functioned during the so-called "normal" periods, i.e. 
without strikes or rebellions. I have in mind here the whole sphere of 
informalities, deviations from official rules of functioning. I have 
described them in the first chapter. 
The analysis of informal processes and phenomena has a certain 
tradition in Polish sociology. For a few years now, there have appeared 
new perspectives in their study. In sociology, the perspective of 
"pathology" has almost disappeared, while a tendency to analyze 
systemie functions of those informalities, and to study their role in 
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micro-arrangements in group life, has started to dominate. These 
problems are being dealt with under different theoretical perspectives.3 
At least two essential features distinguish those theoretical approaches. 
Firstly, their authors assume a various degree of intentionality of the 
government's functioning in allowing the informal processes to form. 
Thus we encounter opinions that the authorities themselves in a way 
"created those informalities" in order to level the ineffective 
functioning "from above" of the created system. There are also 
opinions that those processes were being created spontaneously, and 
were at most tolerated and/or strengthened by the authorities when 
they were propitious to their goals. I am inclined to share this particular 
view. Secondly, the analyses may concentrate on macro-social or 
micro-social results of actions of this type. The subject of analysis in 
this chapter are the macro-social results of this type of phenomena. 
Among the recent works on these problems one should mention the 
analysis of A. Kamiński (1992) who interprets mechanisms of 
corruption as one of the three strategies adopted by the communis state 
regarding society. The first strategy, coercion, has been replaced by 
corruption, which is negative in character. The only positive strategy is 
reform. However, its implementation can be dangerous for the political 
system (Kamiński 1992, pp. 256-59). Although the adaptation 
3
 For example, scientists analyzing the industry and the sociology of organization, 
described various types of bargaining and games for adjustment. As an example, we 
could point to the works by Staniszkis (e.g. concept of authodynamics of structures, 
1976), Kurczewski and Frieske (1974), Kolarska-Bobińska (1984), Iwanowska (1982), 
Sterniczuk (1982; 1984), the collective work by Federowicz, Iwanowska and Żukowski 
(1986) presenting the concept of "reciprocal services" as an adaptation mechanism, or 
the works by Federowicz (1992a) and Poleszczuk (1991). The same subject - but not in 
reference to industry, but as an element of the whole order - appears also in the concept, 
introduced by Krzemiński (1984), of a feudalization of the social system in the Gierek 
era. There are also interesting perspectives for analysis of other subjects: of local 
authorities (e.g. the client-patron concept of Tarkowski, 1981), theorelical concepts of 
corruption (Kamiński, 1986), "micro-organizational" and "macro-organizational" 
perspective (mainly Narojek 1982; 1986; Nowak 1979). I should point here as well to the 
analysis of the "economics of daily life," describing informal processes with reference to 
the theory of exchange, by Pawlik (1985). I have in mind also studies of individual and 
collective strategies for "survival" (Marody 1985; 1987), for "innovational adaptation" 
(Turski 1985), or the "reaction to a situation of an outside compulsion" 
(Koralewicz-Zębik 1983; 1985). We could also include here the analyses by Nowak (1984) 
about various ways of going "outside the system." 
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strategies analyzed here are much broader than the corruption 
mechanisms and I do not consider them to be the strategies adopted by 
the state but rather by society I would like to point out Kamiński's idea 
that the corruption has to be studied from the macro perspective. This 
is an important mechanism penetrating the institutional structure of 
the communist order together with two other mechanisms analyzed by 
Kamiński - coercion and reform. 
The concept accepted here does not restrict adaptation processes 
only to informal phenomena. They constituted and still constitute their 
important part, but only a part of them. The next assumption of my 
analysis is thus a conviction that the processes of active adaptation 
often take the forms of informal phenomena, although they can also 
appear as very "formal" processes. 
The concept of active adaptation is, however, in no case 
equivalent to accepting the convention of a game, or the 
"negotiational" convention. Except for short periods in history when 
these categories described real social processes according to their 
original meaning, I do not see their usefulness in the analysis. 
Firstly, as I mentioned before, analysis in these categories assumes 
equality of partners, which was not the case in the Polish situation, 
when one of the partners could change the rules of the game while it 
was being played, could invalidate its results, etc.4 Secondly, the 
convention of a game and negotiations assumes that both players 
have a strategy directed at a positive outcome of the game. I believe 
that both sides played somewhat different "games." The communist 
authorities played for "real socialism," while the people played for 
individual or group self-fulfilment. What I mean is that not always 
at the foundations of a majority of the people's actions modifying 
the system, in the course of active adaptation processes, lay a cons­
cious desire for such modification. Not always was there a conscious 
Policy directed at changing the system, but there was a conscious 
desire to make the system more bearable to oneself (Rychard and 
Szymanderski 1985). These last remarks refer to the so-called normal 
periods, since in the periods of open forms of conflict such 
conscious policy was followed. 
4
 M. Crozier and E. Friedberg (1982, p. 111) argue that these conditions are not 
necessary for the game. 
84 
I would incline to a thesis that in the post-war period both the system 
and society have changed in the course of those twofold adaptation 
processes. 
Referring to the above observations, I would like to stress that I do 
not perceive government-society relations as a process of easy and 
continuous "plastical" shaping of society by an effective and 
purposeful government. Such a view is to me as equally simplified and 
untrue as the opposing view, according to which the relations between 
the two forces were an unending sequence of rebellions, rejections of 
the system by the society, and repressions of that "disobedient society" 
by the authorities. I reject both of these extreme views, for although 
each has some elements of truth, none of them alone touches the 
essence of the problem. It is clear to me that the dynamics of relations 
between the institutional communist system and society should rather 
be perceived as an unstable balance between the desire of the state to 
"etatize society" (a phrase used by Narojek 1986, and Krzemiński 
1984) and the desire of society to "socialize" the state. Both sides used 
different tactics adapting their partner to their visions and ideals, but 
they also adapted themselves and changed in the course of this process.5 
It sometimes also occurred that both sides were giving up part of 
their original goals or had actually modified them. I am inclined to 
suppose that the government gave up its original goals at least a few 
times. I also believe that the authorities gradually became used to the 
thought that in Poland the realization of the "ideological program of 
socialism" will be marked by certain differences, compared to other 
countries of real socialism. These differences - initially only tolerated 
- during some periods were becoming legalized differences, and were 
made into elements of programs (e.g. the slogan of the "Polish road to 
socialism" or the constitutional entry about individual farms). 
What, then, stabilized the system, which was perceived as an element 
in adaptation processes occurring between the government and society? 
As the above analyses indicate, I see the sources of that balance and 
stabilization neither - on the one hand - only (or even mainly) in 
"legitimation," i.e. in a conscious political support, nor - on the other 
hand - only in terror and fear of repressions. What really built that 
unstable balance, was the whole, difficult to define area spreading 
5
 In sum, this was a process of "dual dependency," described by W. Adamski (1985). 
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"between" classical legitimation and the terror and fear of repressions. 
Exactly between those boundaries lies most of the above-mentioned 
adaptation processes. These processes sustained the system in spite of 
its low social acceptance. The system had, of course, other, more 
powerful safeguards, resulting from its placement among other 
communist countries and from military alliances. These were 
self-evident. However, to sociologists more interesting seem the 
"internal" stabilizing mechanisms, resulting from the dynamics of 
mutual adjustment processes taking place between the authorities and 
society. This type of balance was socially costly. Lack of alternatives 
and pragmatic adaptation in behavior with a simultaneous lack of 
acceptance in attitudes - these phenomena deepen the divergence 
between the sphere of "thinking" and "acting," between the "private" 
and the "official." However, the essence of real socialism in Poland 
consisted of the existence of such splits and divergences in various 
spheres of life. They were an effect of inconsistency in the normative 
Principles of the system. The analysis of adaptation processes in 
categories of legitimation also points to the existence of those 
incoherences. 
3.1.2. LEGITIMATION AND ADAPTATION: LIMITATIONS AND CHANCES 
OF THE CONCEPT 
Emphasizing the limited usefulness of concepts of legitimation in 
explaining the sources of stability, I am at the same time indicating the 
direction of analysis which I will not follow. This choice, however, 
requires a theoretical and empirical justification. From the discussion 
of limits of this concept will simultaneously emerge more clearly the 
direction of analyses to be developed in the subsequent parts of this 
chapter. 
From the sociological point of view, concepts of legitimation6 are 
a convenient tool for analysis because they create a theoretical 
6
 From among Polish authors the following have discussed legitimation with reference 
to the final years of communism in Poland: Staniszkis (1979; 1984), Pańków (1981), 
Jasińska and Siemieńska (1981), Jasińska (1984), Wesołowski and Mach (1983), 
Morawski (1980), Nowak (1984), Mreła (1984), Lamentowicz (1983). We could also 
include here the collective work edited by Rychard and Sułek (1988). 
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framework for the study of processes taking place between political and 
economic systems and the society. It is the legitimacy (or the lack of it) 
which creates a perspective through which the particular strata of the 
society perceive their country. A study of processes of legitimation, 
must therefore mean in practice an analysis of relations between social 
interests and aspirations, and the shape of the system of power. 
Most generally speaking, as a legitimized system we would consider 
a system, in which the conformability of its citizens' behavior to the 
decisions of the governing centers is the result of a normative 
acceptance of the principles creating the legitimacy of the system and 
the decisions resulting from those principles. Thus we can speak about 
legitimation of the political as well as of the economic sphere. We can 
also analyze the degree of legitimation of the social structure 
understood as the degree of acceptation of the rules governing social 
promotion and degradation, rules of attaining various social positions. 
In the general definition given here I have tried to distinguish the 
concept of legitimation from obedience resulting from sources other 
than conscious acceptance - e.g. from fear or from a certain pragmatic 
adaptation. This way we touch one of the theoretical dilemmas. For if 
we restrict the concept of legitimation, it will be easy to defend a thesis 
that the main sources of obedience and stability lie outside of 
legitimation, and that they can often be found in a specific pragmatic 
adaptation resulting from instrumental motives (Mann 1975; Mayntz 
1975). In such a situation we clearly point to limits of the usefulness of 
the concept of legitimation, and it seems reasonable then to speak 
about consent and adaptation (for the purpose of describing those 
pragmatic sources of obedience) rather than legitimation. 
Actually, the discussion presented here refers to this theoretical 
dilemma. The main ąuestion is: did the sources of obedience lie in some 
type of legitimation or rather in a pragmatic adaptation? Here 
I transcend the framework of the perspective of legitimation. I am 
looking for the sources of systemic stability, the sources of "joining" 
the institutional system (Mann 1975). The source of these processes is 
not always legitimation. With such an approach we have a chance, 
then, to define the limits of usefulness of the perspective of legitimation. 
For one could assume that the specifics of the Polish situation meant 
the low degree of legitimacy of the system at the level of rules of 
exercising power, with a simultaneous, more widespread, consent to 
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a number of definite solutions visible in daily life. This type of consent 
created adaptation resulting mainly from pragmatic motives. I will 
attempt to continue this discussion later.7 
Empirical research of the "Poles" series, undertaken in Poland in the 
1980's. convinces that a centralized political system, and in particular 
the hegemonic role of one party, did not possess mass legitimation. The 
percentage of those who supported this model oscillated from 14 
Percent to 28 percent, depending on the way of asking the question 
(Rychard 1985; 1989). Moreover, as I will show in the next chapter, this 
already very weak legitimization underwent an apparent erosion at the 
end of the 1980's. Other studies indicate that a possibility of consent 
appeared at the level of social micro-organization (e.g. in the industrial 
enterprises). A systematic analysis of the perceived sources of 
obedience has demonstrated that Polish society saw those sources less 
often in the democratism of the government, in the charisma of the 
leader (less than 50 percent believed that the majority of people in 
Poland obey the authorities; in fact, 45 percent did obey), and more 
often in negative-pragmatic factors and in the legality of the 
government. The first three motives of obedience mentioned were: fear 
of punishment, advantages in daily life, and belief in the legality of the 
government (all three were chosen by over 70 percent of those 
respondents who believed that people are obedient, [Rychard and 
Szymanderski 1986]). Thus it was a peculiar conglomerate of negative, 
7
 Distinguishing between the political-ideological sphere and the practical-pragmatic 
one already has a certain tradition in Poland (e.g. Lamentowicz 1982; Wesołowski and 
Mach 1983, 1986; Nowak 1984, the concept of "consent" of Morawski 1980, or the 
concept of legitimization included in the works by Staniszkis, e.g. 1979). Relationships 
between these types of legitimization have been discussed in various ways. It has been 
noted that one type of legitimization can substitute the lack of legitimization of another 
type, but only to a certain degree (e.g. Tarkowski, 1988), that political legitimization can 
hamper the building-up of a revolutionary situation as a result of decreased level of 
satisfying the needs (Pacewicz 1983, p. 173). Some argue that also the legitimization of 
the pragmatic type cannot take place without "doctrinal grounds" which, although 
originally of electic character, in the period of stabilization of the new system is 
increasingly being perceived as more uniform (Wesołowski and Mach 1986, p. 23). 
Foreign authors point to the increasing role of pragmatic legitimization as the political 
order stabilizes (e.g. the concept of the system's "normalizing" of Heller 1982, or the role 
of paternalism in legitimization: Feher 1982). The role of pragmatic factors was also 
described by Markus (1982) in his concept of the "overt and covert" types of 
legitimization, and by Mann (1977) in the categories of "institutional fit." 
88 
pragmatic, and legitimizational factors (other elements of legiti-
mization were mentioned less often, among them the democratism of 
elections, and trust in the leader the least). 
To the largest groups of respondents among those convinced about 
obedience to the authorities, this obedience resulted from the fear of 
repressions, from expecting advantages in the daily life, and from the 
legality of the government. Legality was mentioned quite often, despite 
the relatively low popularity of the view on a democratic procedure of 
election. To some respondents, then, the legality did not have to be an 
effect of the democratic procedure of electing the government. 
These results can be seen as a partial confirmation of the hypothesis 
on the role of extra-legitimizational "stabilizers" in the social system 
(partial - because some elements of legitimization, e.g. legality, scored 
high, while some extra-legitimizational, e.g. geopolitics, relatively 
lower). They remain in concordance with theoretical concepts 
describing the reality of the countries of real socialism. One could 
assume that they confirm a more general regularity as well: after all, 
M. Mann's concept regarding "institutional fit" (1975), or the work by 
R. Mayntz (1975) on the sources of stability other than legitimation, 
referred to the western realities. The phenomena of the "deficit of 
legitimation" and of the substitutional character of other stabilizers 
would have, therefore, a more universal character, though, of course, 
the sources of the lack of legitimation in the two systems would be 
totally different. 
The results of studies indicate moreover that the conviction about 
the importance of pragmatic sources of adaptation was significantly 
less dependent on the declared political views than was the conviction 
about legitimizational sources of obedience. Thus one could advance 
a thesis that adaptation was (is?) in some sense apolitical, which means 
that both the advocates and the opponents of the existing institutions in 
the system of power could agree on the fact that the system was based on 
the extra-legitimizational sources of stability. Going further, one could 
assume that both the advocates and the opponents of the political 
system could accept the adaptation mechanism and use it in practice in 
daily life. 
The results of various studies, being referred to here, confirm, 
therefore, the rightness of the initial assumption of the research 
consisting in separating the sphere of legitimation and the sphere of 
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adaptation. Such separation allows for advancing theses on political 
delegitimization and on a simultaneous adaptation as a structural 
factor describing the relations between the "system" and society. The 
analytical step of separating both spheres of phenomena does not 
mean, of course, that we cannot speak about interrelations between 
them. The lack of possibility of pragmatic adaptation (consisting in, for 
exarnple, satisfying material needs) can be a factor additionally 
delegitimizing the political sphere (on that matter see, for example, 
Pacewicz 1983, p. 173). This was, it seems, a process occurring in 
Poland, where references to economic needs were often used as means 
to legitimize the government (Tarkowski 1988), while inability to 
satisfy those needs deepened the deficit of political legitimization. 
The next part of my deliberation, although it concerns mainly the 
analysis of certain adaptive processes, will include theses on the 
interdependence of various spheres, or the levels of adaptation and 
legitimization. 
3.l.3. ACTIVE ADAPTATION: AN ATTEMPT TO SPECIFY 
THE PHENOMENON 
The initial characteristic of processes of "active adaptation," presented 
in the first part of the chapter, included some of their features, which 
I would like to present here in a more ordered manner. Although I am 
describing here processes functioning in real socialism, many of them, 
as the analyses in the subsequent chapters will show, have survived the 
downfall of the system. 
Firstly, these processes are characterized by the fact that they always 
take place between society and the system. As I wrote before, it is more 
often a relation towards institutional structures than a relation towards 
other people. 
Secondly, these processes have an active character, which means that 
adaptation did not consist solely in a plastical transformation of the 
adapting individuals, but also in a modification of the system, in its 
"redefining" in the course of adaptation.8 Activism is, therefore, 
8
 The analyses of Ph. Selznick have shown this in an already classical way. He wrote: 
"— our search for the meaning and significance of the grass-roots policy verifies the 
hypothesis that the channelling of administrative responsibilities through previously 
existing institutions results in conseąuences for the role and character of the initiator 
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understood here as a characteristic of both "sides" of the adaptation 
process: the people and the system. 
Thirdly, modifications of the system as a result of adaptive actions are 
characterized by a various degree of intentionality. Among them there are 
those which are undertaken with the intention of a conscious change of 
the system, its modification even in the micro dimension, or at least they 
are accompanied by a reflection, an awareness of this modification. There 
are also those among which a desire for such modification does not exist, 
which is forming as an unintended consequence, and the only intention 
here is "making it" individually or as a group (Rychard and 
Szymanderski 1986). A thesis could be advanced here that the higher the 
degree to which we are dealing with adaptation processes motivated by 
axiology or political interests, the more apparent is that intentionality. 
Such processes which concern the sphere of material interests usually do 
not have any modifying intention (although this is not a rule). At the same 
time, "transformations" taking place within the society are usually the 
effect of conscious systemic pursuits resulting from the ideological 
program, although they are not always effective and some of them were 
given up by the government. On the whole, this two-way process means 
that the "system" consciously wanted to change the society, while in effect 
the "society" (not always consciously) changed the system. 
Fourthly - and this is a feature directly related to the previous one 
- the adaptation processes in the sense being developed here, although 
they describe the behavior of large groups of people, usually do not 
play the role of integrating people during those actions. Most often, 
individuals act during those processes exactly as individuals. 
Integration is practically limited to smali groups (e.g. certain types of 
"micro-arrangements," in which individuals are aware of being a part 
of the arrangement, which creates the "esprit de corps" of such 
a group). I believe that these processes do not generate integration on 
a mass scale, e.g. that of class. W. Narojek (1986) has advanced a thesis 
that the adaptive behavior motivated pragmatically has an 
which were not anticipated by the formal theory or doctrine" (Selznick 1966, p. 184).This 
"activism" takes place through various types of mechanism of cooption (see also the 
analyses by Kamiński 1976, p. 156, in which he emphasizes adaptation of the system to 
the external interests as a result of informal cooption. Crozier and Friedberg (1982) 
clearly point out the activism of an "actor" directed toward the "system," describing 
these relations in the categories of game. 
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individualistic character. However, in his work he analyzes 
group-making phenomena forming during the course of processes of 
this type. Thus, if I assume here that the discussed adaptive processes 
do not have a group-making character, then maintaining this position 
is possible on the grounds of such a concept of a group when it is 
perceived as an entity aware of its group character and when, in 
principle, groups are being discussed in the micro-social sense. 
Fifthly - these processes fulfil dual functions. On the one hand 
they stabilize the existing institutional order by the fact that they 
make the realization of individual and group interests possible. This 
is, after all, an almost definitional feature of all adaptation 
Processes. On the other hand, some of their forms can disintegrate 
society (e.g. second economy), produce a destabilizing effect 
(numerous pathological phenomena fulfilling "adaptive" 
functions), or create a favorable climate for an outburst of social 
discontent (when these processes are grounded in an ineffective 
economy and the system lacks other stabilizers, e.g. political 
legitimization). 
The features of the adaptation processes presented above describe 
their functioning in so-called normal situations, i.e. in the periods of 
hidden phases of conflict. When the conflict enters its open phase, the 
individual adaptation processes change into collective actions, 
integrating large groups of people, undertaken with a conscious 
intention to reform the system. I will discuss some of the conditions of 
the transition from the state of adaptation to the state of rebellion in 
the subsequent part of the chapter. 
The sources of these processes thus understood are sometimes seen in 
the divergence between the interests, aspirations, and values of the 
society and the shape of the system (e.g. Sharlet 1984; Adamski 1985). 
This divergence generates social tensions, which result in attempts 
action: of the government wanting to adapt society to its conceptions, 
and of society wanting to adapt the institutional system to its 
conceptions. 
In order to characterize the nature of adaptation processes more 
precisely we should consider the fact that this divergence is different at 
different levels of the system. On the basis of concepts and results of 
studies done in industry (Rychard 1987d), confirmed later in mass 
representative research, I have advanced a thesis on three levels at 
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which we can analyze the degree of legitimacy of the existing system: 
ideological, institutional, andbehavioral (pragmatic).9 
The multi-tiered character of the phenomenon of legitimacy consists 
in the fact that the ideology of the system and its main slogans were 
relatively more accepted socially than the institutional solutions, 
especially those concerning the political sphere (as the results of the 
studies mentioned above indicate). Still, at the third, behavioral, leveł, 
people's behavior was often (except for the periods of rebellion) 
acquiescent to the "systemic requirements," but not because of their 
normative acceptance, but rather because of pragmatic adaptation. In 
effect, the system was to some degree (and to a certain moment) 
legitimized "ideologically," accepted "behaviorally," and the area of 
the deepest "deficit" of legitimacy was the middle level: of the 
institutional structure. 
9
 The interpretation of legitimization accepted here, referring to the classical concepts 
of M. Weber and using my earlier analyses based on empirical studies, accentuates two 
aspects of legitimization: subjective and objective. On one side there is the existence of 
belief and claims to legitimacy. On the other, we are dealing with objective norms (e.g. 
"to each according to his work done"), institutional rules (e.g. "governing role of the 
party"), and behavior. This objective sphere can be a subject of claims to legitimacy or 
can be endowed with belief. We could say that this objective sphere legitimizes the system 
through the fact that it simultaneously defines and justifies the rules of people's 
participation in the functioning of the system. According to the reasoning accepted here, 
the objective sphere legitimizing the system exists at three distinct levels of social reality: 
ideological, institutional, and behavioral. As the results of empirical studies indicate, the 
degree of legitimation of these three levels is perceived differently by public opinion. Let 
us add that the ideological level fulfils in this distinction dual functions. On one hand it 
one of the three areas being legitimized, on the other it supplies the lower levels 
- institutional and behavioral - with legitimizing norms. For example, the principle 
included in this level "to each according to his work done" can be analyzed as a norm 
which itself is legitimized or not, and it can be analyzed as a norm which is supposed to 
legitimize institutionalized rules of distribution of goods, existing at the second level. 
On the whole, then, we speak about legitimization when there exist the ruling and the 
ruled (according to M. Weber, legitimization always refers to systems of domination, see 
e.g. Weber, 1978, pp. 952-55) and some spheres of reality (e.g. the three levels distinguished 
by me) - this is the objective side of the phenomenon. The rulers advance claims to 
legitimacy regarding particular spheres of reality, and the ruled endow these spheres with 
legitimizational beliefs - and this the subjective side of the phenomenon. I abstract here 
from the sources of legitimizational belief. In an ideal situation of full legitimacy there is 
a balance between legitimizational clamis and belief regarding each of the three levels of 
reality. However, as observation and results of studies indicate, in Poland such balance did 
not exist. Distinguishing the three levels, at which we can analyze legitimacy, allows 
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However, even this relatively strongest legitimacy of the ideological 
level has undergone a dramatic breakdown at the end of the 1980's. In 
1987, 58 percent of young people still believed that "it is worthwhile to 
continue building socialism in our country," while in 1989 only 29 
Percent accepted this view (data from CBOS, after Marody 1991, 
p. 255). This fall was probably caused also by the fact that the level of 
general values and ideology was not consistent in Polish society. Apart 
from a certain attachment to the ideology and slogans about "socialist" 
origins, at this level there always also existed "non-socialist" values, 
rooted in the tradition of western Christian culture (this inconsistency 
was discussed by scientists, see Bakuniak and Nowak 1984, p. 221). In 
the situation of dramatically increasing erosion of the system of real 
socialism, the values associated with it radically lost support. The 
Position of the opposing universe of values rooted in western culture 
has then risen considerably. 
I will return to the idea of levels of acceptance in the next chapter, 
discussing the problems of legitimation in the post-communist period. 
At this point I would like to discuss more specifically the third, 
behavioral (or pragmatic) level of acceptance of the system. Its 
importance was particularly visible at the close of communism - when 
the remains of belief in "socialist" values declined, while the 
institutional level - as I noted earlier - was never legitimized on a mass 
scale. 
This sphere is the level of pragmatic adaptation, during which the 
system was accepted through behavior, even if in the sphere of values 
and political institutions people opposed it. We could say that it is 
us to identify various types of legitimizational deficits or the legitimizational imbalance. 
It can be the case that the claims of the government fail to "meet" the legitimizational 
belief of the ruled: to the government legitimization of certain spheres is most important, 
while the society is inclined to endow with belief other spheres. It can also be the case that 
the society endows with belief certain spheres which in reality are not fully shaped yet (the 
legitimizational belief exists to a higher degree than the sphere being legitimized). Finally, 
there is also possible a situation in which the society is inclined to endow certain spheres 
at most with a consent, and not a legitimizational belief. Still another situation is not rare, 
in which there exists a kind of inconsistency of some spheres or reality, which concerns 
mainly the axiological level. The ruling advance claims to legitimacy (or use them as 
legitimizing lower levels) regarding different norms than the ruled, rooted in different 
traditions. In the subseąuent part of the chapter and in other parts of the book the above 
distinctions will prove useful in the analysis of the Polish communist reality. 
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a sphere of "daily interest." The distinction proposed here is grounded 
in the presented results of my own studies (Rychard 1983) and it refers 
in its present form to the distinctions made by M. Pacewicz (cit. after 
Pacewicz 1983) and P. Pacewicz (1983). I have in mind the concept of 
an axiological and pragmatic pattern regulating behavior and the 
analysis, developed by P. Pacewicz, of the role of "basic values." We 
could say that the first level is a regulation through values, while the 
second - through interests. As the earlier deliberations have indicated, 
this sphere of values can activize both "prosystemic" and 
"antisystemic" actions. However, usually a "normal state" is the 
situation in which the sphere of values is separated from daily life, and 
reality is being perceived through the prism of pragmatic interests 
(Jedlicki 1985). This means that: "Basic values do not fulfil a regulative 
function, members of society do not confront it with common 
experience..." (Pacewicz 1983, p. 153). Activating basic values as a way 
of organizing perception of reality is viewed by the above author as one 
of the symptoms of a revolutionary situation. Therefore it can lead to 
an outbreak of an open phase of conflict.10 
However, according to earlier remarks, a "normal" state would be 
the separation of the axiological sphere from the sphere of pragmatic 
interests linked closer to actions. This thesis certainly is not true in such 
general form - apparently as during the "normal" times there are 
groups representing "axiological" types of thinking, during the periods 
of open conflict the significance of the sphere of pragmatic interests 
does not disappear completely. The thesis should therefore be taken as 
a description of a certain tendency. The situation in which behavior is 
not steered by values is a situation of anomy, and the seeming balance 
is secured for as long as the system can be stabilized by satisfying 
pragmatic interests. For the description of such situations and periods 
the idea of active adaptation is suitable. 
Among the many possible mechanisms providing adaptation, the 
fundamental role in real socialism was played by those which provided 
individuals with the realization of their personal aspirations and 
10
 This process has been analyzed by J. Staniszkis (1985) as the "rhythm of 
structuralization and destructuralization" (p. 29). The author writes that during the 
"normal" periods the vision of structure does not exist in social consciousness, but there 
is a vision of divergence, while during the periods of crisis the vision of structure is 
polarized, based on moral judgements. 
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interests (mainly those which concerned daily existence). These 
mechanisms could function both within the formal and the informal 
structure of the system. Formal solutions were above all those 
mechanisms which were supposed to link the material situation of 
citizens with their input of work. As we know, this type of mechanisms 
did not function fully in the period of real socialism because of the 
domination of political criteria in economic practice, among other 
reasons. The significance of those mechanisms was visible mainly in the 
sphere of argumentation and in the attempts to create "economic 
legitimacy." This was the whole type of justifications for the legitimacy 
°f power, when the government referred to social needs which it 
satisfied (e.g. Staniszkis 1979; Pańków 1981; Wiatr 1982). 
As the results of studies indicate, this way of creating balance 
between the shape of the system and social expectations would succeed 
as long as the government was effective in the realization of the 
declared goals. We can arrive at such conclusion indirectly, on the basis 
of the analysis of answers to a question about the perceived sources of 
disobedience to the government. It turned out that the majority of 
respondents (51 percent, if we take as 100 percent those who believed 
that the majority of Poles was disobedient to the government), saw the 
sources of disobedience in such categories as the lack of trust and the 
government breaking its promises. Few responses pointed to such 
characteristics of the government as its repressiveness (6.4 percent), 
imposed character (5.6 percent), or its incompetence and profiteering 
(15.9 percent) as the sources of disobedience. This would mean that the 
vision of "broken promises" was during the decline of communism in the 
view of the majority of respondents a decidedly more serious source of 
disobedience than those characteristics of the govemment which resulted 
from the way it was elected, its method of rule (repressiveness), its 
competence, and the interests which directed its actions (Rychard and 
Szymanderski 1986). 
The basic problem of the adaptation mechanisms, functioning within 
the framework of official systemic solutions, is, however, their 
ineffectiveness. From that point of view, more effective seem to be 
those mechanisms which function within the "informal" structure of 
the system. I have in mind here all types of informal actions, during 
which people tried to "modify" the system (by departing from formal 
rules) in order to adapt to it more easily. 
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These principles functioned at different levels of the system, both in 
its macro- and its micro-structures. Undoubtedly, the informal 
bargaining processes of the Polish economy had a macro-structural 
character. I am referring to the institution of informal bargaining for 
resources or for the extent of planned tasks. This institution was 
a fundamental way of regulating the economic order under real socialism. 
Another informal (but consciously tolerated) mechanism functioned 
in industrial enterprises. I have in mind here the role of an enterprise as 
a channel for articulation of diverse interests. The industrial enterprise, 
because of the shortage of other forms of articulation of public, civil, 
and consumer's interests, often played this role. The threat of strike 
action or of decreasing the tempo and quality of the work was an 
effective, though very costly, mechanism of exerting pressure. This is 
a good example illustrating the concept of "active adaptation:" the 
enterprise (an element of the "system") was somewhat changing its 
identity, becoming partly a political party and an element of 
a quasi-welfare state (this process was described by Mreła 1984, 
pp. 14-5; 1984a, p. 30), while the people were given a chance to realize 
some of their interests, and were becoming tied to the "system" by 
stronger bonds of cooperation. Some of these solutions were grounded 
in the ideology of a "socialist industrial enterprise," understood not 
only as producing a institution, but also a social, educational, and 
a political one (Narojek 1973, pp. 143-54; Mreła 1984, p. 14; 1984a, 
p. 41). Although the sense of this definition has changed considerably 
during over 40 years of communism (e.g. the enterprise remained 
"political," but as a means of exerting pressure on the government 
rather than as an instrument to shape attitudes by that government, see 
Morawski 1986), these functions of enterprise were, however, to some 
degree justified by the ideology of the system. 
The third fundamental type of the adaptation mechanisms functioned 
mainly in the social micro-structures. I have in mind here the diverse 
ways of using an organization to satisfy private interests in an 
extra-formal way and not registered by the system. A basic example here 
would obviously be the "second economy," though in reality it was only 
an example of a broader phenomenon of "secondary purposes"11 in 
11
 I use this expression to describe the mechanism which let members of an organization 
satisfy their needs in a situation when the basic goal of the organization is to its members 
unattractive (after Gawda, Kowalczyk and Rychard 1974, p. 110). 
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the functioning of all formal organizations. There was a "secondary 
school system" and "secondary health services" (see Bednarski 1984; 
Rychard 1984), as well as - to a certain degree - "secondary politics" 
(in this case it would not be the opposition, but rather the whole 
sphere of informal deviations and possibilities to realize private 
interests through the political system). On the subject of the second 
economy in the final period of communism in Poland a number of 
works have been written (Bednarski 1984; 1985; Wiśniewski 1985). 
There is however, very few analyses of the whole class of mechanisms, 
which would go beyond the perspective of organizational pathologies. 
This perspective is also often used in descriptions of the parallel 
economy. I believe that this approach is decidedly insufficient. 
Phenomena of this type should be seen not only as actions aimed at 
decreasing the effectiveness of the system, but often as means to enable 
the system to reach any kind of effectiveness. This is why attention 
should be paid not only to the irregularities in the sphere of 
distribution, formed as a result of the functioning of those kinds of 
mechanisms, but also to their "income-creating" role, which - in 
a sense - made functioning of the system possible. These mechanisms 
Were in a way independent from the political order (I discussed their 
functions in the post-communist period in the preceding chapter). 
There is no doubt about the fact that these mechanisms were costly to 
the system, for they lowered its effectiveness. But it should be 
remembered that we can speak here about a "decrease" in relation to the 
"ideal" standard, which would be an efficiently functioning, centrally 
supervised economy. Such a standard remained only in the sphere of 
ideology, therefore it is more reasonable to discuss the functioning of 
those mechanisms with reference to a real system. It may then turn out 
that the mechanisms of "organizational secondary purposes" were an 
attempt to vitalize the structure of the system, and that their 
"coexistence" with the formal system was a form of symbiosis rather 
than that of parasitism. 
I believe that more unequivocal are the social consequences of those 
mechanisms. A thesis is often advanced about the duality of the social 
life in Poland under real socialism, usually defined by dichotomies 
like: private-official, we-they (see, for example, Wnuk-Lipiński 1992). 
I think that these mechanisms can be perceived as ways of reducing and 
erasing this dichotomy. Such a conclusion can be drawn from the 
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analyses by W. Narojek (1982) and W. Sterniczuk (1984, p. 150), as well 
as the thesis of S. Nowak (1979) on the informalities as "bridges" 
linking the world of people with the world of institutions.12 We could 
say that exactly through this type of informal mechanisms those 
dualities were being integrated and partially erased. In the course of 
daily interactions, the "enemy" (in the symbolic sphere) was often 
becoming a partner, because it allowed people to settle their individual 
interests. In effect, people were to a greater degree becoming a part of 
the system's structure, although at the same time the system was not 
exactly the same anymore. 
The above deliberation would mean that I am noticing only the 
stabilizing effects of those mechanisms.13 I believe that we can speak 
about three types of effects of the functioning of mechanisms of 
active adaptation: stabilizing, evolutionary, and "revolutionizing" the 
system. Let me discuss the possibilities of the occurrence of each 
of them. 
From the analytical point of view, we can speak about stabilizing 
effects when the behavior aiming at realization of individual interests, 
values, and expectations, has a chance for realization mainly in the 
"informal" structure of the system and when at the same time the reform 
of the system is not realistic. I would see chances for evolutionary effects 
of this type of mechanisms when there would be a possibility of a reform 
of the system, which would "formalize" the hitherto informal 
mechanisms. And finally, we could speak about "revolutionizing" effects 
when there is neither a possibility of rebuilding the system, nor is there 
a possibility of realizing individual interests through informal 
mechanisms. 
How did the Polish situation look in the view of those three possible 
types of effects? For example, the economic behavior of people, 
12
 Although this way of linking the society with the institutional system can be named 
corruption, since it is interpreted as blurring the line between the private and public 
(Kamiński 1992, p. 124). I am of the opinion that not all "links" of this type can be 
interpreted as the corruption. However, this is true that one of the few ways of making 
communism less hostile and more "socially rooted" was to corrupt its institutions. To some 
extent the whole sphere of informalities (and belonging to it corruption) was officialy 
tolerated as substitute for democracy. 
13
 On the subject of stabilizig effect of the "second economy" see Staniszkis (1984). 
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realized within the structures of the parallel economy, can be perceived 
as a stabilizing factor, an evolutionary factor, and as a potentially 
"revolutionizing" one. It stabilized because in effect it strengthened the 
existing system of supervising organizations and it constituted its natural 
base (see, e.g. Hankiss 1987, p. 47). However, we could also say that this 
sphere (keeping the example of the parallel economy) was the only one to 
retain the remains of rational-economic thinking and to function 
according to the economic interest. L. Kolarska (1985) advances a thesis 
that exactly in the activities undertaken in those spheres (among others) 
one could see the source of "proeffective" orientations, which could be 
Propitious to the acceptance of the economic reform. Thus a problem 
arises: can the behavior within the parallel economy be really regarded as 
an example of behavior conforming to economic rules? I believe that it 
does not always have to be so. A large part of informal actions (including 
those undertaken within the second economy) can be described in 
categories of a peculiar "social economy." I mean that in spite of strong 
ties with the formal structure, this economy was governed neither by the 
rules of a "central planner," nor by purely market rules. With reference 
to the Soviet system, this has been discussed by A. Besancon (1981). The 
fundamental role was therefore played here not by material ties, but 
Personal ties of various types. Perhaps then, its rules cannot be 
"transferred" to the "official" system, and its natural location - though 
a very important one - would be on the fringes of the system. The 
structural reasons for the impossibility of making the "second economy" 
a dominating economy have been described by J. Staniszkis (1984). Some 
economic analyses also incline to a pessimistic view on the evolutionary 
chances of the informal activity of this type. M. Bednarski argues that 
work in the unofficial sector decreased the chance of themotivating role 
of financial incentives (available in the official sector), because in the 
official sector the available financial rewards were much lower, and 
the financial incentives were becoming unattractive (Bednarski 1985, 
Pp. 559-60). Thus, a reform could be "non-competitive" for the 
unofficial sector, which decreased the chances for the existence of 
evolutionary effects. This regularity seems to occur also in the 
Post-communist period. It seems, however, that the adaptation 
mechanisms played a certain role in the erosion of the communist system 
for they had to rely on an organizational-economic system, which 
Provided them with a minimum of effectiveness (in order to obtain 
resources). The total breakdown of effectiveness of that system meant 
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a loss of sources of pragmatic adaptation (see Narojek 1986). If this 
happened in a system which, as in the case of Poland, suffered from 
a deficit of political legitimacy, it was propitious to the acceleration of 
systemic change. 
An additional destabilizing factor was also the perception of 
injustices and illegitimacies of the rules of distribution created by the 
second economy, which has been noted by L. Kolarska (Kolarska and 
Rychard 1984). This led to the erosion of the official ideology (Markus 
1981), as the people perceived more sharply the divergence between the 
proclaimed slogans and the reality. On the whole, there occurred 
a process, described above, which consisted of using moral and ethical 
standards in the evaluation of reality, which formerly was perceived 
mainly in the categories of pragmatic interests. This is a specific 
example, illustrating the theses referred to earlier on the destabilizing 
effect of perception in the categories of values of the daily sphere, 
perceived until then through the prism of interests. 
In sum then, I would incline toward the view that the informal 
mechanisms of active adaptation (here discussed mainly with the 
example of the second economy) fulfilled rather stabilizing functions, 
and were propitious to "revolutionizing" changes, while rather rarely 
they could be seen as a factor influencing the "evolutionary" changes of 
the system. In other words: they contributed to the downfall of the 
former system to a greater degree than to the building of the framework 
of the market economy. Their functioning is, therefore, a good 
illustration of one of the theses in this book, namely that the factors 
leading to the downfall of communism turn out to be at the same time 
barriers to the process of building the new system. 
The forms and consequences of mechanisms of "active adaptation," 
outlined here, illustrated the principle thesis of this chapter, on 
two-sided changes: of the "system" and the "people" as the essence of 
these processes. The concept of a "fourfold system" is a generalization 
of this thesis. The last part of this chapter is devoted to the presentation 
of this concept. 
3.1.4. THE "FOURFOLD SYSTEM" AS A FORM OF ACTIVE ADAPTATION 
The point of departure in the presentation of this concept can be the 
thesis advanced at the beginning of this work, about the post-war 
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Period as a continuous process of mutual adaptation and modification 
of the "people" and the "system."14 
The concept, the initial outline of which I will present below, is a trial 
typology of institutional and structural consequences of adaptation 
reactions of this kind - the effects of the divergence between the system 
and the social needs and aspirations on the shape of the institutional 
system in Poland during the decline of communism. I should make 
reference here to the distinction made by A. Besancon (1981), who, 
writing about the Soviet economy, has distinguished three principle 
sectors in the sphere of production and in the sphere of consumption: 
(1) providing power (in the sphere of consumption restricted to those in 
Power); (2) the socialist sector (in principle - the "official" planned 
economy); and (3) the non-socialist sector (which includes elements of 
the legal and illegal economy). These three sectors interact with one 
another, and the citizens also make use of the production and services 
of various sectors. All three are in a sense indispensable to one another. 
This type of thinking about various sectors is useful in my concept. I do 
not restrict, however, the usefulness of such analyses to the economy 
only. Moreover, in the approach of Besancon -if I have understood his 
intentions correctly - the three-tiered character is in a sense a result of 
intended practices or the effect aims of economy. The disintegration of 
the institutional system in Poland, which I am going to analyze, was not 
an effect of conscious, intended practices of the system's steersmen, 
14
 At this point we can find useful the analyses of sociologists attempting to present 
typologies of various adaptation reactions (stating it in a simplified manner). Thus, for 
example, J. Koralewicz-Zębik distinguishes the following reactions to the situation of 
"external pressure:" attempts to change the system, withdrawal (which can cause an 
attempt to change the situation-system from outside, e.g. opposition), attitude of 
controlled courage (i.e. partial changing of the reality through informal practices), and 
conformism (Koralewicz-Zębik 1983, pp. 29-30). Sometimes the analyses of processes of 
this type refer to R.K. Merton's theory of anatomy. We could also point to the concept of 
S. Nowak (1984a), whose author presents a modification of typologies of the anomic 
ways of adaptation, or to the work by R. Turski (1985), who has distinguished 
conformist adaptation, innovative (by which the author understands informal practices) 
withdrawal, and alternative orientations. T. Żukowski (1986), who analyzes adaptive 
Processes, also refers to the theory of anatomy. Many works of this type have appeared 
recently, and their common feature is apparently an attempt to describe and explain the 
reaction of the Polish society to the situation of crisis. I should also mention here the 
Works of the scientists studying lifestyles, concentrated around A. Siciński (1983; 1984), 
especially the concepts of "alternative" lifestyles. 
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but rather a result of processes adapting "the system to the society," to 
a certain degree unintentional. 
The problem of systemic disintegration in the East European countries 
has been developed in the academic literature for some time now. We can 
point here, for example, to the concept of R. Sharlet (1984). The author 
describes the sources and conseąuences of the formation of 
"counter-systems" in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern 
Europe. Their existence resulted from the incongruity of the official 
system to the people's needs (see also Hankiss 1987, p. 50). It assumed 
various forms - it could be the second economy, a parallel culture, 
religious practices, ethnic nationalisms, youth subculture, double 
morality, etc. With reference to the Polish situation, a typology of those 
phenomena was presented by E. Wnuk-Lipiński (1984), who analyzed 
them at the level of politics, economic life (where he has distinguished 
three types of market: free market, controlled market, and elite market), 
and in the socio-cultural sphere. The existence of crevices in each of those 
spheres was caused by the inability to satisfy needs in the sphere of 
official politics, economics or culture.15 
My proposal is also a typology of those systemic disintegrations. Thus 
I am presenting in it a specific model of the institutional structure of 
communism, or real socialism. This model departs from the normative, 
ideological picture of that political order. However, it is at the same time 
different from the classical approaches to totalitarianism, which 
emphasized homogeneity and centralization as the basie features of the 
system of institutional communism. 
I believe that already at the beginning of the 1980's we can hardly 
speak about the existence of one institutional-organizational system in 
Poland. There existed a number of systems. Of course, not all of them 
were formed as a result of adaptation processes, but some of them can 
certainly be perceived as a consequence of those mechanisms. 
15
 In Hungarian academic literature, a comprehensive description of this type of 
disintegration in the economic, public, cultural, social, and socio-political spheres has been 
presented by E. Hankiss (1987) in his concept of a "second society," distinguishing the 
"first society" (in its formal and informal sphere), second society and alternative society. 
The difference between the last two consisted, according to the author, mainly in the fact 
that the second society was characterized by a lack of a number of features of the "first 
society," while it did not develop the features which appear fully only in the "alternative 
society." 
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I am advancing, therefore, a thesis on the disintegration of the system as 
a result of adaptation processes - processes which aim at a reduction of the 
divergence between social expectations and the shape of the system. 
I believe that we can distinguish four basic systems, or rather that we can 
speak about a fourfold system. It consisted of the following elements: 
Figure 2. The Fourfold System 
The official system16 is in a way the "core" of the whole four-element 
structure. It included a set of norms, institutions, and organizations 
grounded in the principles of the socialist order. The system functioned 
in the sphere of politics as well as the economy, administration, health 
care, culture, etc. Thus it constituted the official side of "real socialism" 
(see Hankiss 1987, pp. 47-7a). The unofficial system to a large degree 
overlapped with the "secondary purposes," described above, of various 
organizational activities in Poland. The majority of informal adaptation 
processes took place exactly within this system. Its existence was to 
a certain degree a result of the modification of the official system in the 
course of processes of active adaptation. Hence it was both an effect of 
those processes and an indication of their existence. 
The non-system, or actually a number of "non-systems" is a relatively 
incoherent category, and the principle common feature of its elements 
16
 The distinction of these four elements was largely influenced by a joint work with 
Prof. Magdalena Sokołowska on The Alternative Solutions in a System with Formally 
Restricted Alternatives (1988). 
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is the fact that they were derived from the former system, and were 
genetically alien to the ideological principles of socialism. In the 
economic sphere it was the private and Polonia-foreign sector of the 
economy (although we could argue whether the private ownership of 
land in agriculture did not become an element of the official system, 
since the official system displayed an ability to adopt initially alien 
elements). In the ideological sphere there was certainly the role of the 
Catholic Church in the public life. We can place here also the 
institution of temporary stays abroad used to improve one's own 
situation. It is obvious that the elements of the non-system mostly were 
not a result of adaptation processes, since they were historically older 
than the official system. They may, however, be treated as a form of 
processes of this type. 
Finally, the anti-system, which in fact can be described as a set of 
oppositional groups diverse in their programs, degree of organization, 
degree of influence, and degree of activity. Usually the existence of 
opposition is perceived as an indication of a deep conflict. It is certainly 
so, but this in my opinion does not exclude perceiving those groups also 
as one of the consequences and forms of the processes of active 
adaptation. A specific feature of the anti-system was the fact that it 
existed more clearly in the spheres of morality and politics (although 
even here it is difficult to speak about its uniform identity), while in the 
economic sphere it was practically nonexistent. 
The four elements listed above remained at different "distances" 
from one another, in different mutual relations. I believe that these 
distances are close to the hierarchy (from the top) of the systems 
presented in figure 2. The closest to the official system was the unofficial 
system, and often it is difficult to draw a clear boundary between them, 
since the unofficial system in a way "outgrew" the official system "in 
each of its tissues." The non-system is easier to separate - it was, after 
all, a separate world of formal organizations. Its relations with the 
official system, however, were not hostile. Undoubtedly the most 
distant was the anti-system, in the programmatic as well as 
organizational sense. Both the fact that it could not act legally, and that 
its dominating methods were underground and semi-underground 
practices contributed to its alienation. 
The fundamental feature of the model proposed here is therefore the 
assumption that each of those systems can be defined by describing its 
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relation to the official system. This assumption applies fully to the 
non-official system and to the anti-system, but only partly to the 
non-system. Some institutions of that system (e.g. the Church) did not 
need to define their identity through their relations with the official 
system, since the sources of their identity reached much further. 
The basic problem in the separation of the four elements thus defined 
is the question in what sense can we speak here about "systems?:" 
W. Wesołowski, formulating remarks to the initial version of this work, 
suggested addressing rather four types of the social environment of 
Polish people - the more so since there is an awkwardness in saying that 
the whole system includes a "non-system" and an "anti-system." We 
can avoid this awkwardness when we realize that these designations 
describe the relation of both elements to the official system. It is true, 
however, that if by the "system" we understand an entity with a certain 
degree of institutionalization and formalization, with a clearly 
separated internal structure, then not all of the four elements fulfilled 
these conditions equally. In fact, only the official system and main 
elements of the non-system (the Church, private agriculture, trade) 
took the form of a formal organization and precisely as such 
organizations they were accessible to their participants or clients. Both 
the unofficial system and the anti-system did not have (in principle) the 
character of formal organizations. Contacts with them were rather 
contacts with various informal social groups. We can see, then, that the 
most formalized character had either the elements of the official system 
itself, or the elements of the non-system which was tolerated and 
legalized by the official system. What did not become legalized in 
Principle remained not formalized. The "systemic" designation used in 
the typology should, therefore, be understood in a non-rigorous way. 
They are mainly an expression of the desire to separate the four 
elements in order to be able to speak about the relations between them. 
The four elements of the general system of real socialism presented 
above can be separated in an empirical manner - they represent distinct 
rules of practices, often also distinct organizations. The partner of 
those four systems, called the "society," is a somewhat different matter. 
First of all, the separation of the "society" from the four systems is an 
analytical step. I have to stress that in reality each of the four elements 
of the system constituted at the same time an element of the society. 
There is however a difference. Although we could separate within the 
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society its specific parts being in relations with only one element of 
the system, it would be an artificial move. That is why the divisions 
within the society were marked with a dashed line. In the case of 
society the division lines, in my opinion, run not between distinct 
groups, but between the social roles of each individual. The same people 
entered relations with various elements from among the four systems 
specified above. Few groups (perhaps even individuals) were in 
a relationship with only one system. Thus while the division into 
systems has an empirical character and it separates distinct organisms, 
the division of the society has a rather analytical character and its 
purpose is to separate distinct social roles played usually by the same 
individuals.17 
In the concept briefly sketched here, the most important is not the 
description of the model's elements (i.e. the four systems and the 
society), but the description of the relations between these elements. 
I assume that these relations can be described well in categories of 
exchange. This does not mean that in the analysis presented here I will 
refer to a certain theory of exchange developed in sociology. What 
I mean is that between particular systems, as well as between particular 
systems and social roles, various types of exchange took place. People 
exchanged work for money, support for accommodation in daily life, 
the risk of conspiratory activities for realization of values dear to them, 
etc. On the whole, then, the majority of those exchanges could be 
described in categories of interests and values. 
These exchanges took place between the systems as well as between 
the systems and "social roles," as I mentioned above. I am advancing 
a thesis that both types of exchange constituted the main factor 
integrating the disintegrated entity composed of four systems and society. 
17
 This view can be justified by the thesis of J. Koralewicz-Zębik, who wrote regarding 
her typology of the reaction to a situation of external pressure: "If individuals could be 
classified into certain types according to their most frequent attitude, we could speak 
about opportunists, conformists, and independent oppositionists. More often, however, 
the same individuals represented different attitudes at different times" (Koralewicz-Zębik 
1985, p. 15). We could also cite the view of A. Besancon that "the Soviet citizen, with few 
exceptions, does not belong to only one sector of production and does not provide 
himself with goods from only one sector of consumption" (Besancon 1981). W. Narojek 
(1986) points to the fact that every citizen plays both the role of a functionary and the role 
of a petitioner (p. 128). We should also recall the view of Hankiss (1987, p. 27) who 
argues that people functioned within different societies. 
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The exchanges between the four segments were very important for 
the durability of the whole system. We could attempt, for example, to 
describe in economic categories the flow of resources from the official 
to the unofficial system (and perhaps to other systems as well) and 
Probably the flow of the outcomes of those systems to the official 
system (Besancon did that with the case of the Soviet economy). It so 
happened that the resources of the official system made the functioning 
of the unofficial system possible, but thanks to that fact the official 
system functioned as well (receiving in exchange, for example, the 
minimum of loyaity). Going beyond the sphere of economy, we can say 
that even the anti-system - to a limited extent - played a stabilizing 
role: it was indispensable to the official system because it enabled that 
system to retain its identity through the chance of defining itself in 
relation to the anti-system. We could say in an even broader manner 
that each of the two systems (the official and the anti-system) provides 
its partner with an identity, and sometimes suggests solutions to be 
used within each system (on different strategies of the official system 
regarding the "counter-system" see Sharlet 1984). 
The majority of exchanges between the systems, however, occurred 
in the system-people relations. In effect, this meant also that in practice 
there were no direct exchanges between "the people," since usually 
these exchanges took place between the people in their roles as 
"elements" of the particular systems. This is why in the subsequent 
analyses I will concentrate on the exchanges of the people-system type. 
Referring to the most general assumptions of the theory of exchange, 
I assume that people aim at equivalent exchange. Of course, this is the 
ideal state, disturbed by the inability to recognize precisely all 
Possibilities and by the difficulty to determine one's own preferences.18 
However, often exchanges between the people and the particular 
elements of the system did not have an equivalent character. Hence, 
I am advancing a thesis that people tried to compensate themselves for 
the non-equivalence in local exchanges with a given system through mor 
equivalent exchanges with other systems. Two kinds of such 
compensation were possible. Firstly, the needs which were not satisfied 
in exchanges with the official system could be satisfied in exchanges 
18
 This is a classical problem of a bounded rationality, discussed by the theorists of 
organization (e.g. March and Simon 1964) as well as by the theorists of exchange. 
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with another system. For example, in the sphere of need for political 
participation this could mean turning to "anti-systems." Secondly, we 
were dealing with substitution of those unsatisfied needs (keeping the 
example of political participation) by satisfying other needs (for 
example, giving up political participation in exchange for advantageous 
"economic" reciprocities with the non-system or the unofficial system). 
On the whole, the system (as an entity consisting of four elements plus 
society) would have a tendency to strive for an equivalent change at the 
macro level. Hence we can infer that for the balance of the system was 
necessary an ability of the people to compensate themselves for the 
local non-equivalences in certain exchanges through equivalent 
exchanges (or even "overpayments") in relations with other systems. 
Let us examine a simple example illustrating the advanced thesis. Not 
rare was a situation in which an individual who, in the course of his 
interactions with the official system, did not receive sufficient 
gratifications concerning his interests or values, "turned" to other 
systems in order to compensate himself for these non-equivalences. The 
individual could thus satisfy some of his economic interests in 
exchanges with the unofficial system (e.g. through practices in the 
secondary sector of the economy), while he could realize his value 
system in exchanges with the non-system (e.g. the Church) or the 
anti-system (e.g. satisfying informational needs).19 Many people in 
Poland behaved in a similar "dispersed" way, although the 
representatives of each of the four systems would probably want the 
people to be the "clients" of their systems only. 
A question arises whether this "dispersion" put a strain on 
individuals or whether it was not troublesome. It is difficult to find an 
answer to this question in the academic literature. Until now, 
researchers have concentrated mainly on the analysis of consequences 
of various "dualities" in the social life (e.g. private-official, in accord 
with one's own convictions - extorted by external circumstances). In 
the presented concept we are dealing with a "fourfold character." 
I believe that the problems of individuals resulting from the "duality" 
and from the "fourfold character" are similar. In the academic 
literature there is no unequivocal position on the subject whether these 
19
 This way of functioning of the people in Poland has been discussed by A. Kamiński 
(1986). 
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dualities, a necessity of different behavior, e.g. in private and official 
situations, put a strain on people or not. J. Koralewicz-Zębik (1985) 
argues that practices conflicting with one's own convictions generate 
tensions. E. Wnuk-Lipiński, the author of a concept of "dimorphism of 
values" analyzing this duality at the axiological level, argues that it was 
socially harmful (1992, p. 68). J. Lutyński (1986) on the other hand, 
believes that the incoherence between the private and the public sphere 
was not troublesome. Apparently a unequivocal settlement of this 
question is not possible, since the degree of distress was to a certain 
degree dependent on the significance of convictions and on the sphere 
of values of a given individual. However, one could notice in the Polish 
situation a functioning of specific mechanisms reducing this 
discordance, the tension created as a result of duality or the "fourfold 
character." Functioning for many years in situations of contradiction 
between the private and the public sphere, between fiction and truth, 
Probably created in the Polish society a norm which I would call the 
norm of legitimized duality, or -more broadly - the norm of legitimized 
ambiguity. This norm would consist, speaking simply, in the 
internalization of these ambiguities as common conditions. For in 
reality, people realizing the inevitability of the functioning in the 
"multidimensional arrangements" had to, if only for pragmatic 
reasons, "get used to" them in some way. That is why probably not 
always and not every duality created tensions, about which the 
following quotation convinces us: "They belong at the same time to the 
world of institutions and are perceived by others as 'they,' and 
simultaneously - when leaving their occupational roles they become 
ordinary people - they are aware of their own aversion to all other 
institutions which make their life miserable through their negligence 
and inefficiency. Surprising is the easiness with which people move 
from one attitude to another" (Nowak 1979, p. 162). 
There was still another mechanism reducing tensions created by the 
duality of the private-official type. This role was played by the 
Phenomenon of disintegration of the system, that systemic "fourfold 
character." For it meant that it was not the case that some values or 
Practices could be realized only in the private sphere and not within 
institutions. The systemic disintegration gave a chance to realize the 
"private" sphere within one of the systems, outside the official system. 
There existed institutionalized models for satisfying those aspirations 
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and they were not limited only to groups of family and friends. 
Speaking metaphorically, but perhaps more illustratively: the "fourfold 
system" corresponded with the "fourfold personality" and this balance 
somewhat reduced the tensions. 
Hence the system was not fully without alternatives. Its fourfold 
character was simultaneously a form of an alternative. 
In the concept presented here, the relations between social roles and 
the distinguished systems are of fundamental significance.20 As 
I mentioned before, I believe that these relations can be described in 
categories of exchange. Drawing from the sociological works on the 
theory of exchange seems promising here. However, we encounter 
a certain problem. There exist concepts of exchange describing 
inter-organizational relations (e.g. already classical analyses by Blau on 
the complex systems of exchange or Levine and White 1961). There 
also exist successful and interesting analyses describing Polish reality in 
categories of the theory of exchange, but between individuals or social 
groups (I have in mind here the work by Pawlik, referred to earlier, on 
the economics of daily life, 1985). In the case of my concept, we would 
need a theoretical interpretation of exchanges between "the people and 
the system," i.e. between individuals and more or less organized 
entities. Of course, with the acceptance of a certain perspective, this 
question is always reduced at the end to exchanges between individuals. 
However, what I would need is to take into consideration in this 
concept the institutional and macro-social aspects on one hand, and 
micro-social on the other. For the ąuestion about exchange between 
"the people and the system"21 is to a certain degree a ąuestion about 
relations between micro- and macro-structures, about relations 
between the "social" sphere and the institutional one. 
As I wrote earlier, the balance of the whole institutional and social 
system (i.e. the four systems and the society) was secured by the 
possibility of compensating for the non-equivalent exchanges with one 
20
 From the theoretical point of view, other kinds of adaptative processes are also 
possible - e.g. between organizations (Kamiński 1979). A distinction of various kinds of 
these processes has been included e.g. in the work by M. Federowicz, A. Iwanowska and 
T. Żukowski (1986). On the role of organization in adaptive processes see also 
Żukowski (1986). 
21
 I have to point out the contributions of M. Crozier and E. Friedberg (1982) to this 
matter, although the main category in their work is the game. 
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system (the official system) through exchanges with the remaining 
systems. In the view of P. Blau's theory of exchange, the process 
of attaining and losing balance has a continuous character. He 
writes: "Reciprocity on one level, however, entails imbalances 
on others" (Blau 1967, p. 336). Jonathan H. Turner (1985), 
analyzing Blau's theory, puts it this way: "...to balance relations 
in one exchange context by meeting reciprocal obligations and 
conforming to norms of fairness is to put into imbalance other 
relations. Thus, the imbalances potentially encourage a cyclical 
Process in which actors seek to balance previously unbalanced 
relations and thereby throw into imbalance currently balanced 
exchanges" (p. 325). 
On the whole, then, in the relations of exchange there is always 
a source of future imbalance. With regard to the "fourfold" system 
this means that the overall balance was a dynamic state, that 
there always somewhere existed imbalance, and that the processes 
of compensation for the non-equivalent exchanges with the official 
system created new imbalances. This type of imbalance, however, 
was not of crucial importance for the whole institutional-social 
°rder. A problem arose when compensation did not have the 
"dispersed" character, when those exchanges concentrated on one, 
other than the official, system. We could advance a thesis that 
the hitherto dominating, in the sense of providing the whole social 
order with an identity, would become that system which took 
over the majority of exchanges. Such was the social movement 
"Solidarity" in 1980-81. However, domination of any system other 
than the official one disturbed the balance from the point of 
view of the official system, which could tolerate at most the dispersed 
reciprocities but not the concentrated ones. Thus a counter-action 
followed. It restored balance from the point of view of domination 
of the official system, but it destroyed the integrity of social balance. 
From the above deliberation we can infer another thesis, saying that 
one of the causes of tensions and conflicts in the structure of the whole 
system was a different designation ofpoints ofbalance: the domination of 
the official system and securing the equivalence of exchanges. These two 
Points of balance created conflict when compensation for the 
non-equivalent exchanges ceased being dispersed and began to 
concentrate on one system, other than the official one. In reality, then, 
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at the basis of conflicts lies the ąuestion of systemic identity.22 The situation 
of dispersion of compensational exchanges, however, did not disturb the 
identity, since no entity was formed which could created an identity 
competitive to the official one. The dispersion of exchanges, then, could be 
perceived as a spontaneous way of overcoming the inconsistent identity of the 
system: the official system still dominated, but in spite of that also the 
identity of the society received chances for realization. The problem of 
relations between social identity and the identity of the system is one of the 
most important and possible to be analyzed through the model of relations 
between the "fourfold system" and the "fourfold society." 
We could ask a ąuestion whether we could subjugate some types of 
"exchanges" to each of the specified systems? This problem is difficult 
to solve, since according to the theorists of exchange (e.g. Blau 1967, 
pp. 94-5) an immanent feature of those processes is the ambiguity of 
reciprocal values. This ambiguity is greater in those types of exchanges 
which take place in the informal sphere (which, with regard to the 
processes of exchange within a local population, has been shown in the 
analysis by Pawlik 1985). However, we can probably analyze only the 
types of exchanges (and not the concrete evaluation of the exchanged 
goods) between the people and the particular systems. Were there some 
types of reciprocities characteristic to certain systems? J. Gęsicki, 
Z. Rykowski, and J. Wertenstein-Żuławski (1986) distinguish different 
variants of the young people's ways of dealing with the situation: the 
economic variant, the cultural, the political, and the religious variant.23 
22
 This thought is a elaboration on the concept of contradiction in the principles of 
identity-legitimacy of a system when strengthening the "centralistic" principle destroys the 
"market" principle and vice versa (Rychard 1983, pp. 112-13). This distinction is 
analogical to the thesis by A. Kamiński (1983, pp. 139-40; 1984, pp. 221-22) on two kinds 
of balance: of the institutional system with regard to an agreement between "... material 
and non-material products of the system and the needs and aspirations of the society..." 
(Kamiński 1984, p. 221). According to the cited author, attaining one state of balance 
destroys the balance of the other type, there also occurs a reverse relation. In my concept 
such negative feedback (when balance from the point of view of the society is irreconcilable 
with balance from the point of view of the official system) occurs only in a case of 
concentration of compensational reciprocities on one of the systems other than the official 
system. For only then will the identity of the system be disturbed from that system's point 
of view. 
23
 This distinction is similar to the types of duality analyzed by E. Wnuk-Lipiński 
(1984): economic, political, and cultural. 
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It seems that using - for example - categories mentioned here, we could 
not describe the suggested four systems and the types of exchange 
between those systems and the society. For example, through the 
non-system one could realize the cultural variant, as well as the 
economic and the religious one. Despite that fact, we can ask a question 
in more general categories: whether, for example, it was not the case 
that reciprocities with some systems involved to a greater degree the 
sphere of pragmatic interests, while with others - the sphere of values? 
Going further, we can ask which exchanges had a greater chance for 
integrating around them social groups. The exchanges with the 
unofficial system concerned mainly the sphere of pragmatic interests. 
Although they involved large segments of the society, these exchanges 
did not have a group-making character - people participated in them as 
individuals. The unofficial system did not create its own culture 
either.24 However those exchanges which involved to a greater degree 
the axiological sphere and values, i.e. exchanges occurring mainly 
between the people and some elements of the non-system (e.g. the 
Church) and of the anti-system, had integrating possibilities.25 I believe 
that one of the problems consisted in the fact that the systems which 
had an "integrating power," concern to a greater degree the symbolic 
sphere than material interests (e.g. anti-system), while those which 
referred to material interests did not integrate people but rather 
organized individual adaptation processes. In effect, in the phase of 
open conflict integration occurred rather in categories of values and 
axiology. In some sense then, the difficulty in overcoming the crisis was 
caused by the fact that there existed a dichotomy: either individual 
24
 This thesis is perhaps too categorical. For, as J. Koralewicz-Zębik (1985) believes, 
some types of unofficial practices could serve the realization of values or the well-being of 
institutions, not only the pragmatic interests. However their group-making and 
axiological role was weakened by an often extra-legal character of those practices (this 
thesis was advocated by Staniszkis, 1984) and by the fact that people undertook those 
Practices usuaily treating them as a "necessary evil" - an evil, because it was discordant 
with their convictions, and necessary because it allowed to settle matters otherwise 
impossible to settle (empirical data convince about this attitude, see Koralewicz-Zębik, 
Wnuk-Lipiński 1985, p. 192). 
25
 I rely here on the thesis, referred to before, of W. Narojek, on the individualistic 
character of pragmatic behavior and on the integrating character of moral behavior, 
although, as I wrote before, the author argues that pragmatic practices have 
group-making consequences as well. 
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adaptation processes or thinking in the sphere of axiology and values. 
The contrast: indmdual interests - group values, did not have a space for 
the category of group interests.16 Creating structural conditions 
enabling suppression of this limiting dichotomy was - and to some 
degree still is - one of the steps necessary to overcome the crisis. 
The weakness of "anti-systemic" practices in the economic sphere, 
and domination of the moral perspective in oppositional activities, had 
their consequences after the downfall of communism. We can see in 
that fact one of the reasons for the successful transfer of the former 
communist nomenklatura into a newly-created class of businessmen. 
Oppositional activists were far less successful here. 
3.1.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I presented in this chapter the concept of active adaptation, departing 
from the critique of approaches to legitimization as a way of explaining 
the sources of stability. This concept is also different from explanations 
on the grounds of the totalitarian model. A certain generalization of 
the concept of active adaptation is the model of a "fourfold system," 
which has been briefly outlined, and the continuation of which will be 
included in the last chapter of this work. This type of concept should be 
treated as a kind of discussion with the thesis on the lack of alternatives 
as a source of obedience. For in reality, according to the idea of 
a fourfold system, the source of adaptation processes was a kind of 
alternative, provided by the disintegration of the system into four 
elements. 
In my analysis I concentrate mainly on the study of behavior; outside 
this analysis remains the world of normative rules which constitute the 
basis of the analyzed behavior. This type of analysis has been 
26
 M. Markus points to the fact that Polish society integrated itself around values 
rather than economic interests (1981, p. 47). He saw in that a new chance for building 
a "civil society." I believe, however, that this was rather a constraint. W. Narojek writes: 
"As long as the movement for restoration remains a movement for moral revival, it is not 
able to express any definite socio-political interests..." (1982-84, p. 152). J. Staniszkis 
(1985) argues that material interests could not exist in this kind of system at all. I would 
incline here to a medial view: political and economic interests existed both in the official 
and in the unofficial structures, but they did not fulfil group-making functions (for the 
reasons, among others, mentioned by Staniszkis with reference to interests in the "second 
economy"). 
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developed as a part of the concept of "collective sense" of M. Marody 
(1987; 1988). 
Active adaptation and the "fourfold system" which was the result of 
this adaptation, were a social strategy for dealing with the imposed 
system. Some of its forms still exist, and they are discussed in other 
parts of this book. In the next chapter, however, I want to analyze 
problems of legitimacy and of its crisis in the first post-communist 
period. As we will see, this crisis was essentially different from the crisis 
of legitimacy during the decline of communism: the first one resulted 
from the lack of legitimation, while the other results from insufficient 
adaptation of the formula of legitimation to the nature of changes. 
3.2. BREAKTHROUGH AND THE POST-COMMUNIST 
LEGITIMACY CRISIS27 
3.2.1. THE CHARACTER OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 
In this chapter I present the basic dilemmas in the relationship between 
government and society after the 1989 turning point in Poland. In order 
to describe these relations I will draw on the concepts of legitimation as 
they provide a suitable framework for the analysis of the processes 
taking place between the political and institutional system and society. 
I will be concerned with the basic chances of, and threats to, political 
legitimacy during the transitional period in Poland. Before moving on 
to a detailed presentation of my major theses it is essential to define the 
transitional period as this will bring out the nature and problems of 
legitimation in post-communist Poland. 
It has become increasingly popular to describe Poland in the 
early 1990's as a post-communist country. Although this term is 
27
 The first version of this chapter was written in 1990 during the author's stay in the 
Sociology Department of the University of Chicago as part of the Ford Foundation 
Fellowship Program. He wishes to thank these institutions and to acknowledge their 
assistance in facilitating the completion of this chapter. It was published in a book 
"Democratization in Poland, 1988-1990. Polish Voices" (G. Sanford [ed.]), The 
Macmillan Press Ltd., London 1992. Author wants to express his thanks for the 
Publisher and for the editor for permission to publish it in this book. This chapter was 
also reprinted in a book Political Participation and Democracy in Poland and West 
Germany (G. Meyer and F. Ryszka, [eds]), Warsaw 1991. The current version is updated 
and modified. 
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rarely defined, intuition tells one that it is an accurate description 
of the essence of this period, which is a state of transition. It 
can be defined as the absence of both fundamental communist 
institutions and arrangements and of the finally shaped mechanisms 
of the new order. Communism no longer exists but new systemic 
arrangements still have not fully crystallized. This state of affairs 
is well expressed by the term "post-communism" which puts the 
emphasis more on the type of system which we are moving away 
from rather than the one we are aiming for. 
The above description of post-communism is oversimplified 
however. Above all we do not know the final destination and shape of 
the emerging model. The transformations taking place in Poland are to 
lead the country to a market economy, parliamentary democracy, and 
a civic society. These are the aims of Solidarity's program which is the 
country's dominant political force.28 There is a basic lack of clarity 
however about what these aims mean in practice and how they will be 
achieved. It is in this area that problems of legitimacy appear which 
I will discuss later. A further simplification in the above attempt to 
define the post-communist period is that it is not wholly elear in what 
sense we have really entered onto the post-communist stage. There are 
many indications that the system has undergone more rapid erosion in 
the formal, rather than in the deeper social, sense of consciousness and 
institutional traditions. This inheritance also causes further problems 
for legitimation. 
In sum therefore, the view that post-communism signifies the 
simultaneous absence of both the old and the new system, and that it is 
a transitory process in the strict sense of the absence of any system, 
needs to be modified. We know, after all, the basie shape of the final 
model while at the same time basie remnants of the previous one 
survive in the social-institutional system. And - last but not the least 
- the very post-communist period has shaped its own logie, dynamics, 
and mechanisms of reproduction. 
One of the basie features of the first stage of post-communism in 
Poland is the changed balance of social forces. It is often said, 
particularly by journalists, that Poland together with the other East 
28
 Cf. the draft "Uchwała Programowa II Zjazdu Delegatów NSZZ Solidarność" in 
Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 March 1990. 
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European countries, has moved from communist domination to 
political pluralism, in other words from a monocentric to a polycentric 
system. It is true that this would appear to be the basic direction of the 
evolution. A more precise examination, however, provides a somewhat 
different view. The previous state was admittedly monocentric in the 
political sense but on the social level there was a dichotomous balance 
of forces of the "them and us" type. At the beginning of 
Post-communism the situation was not so much that pluralism has 
been achieved but that one of the pillars of the dichotomy, communist 
domination, had been removed. This was admittedly an indispensable 
breakthrough on the road to pluralism as it constituted a fundamental 
barrier. All the same on can regard the first stage of transformation not 
as a movement from monocentrism to polycentrism but rather as a change 
from a state of full to peculiar dichotomy in which one of the pillars 
vanishes (as I put it in the chapter 2.2).29 This provides a more accurate 
definition of the transitional post-communist stage. The balance of 
social and political forces which characterizes this period of imperfect 
dichotomy and an absence of clarity as to how the political scene was to 
be filled was also the source of legitimation problems. 
In discussing legitimation in the previous chapter, I was concerned 
with the analysis of normative sources, the principles on which people 
accept and subordinate themselves to the existing institutional system.31 
Legitimation, understood in this sense, affects three levels of social 
reality on which its appearance can be examined. Let us review them: 
the first is the ideological level, in other words the basie principles of the 
system. The second is the institutional level, mainly political but also 
economic insofar as it concerns the systemie aspeets. The third level is 
that of "everyday reality," where relations towards the system are 
expressed in the behavioral sense of support or rejection. The objection 
29
 The results of CBOS surveys on the political preferences of Poles reflects the 
remarkably non-symmetric balance of political forces in which the only significant one is 
Solidarily; "Panorama polityczna w społecznej świadomości 1990" in Komunikaty 
z badań CBOS (Warsaw, January 1990), p. 2. 
30
 According to Jadwiga Staniszkis in Tygodnik Solidarność, no. 1,1990, the legitimacy 
Sap is caused by the absence of an opponent. In this chapter I will concentrate on the 
other reasons, apart from the absence of an opponent, for the legitimacy gap. 
31
 The Weberian view of legitimation as a normatively based form of obedience is 
widely accepted by analysts of communist countries. Cf. Krisch and Rigby, in Rigby, 
Feher (1982); Lamentowicz (1988). 
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can however be made that it is difficult to talk of legitimation here, as 
the relationship towards everyday existence is expressed rather more by 
a type of pragmatic permissiveness. Let us note however that on this 
level one can see the normative building of support.32 Full legitimacy is 
a state in which the axiological norms and institutional rules of the 
system are accepted and where behavioral submission to the latter is 
based on an acceptance of the fundamental norms of the system. This is 
therefore a situation in which the claims to legitimacy formulated by 
the authorities are recognized as justified on all three levels of reality.33 
The problem of legitimacy has been a popular subject in Polish 
sociology for some time and its salience is now even more justified. 
Until the collapse of communism the profession concerned itself with 
the issue of obedience towards the authorities. It was inferred that 
obedience stems from other sources. The significance of the analysis of 
legitimacy up till now has been, therefore, the inevitable conclusion 
that communist power was not legitimized, which I analyzed in the 
former chapter. This had political significance as the whole doctrinal 
system was based on the premise that it was legitimate. Consequently, 
discussions of legitimacy often became the victims of either formal 
censorship or other forms of discouragement. The problem can 
currently be approached in a completely different, and one would have 
thought deeper, manner. One can enquire freely into the sources and 
forms of legitimacy and also into the new problem of the legitimacy 
crisis and the identity crisis associated with it. Insofar as the crisis 
previously stemmed simply from the absence of sufjicient bases of 
legitimacy current legitimation problems are caused by the inadequate 
application offorms of legitimation to the program the implementation of 
which started in 1990. 
This is the main difference between the communist and 
post-communist legitimacy crisis. The first one was analyzed in the 
former chapter. My main thesis was that active adaptation mechanisms 
32
 Weber emphasized the behavioral aspect of legitimation in his writings, cf. Weber 
1978. W. Wesołowski clarifies some of Weber's inconsistencies on this aspect of the 
behavioral and normative application of legitimation concepts. Cf. Wesołowski 1988, pp. 
39-41. 
33
 I follow Weber here in accepting that the recognition of these demands as 
justified is the basis for the existence of a state of legitimacy between rulers and 
ruled. (Weber 1978, p. 214). 
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were the main substitutive mechanisms for the legitimacy. In this 
chapter the legitimacy crisis in the first post-communist period will be 
analyzed. One of the theses which I will present in this chapter is that 
there is an evolution of the forms of adaptation. During the decline of 
communism active adaptation was the dominant form while in the first 
phase of post-communism the main mechanism was passive tolerance 
(or passive support). 
The problem of legitimation, its chances and the threats to it in the 
new situation, boil down to the basic question; in what way could the 
new socio-political order created by the Solidarity government be 
legitimized? Could this government base itself on the inheritance of the 
workers' revolt against the pathologies of socialism as a justification 
for its program of fundamental systemic change? 
I believe that an answer to this ąuestion can be supplied by the 
blockages of the legitimation process in Poland. I formulate the 
problem as two preliminary theses which I will attempt to substantiate: 
Firstly, there is a certain paradoxical contradiction between the 
existence of a government which enjoyed a high degree of confidence, 
and which therefore had a basis for legitimacy denied to the previous 
communist authorities, and the existence of certain blockages to 
legitimation. 
Secondly, these blockages were caused because the first Solidarity 
government was creating a system which has no elear addressee and 
which could no longer be legitimized by Solidarity symbolism without 
changing its identity. It is possible that difficulties in creating this 
institutional order and in introducing this system stem from this. This 
thesis suggests that the legitimation problems of the new order concern 
three aspects, social, institutional, and symbolic. Basically they reflect 
the three earlier mentioned levels of reality: ideological, political-
-institutional, and everyday-behavioral. These three levels therefore, 
encapsulate my thesis on the subject of the blockages and the 
legitimation potential of the new order. 
The dilemma of legitimation mentioned in the second thesis, which is 
in this sense characteristic of the transitional post-communist period, is 
that the pluralist-market order now established is difficult to justify in 
terms of an inheritance arising from the struggle, not so much against 
socialism itself, but against its pathological and deformed aspects, out 
of which to a considerable extent Solidarity was born in 1980. That is 
120 
why some programmatic documents emphasize so strongly that the 
basic ideas of the 1989-90 breakthrough were already present in the 
Solidarity program of 1980-81. It was, after all, an attempt to fill in the 
"legitimacy gap" between the Solidarity of 1980, when it was only 
a trade union, although admittedly one mainly so in a formal sense as 
in reality it was much more, and the Solidarity of early 1990, which is 
a force fundamentally rebuilding the whole political and economic 
system. 
The analysis of legitimation problems in such a heated and changing 
political period is weighed down with the danger of rapidly becoming 
out of date. At the same time the need for attempting to interpret and 
to give some sense to the ongoing changes becomes stronger. It would 
appear to me that the solution to this problem is that one should accept 
a narrower time-scale for the analysis. This is, therefore, an analysis of 
legitimation problems in post-communist Poland, defined in the earlier 
terms as as period of imperfect or peculiar dichotomy. This time-scale 
therefore, establishes it in a specific historical period which to some 
extent safeguards it from becoming out of date (from the June 1989 
elections to the middle of 1990). This will cover the first phase of 
post-communism and this is the period analyzed in the chapter. 
However, many theses still apply to the next phases taking place in the 
years 1991-93. It would also appear that the legitimation dilemmas of 
the post-communist period, although hopefully transitional ones, are, 
however, highly significant for all European countries, and not only for 
those of the East. 
The structure of my chapter is as follows: first, I will present a short 
analysis of the reasons for the collapse of the communist order, based 
on the concept of legitimation. Next, I will present a hypothesis on the 
type of legitimacy which dominated the first phase of the 
post-communist period. This section of the chapter is devoted to 
a more detailed examination of the two theses presented above on the 
problem of legitimacy. Finally, I will deal with the consequences of the 
dilemmas of legitimation for the identity of the whole social order. 
3.2.2. WHY DID THE OLD ORDER COLLAPSE? 
The main reason for the fali of the old order was the exhaustion of its 
main stabilizers, which one can recognise as a pragmatic "active" 
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adaptation strengthened by the external situation of the country and the 
possibility of using force within it. 
By "pragmatic adaptation" I mean that other stabilizers existed 
apart from force. What I have in mind is the whole of the "grey 
area" between naked force and full legitimacy. This grey area, 
made up of various informal and everyday adaptive activities 
moderating the sharpness of the "them and us" division contributed 
to the stabilization of the situation by making it more bearable 
for people and more socially grounded, as I described in the preceding 
chapters. 
I will examine the reasons for the breakdown of the sources of 
stabilization under a number of headings; I will describe the decreasing 
effectiveness of adaptation strategies and the collapse of the legitimation 
system among the elites as well as the continuing absence of legitimacy 
within society. I will leave changes in the international system out of my 
analysis although they had a fundamental influence on the course of 
events within Poland. I will however indicate the significance of the road 
taken by the Polish communist elite in what led up to the breakthrough. 
The adaptation strategies ceased fulfilling their stabilizing role, as all 
such informal processes need resources for their effective functioning.34 
For example, the whole sphere of the second economy cannot fulfil basic 
stabilising functions without a minimum of efficiency by the first 
economy. Further, trips abroad which basically functioned outside the 
system were available, but not for everybody. The same remark applies 
to work "for oneself" outside the framework of the state economy. All 
these processes naturally affected the kernel of the official system and, 
what is more they can appear currently in new forms in fulfilling 
adaptative mechanisms for the difficult economic program (Kolarska-
-Bobińska and Rychard 1992). According to some new data, the 
majority of these informal adaptation processes have survived, though 
they changed their form. For example, the prices in the black market 
now are lower than those in the normal market. This is the only way for 
the black market to be competitive. This is quite contrary to the 
34
 R. Turski has formulated the thesis that one can speak of the two types of 
transformational and adaptive capacities of the monocentric system. While agreeing with 
the author that the system lost its transformational capacity to the greater degree one can 
assume that in the final analysis the cause of its downfall was also the loss of its adaptive 
capacity. Cf. Turski (1989). 
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situation in the communist era: goods on the black market were more 
expensive because there was a scarcity of them in the normal "official" 
market (Bednarski 1992). Generally, according to the same author, the 
second economy during communism was of an "antisystemic" 
character and is now located more inside the market system. This 
would confirm one of my theses (chapter 1) that some sources of 
changes which were located outside system, on its peripheries, are 
becoming a part of the core of a system. They could not substitute for 
a fundamental change in the kernel of the system itself. However, they 
contributed to its erosion. 
As I mentioned earlier, a certain role in breaking the old order was 
played by a decline in belief in its legitimacy within the previous 
communist elites themselves. The institutional system was stabilized 
not only by informal adaptation strategies used by ordinary people but 
also by the elites. I hold that the basic reason for the breakdown of the 
former regime was its increasing inefficiency among the elites as well. 
This led to the destruction of belief in legitimacy amongst these groups. 
One can defend the thesis that the legitimacy crisis stemmed not so 
much from the decline in legitimacy amongst the masses, as this was 
always insufficient, as from the gradual erosion of this belief in the eyes 
of the communist elites. I will illustrate this point by referring to 
theoretical conceptions as well as to certain empirical studies. 
I agree with A. Heller when she writes, basing herself upon Weber, 
that "a social order is legitimated if, at least, one part of the population 
acknowledges it as exemplary and binding" (Heller 1982). According to 
this conception a legitimacy crisis only leads to the downfall of the 
system when it is not legitimated even by communist party members 
and the rest of society accepts an alternative order. One can also cite 
A. Przeworski's belief that the existence of an alternative is an 
inevitable precondition for the transformation of the authoritarian 
system (Przeworski 1986). According to a poll carried out in early 1988 
the legalization of the opposition was supported by 38 percent of PZPR 
and 41.6 percent of OPZZ members; the increase of support among 
these communist party and trade union groups between 1984 and 1988 
was somewhat greater than among the rest of the population (Rychard 
1989). If one accepts membership of these institutions as an indicator of 
closeness to the authorities in ideological and worldview terms one can 
say that the system was de-legitimated in the eyes of a substantial 
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section of its partisans. One can add that close to 30 percent of PZPR 
members (28.4 percent) in early 1988 also either wanted a decrease in 
communist control or were undecided on the issue. Similar findings 
were obtained by CBOS surveys; beginning from August 1989 PZPR's 
activity was approved by less than half of its members ("Opinia 
społeczna..." 1990). The first condition was thusmet, as was the second 
in the form of the existence of an alternative. This role was fulfilled by 
the movement for change supported and symbolized by Solidarity. 
Even a third condition - not formulated by Heller - was also realized in 
that the alternative vision was supported by a substantial section of 
PZPR members. 
The final but most fundamental reason for the breakdown of the old 
stabilizers was the factor of the almost continuous absence of political 
legitimacy among the masses throughout the whole of the postwar 
period. This was the reason why one could in effect talk about 
a continuing, unextinguished political conflict (Adamski et al., Polacy 
88). The minute stock of political legitimacy was most clearly 
manifested in the results of the June 1989 election. But all the same, the 
legitimacy deficit was already apparent in earlier sociological surveys as 
demonstrated by the following indicators; the legalization of the 
opposition was supported by 39.4 percent of respondents in 1984 but 
by 47.3 percent in 1988. On the other hand the strengthening of PZPR's 
leading role in the exercise of power never enjoyed the support of more 
than barely a third throughout the whole of the 1980-88 period; the 
fraction expressing desinteressement in the extent of its power increased 
all the time. The following figures illustrate this legitimacy deficit 
further. In 1980 32.8 percent supported the above principle and 11.5 
Percent were undecided but the figures for 1981 were 20.4 and 11.2 
Percent, for 1984 28.3 and 22.5 percent, and by 1988 they had reached 
25.6 and 28.8 percent (Rychard 1989). 
Society was conscious, at the same time, that the main stabilizers of 
the social order were of the negative-pragmatic character (the 
Possibility of punishment for disobedience and the possibility of an 
easier life and for various matters to be arranged if one were obedient), 
as I described in the previous chapter (Rychard and Szymanderski 
1986). 
In sum therefore, large sections of Polish society appreciated the role 
of pragmatic stabilizers while at the same time the legitimacy of such 
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a basic political institution as the communist party was negligible in 
society and was decreasing, even among its members. A situation in 
which the low efficiency of the economy caused the ineffectiveness of 
the pragmatic stabilizers of the institutional system and where the 
PZPR was deprived of political legitimacy both among the masses and 
to an increasing extent among its own elites could not survive without 
change. A breakthrough took place arousing hopes of an evolution 
towards a democratic and market order. 
The above-mentioned factors were essential, though not fully 
sufficient, in effecting the breakthrough. One should remember the 
events which led to the breakthrough and which determined its 
character. The basie change in the system was begun by the Round 
Table Agreement as a result of which the communists abdicated 
a significant part of their power. Although later events went far beyond 
the framework of this agreement one cannot exaggerate its significance. 
It was unprecedented for the elite in a communist country to agree to 
an evolution leading to its "self-liquidation." As a result of these 
agreements a self-generating social movement was initiated whose 
roots lay in the Round Table even though the extent and depth of the 
changes soon constituted a qualitatively new reality. These agreements 
were reached as a result of the compromise between the opposition and 
the Polish communists. 
The reasons for such a decision by the Polish communists will no 
doubt provide the subject for long academic debate. An important role 
was surely played by the authorities' realization of the ineffectiveness of 
the policy which had up till then sought ways of stabilizing the system 
either through rationalization, reforms from above, or repression. The 
state of the economy deteriorated and the socio-political conflict 
remained unresolved. Simultaneously the pragmatic stabilizers, 
discussed above, exhausted themselves, political support remained 
absent while the erosion of political legitimacy within sections of the 
elite began to appear. The group exercising power could not fail to 
observe these phenomena. 
The beginning of the Polish breakthrough through the road of 
agreement affected its character. It has taken place, so far, in 
a non-violent way. An important role in leading to this breakthrough 
has been played by General Jaruzelski. This politician has been able to 
successfully change his image: from an individual who was mainly 
125 
identified with martial law to one who also contributed to leading 
Poland to full democracy. This basic change would be difficult to 
believe if it had not really happened. Although he is hardly likely to be 
a major political figure in the "Poland of the future" his influence on 
the "non-violent" character of the first stage of transformation in 
Poland deserves to be stressed. This watershed in the history of Poland 
is not however free of its own legitimation dilemmas which will be 
examined in the next section. 
3.2.3. LEGITIMATION PROBLEMS IN THE TRANSFORMATION PHASE 
As I pointed out one can analyze the legitimacy of a political order on 
three levels. The first, that of ideological-axiological legitimation 
concerns the normative bases of the system. The second is the 
legitimation of the institutions of the system while the third is the 
behavioral response to the everyday organizational reality of the 
system expressed in behavior which is based rather on pragmatic 
adaptation than on legitimacy. I presented and illustrated the thesis 
that during the communist period the maximum legitimacy deficit was 
to be found on the second institutional-political level. 
How did the situation appear, after the 1989 breakthrough, from this 
point of view? Where were the bases of systemic legitimation located 
and where did gaps appear? At the end of 1989 and subsequently one 
could discover interesting observations in Polish discussions on the 
subject of the sources of systemie stability after the formal fall of 
communism. The unusually high level of confidence in the government, 
despite its introduction of a socially costly and hurtful economic 
program, was widely pointed out. Until then the communists had had 
political problems even with individual price rises. The first Solidarity 
government, however, was still supported by society despite such 
a drastic economic program. One can explain this phenomenon solely 
in terms of the social legitimization basis of the new political order. 
At the same time that legitimacy exhibited certain characteristics 
which analysts began to note. Society had a "lover's attitude" towards 
the government (Dorn 1990). This depended upon an enormous degree 
of confidence unaccompanied by a similar amount of understanding. 
One can find a similar conclusion in A. Sułek's report (Sułek 1989). 
One notes likewise that the government is well served by the social 
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attitude of passivity and passive permissiveness which, as described by 
Jadwiga Staniszkis, does not offer people the chance to participate 
(Staniszkis 1990; Kolarska-Bobińska and Rychard 1989). I would like 
to take these remarks as the starting-points for further examination. 
One can judge that the strongest stabilizers at the beginning of 1990 
were an ideological-emotional legitimation as well as the behavioral 
adaptation which would appear to be expected by the government. In 
sum therefore, the system's stability was based mainly on the first and 
third legitimation levels while the second institutional-political level 
was the most weakly structured. From this point of view one can 
discern certain paradoxical, if superficial, similarities to the sources of 
stability and the structure of the legitimation pattern in communist 
times (pragmatic adaptation and some belief in socialist values) but 
also fundamental differences. 
Above all the legitimation problems associated with the second 
political level was completely different in nature. The legitimacy deficit 
on this level stemmed in communist times from the lack of acceptance 
of the then political order which was rejected by the majority of the 
population. On the other hand the problem of the first post-communist 
stage stemmed from the partial absence of the new political order in the 
institutional sense, although its authors and general bases had mass 
support. Summming it up less precisely but more graphically the 
communist political order existed but was rejected while the 
post-communist political order still has not been shaped but has been 
accepted. Both situations create problems of legitimacy but they differ 
in type. The problems of communist political legitimacy stemmed from 
the rejection of the existing and structured reality of the second level, in 
other words, of basic institutional rules. On the other hand, in the first 
phase of the post-communist period it was not clear what should or 
should not be accorded legitimacy. Confidence therefore existed, but 
the appropriate level of reality to which it should be accorded still has 
not been shaped. 
One can likewise see similar fundamental differences on the first level 
of basie principles. As I wrote in the former chapter, its role was 
conditioned during the communist period by the acceptance by 
a substantial part of society of general socialist ideas such as social 
justice and eąuality. All the same, it was difficult to build support for 
the reality of actually existing socialism on the basis of the acceptance 
127 
of such general slogans. Apart from that there was always an 
attachment in Polish society's system of values to another competing 
set of Christian and democratic values. The Solidarity government 
harks back to these traditions. One can suppose that as a result of the 
erosion of general socialist values that this type of appeal is much more 
accepted.35 All the same legitimation on this level meets with certain 
barriers, which I will discuss later. 
Finally, in what sense can one talk of the stabilizing role of behavior 
(the third level) in the post-communist period, insofar as I argued the 
case in the preceding section, that the exhaustion of pragmatic 
adaptation was one of the main reasons for the breakdown of the 
communist order? I view it that we have to deal with the building of 
a new form of that adaptation in the post-communist period. In the 
past this stemmed for the most part from the feeling of the lack of 
alternatives to the existing, although not accepted, order. 
Post-communist adaptation, on the other hand, is also based on such 
a feeling of a lack of alternative, but it involved an accepted order. We 
have, therefore, to deal with obedience on the level of behavior but as it 
nas legitimizing belief behind it it is different from the previous type of 
pragmatic adaptation. 
In other words, referring back to the distinction set out in the 
introduction, the communist system was based on some ideological 
belief, institutional rejection, and acquiescence on the behavioral level. 
Whereas in the post-communist situation strong belief exists on the 
ideological level (albeit with some problems), legitimizing belief also 
exists on the institutional level (even to a greater degree than the actual 
existence of the structures themselves) and on the basis of behavior; 
the latter can be exemplified by the sentiment that one has to be 
obedient, however difficult it may be, because it is "our" government. 
This last type of legitimating belief does not refer back either to the 
ideology of the new government or its institutional program; but it is 
also something more than unthinking acceptance, the form of 
obedience defined by W. Wesołowski (1988, p. 42). He writes that in 
this type of behavior the central feature is the unthinking "one 
35
 According to CBOS data 9.8 percent of society considered in January 1987 that the 
socialist system had brought Poland more harm than good; the figure increased to 13,9 
Percent in May 1987 and 37 percent in July 1989; "Opinia społeczna... 1990". 
128 
has to" (which refers to the demand for obedience). During the first 
phase of post-communism the central feature in the formulation "one 
must be obedient, even though it is difficult, because it is our government''' 
was the italicised phrase. The stress put on the word "our" empowers me 
to describe this type of behavior as reinforced, legitimizing belief. 
The common feature of both communist and post-communist 
stabilizing mechanisms on the behavioral level is however the feeling of 
rather weak participation in political life. 
One can use the following arguments in order to justify this thesis. 
Modern legitimacy is based on active political support. Public opinion 
polis continued to show that support declared for the authorities was 
high (for example 76 percent had confidence in the government in 
December 1989) ("Nastroje społeczne..." 1989). But at the same time the 
population could not participate actively in this support and this did not 
change substantially in the years 1990-93. One can hypothesize that the 
difference between potential support and the weak possibilities for its 
mobilization would occasion tension. The danger was that one of the 
ways of reducing this tension will be the withdrawal of support. It is true 
that it did not happen during the first phase of post-communism. 
The first precursor of the problem of maintaining support during that 
time was the clear increase in feelings of uncertainty and in the the 
percentage of people foreseeing social tension. This rise was noted by 
CBOS between November 1989 and January 1990. Apart from that, 
according to the same institute's findings between February and March 
1990, the percentage of those considering that it would be possible to 
liquidate the crisis in Poland with five years fell from 63 to 52 percent; 
one also noted a certain falling-off in support for the government's 
economic program (which I described in the subchapter 2.2) {Gazeta 
Wyborcza 1990). It naturally does not follow that the basie reason for 
this wavering in political support was the tension caused by the 
impossibility of expressing this support in an active way. It is possible 
that a much greater role was played here by the hardships caused by the 
government's economic programme. Apart from that, some falling off in 
support could result from the insufficiencies of the institutionalized 
opposition to the Solidarity movement. In this critical situation 
discontent which could not find an institutionalized outlet could express 
itself well in a general falling-off in the level of support for the Solidarity 
program. 
129 
The hypothesis of the existence of tension between potential support 
and the impossibility of mobilizing it is therefore only one of a number 
of possibilities. Various indicators suggest that this state of passivity 
suited society. A CBOS report concludes, on the basis of its relevant 
surveys, that "one can in addition surmise that the 'pro-Solidarity' view 
expressed by the majority of society indicates a sympathetic and 
friendly favored sports team type of support rather than a readiness to 
join in actively in the movement or to tie oneself organizationally to it" 
("Panorama polityczna..." 1990, p. 7). Similarly other authors pointed 
to the emergence of a strategy of passively waiting for the changes 
taking place to work themselves out, especially in the economic sphere 
(Staniszkis 1990a; Rykowski 1990). 
The fact that one can arrive at a certain consensus between the 
government and society on the basis of mutual agreement on passivity 
did not, however, rule out potential tensions but it could, at most, 
postpone the time of their appearance. It is inevitable that they will be 
born since the ongoing implementation of the program of fundamental 
transformation can only succeed under conditions of societal 
mobilization on the political, economic, and civic dimensions. In my 
opinion one can therefore see here the emerging outlines of conflict 
between a type of mobilized support (passive-emotional) and the 
program whose support depends upon support of a different, 
rational-active type linked with political, economic, and social 
participation. The results of social surveys carried out in Poland enable 
us to support such a thesis. They indicated that the authors and 
promoters of the change enjoyed more support than the program of 
change itself.36 The emotional dimension therefore counted for more 
than the rational one. Here again one can call on the following survey 
findings in support; 56.3 percent supported the privatization program 
but only 10 percent knew what it entailed {Gazeta Wyborcza 1990). 
It would appear that one can formulate the conflict discussed in the 
above thesis in the following terms: the institutional system in the first 
post-communist phase in Poland was stabilized rather more by values 
(the first legitimation level) than by interests which could express 
36
 This is in effect a reversal of the situation during the communist period when the 
communist reform program enjoyed more support than its authors. Cf. OBOP 1989 
communiąue and CBOS communiąue "Społeczna ocena i przewidywane następstwa 
programu Balcerowicza" (Warsaw 1990). 
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themselves in the institutions of the political and economic structures 
(the second level). At the same time the Solidarity government was 
implementing a program which could only succeed if interests are 
mobilized to work within these structures. This was the source of the 
most important contradiction of the transitional period which give 
birth to legitimation problems. Support based on emotional belief 
rather than on rational understanding is somewhat brittle and open to 
manipulation. Political and economic interests provide a more reliable 
basis but these are far from being organized and institutionalized in 
post-communist Poland. In this way I return to one of my earlier 
arguments, that in spite of the considerable "potential" for 
legitimation, basic problems may emerge in this field. In other words it 
is difficult to set a rational legitimacy into motion which is based on the 
negotiation of interests and the acceptance of divisions and conflicts. 
This is going to change during the second phase of post-communism 
which will be described in the last chapter of the book. 
Passive support during the first phase of post-communism had in 
common with the communist times low participation in political life. 
This passivity was, however, supportive of reform, as I described in the 
chapter 2.2. The difference between communism and the first phase of 
post-commusnim is, in my opinion, that "active adaptation" 
mechanisms modifying the official rules were not very widely used after 
collapse of communism. They survived (and I will deal with them later 
on) but the dominant orientation was passive support. The reason for 
this was that the rise of normative legitimacy after the collapse of 
communism and resulting from it submitting of the individuals' and 
groups' needs to the general support for the first "our" government. 
We can pose a thesis that from the point of view of the dominant 
strategies there was an evolution from the "active adaptation" strategies 
during the decline of communism to the "pasive support" strategies 
during the first phase of post-communism. 
I will now move on to my second main thesis for this chapter, which 
is that the transformations proposed by Solidarity did not find 
institutional and social support for their implementation but in practice 
could only be based on Solidarity symbols and ideology. This thesis 
applies mainly to the first phase of post-communist. However, many 
peculiarities of the post-communism institutional structure last for 
a longer period of time. The Second Solidarity cannot be easily based 
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on the ethos of the First. Three types of legitimacy gaps or deficits 
consequently arise: the institutional, the social, and the symbolic, which 
correspond to my three legitimation levels, and whose coexistence 
cause basic problems for the identity of the order as a whole. I now 
move on to discuss these three types of problems. 
I will begin with the problems connected with the institutional 
structure. It would appear that the basie transformations taking place 
in the first phase of post-communism were not supported by 
a sufficient rebuilding of the political and economic institutions. 
Conseąuently, it was difficult to examine the legitimacy of the system 
on this level as it was the least structured. The idea of economic 
planning has been challenged but fundamental institutional changes 
still have not taken place. Analysts point out that the first 
post-communist government maintained the whole industrial structure 
inherited from communism and that nothing constituting the kernel of 
the Polish economic firm had been changed (Kisiel 1990; Wesołowski 
1990). A fundamental change will be introduced here by the 
privatization program but this is a long term task and is the basic 
measure for changing the economic system. Without going into detail, 
one can point out that according to expert opinion privatization will 
not of itself resolve the problem of large scale Polish enterprises; what is 
necessary, in addtition, is a program for a whole range of other, not 
solely privatizational, property transformations. 
The basie insufficiencies of the institutional structure in the 
transitional phase were also apparent in the political sphere. They 
stemmed primarily from the character of the transition which I defined 
earlier as one of peculiar dichotomy. The dissolution of the PZPR 
meant the disappearance of the basie institution against which 
Solidarity had defined itself.38 Such a situation meant that the problem 
for Solidarity was no longer whether it should institutionalize its 
participation in politics, but merely how this should be done. Should it 
allow the appearance of specific political parties under the Solidarity 
banner working outside the trade union structure? One can suppose 
that this solution would maintain the situation in which politics in 
37
 Such views were expressed at the siting of the Economic Council attached to the 
Council of Ministers in February 1990. 
38
 Jadwiga Staniszkis, as mentioned earlier, discusses the "legitimacy gap" caused by 
the disappearance of Solidarity's opponent in Tygodnik Solidarność, no. 1 (1990). 
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Solidarity took on both a trade union and a "civic" aspect; as it did not 
have its own specific place, confusions and problems of identity would 
arise. The political splits inside Solidarity and the creation of the 
multi-party structure in the years 1990-93 has solved some of these 
problems (as I pointed out in the chapter 2.2 and also in the last 
chapter). But generally, the institutional weakness of the 
transformation is a rather stable phenomenon. 
It is a certain paradox that Solidarity's relative weakness as an 
organized political force was revealed at the moment when it took over 
power. Delays in forming the bases for a new "political class" 
hampered the transformation towards democracy. The absence of an 
organized political base increased the chance of social support for 
various types of political visionaries who might, for example, attempt 
to beguile society with the vision of a strong central power ensuring 
order. The problems which appeared on this score had therefore 
a legitimizing character sensu stricto; this applies where in institutional 
terms Solidarity's symbols and inheritance are most localized. 
Quite apart from the question of how the Polish political scene will 
be filled in and energized, one can ąuestion the degree to which Polish 
society was (is?) ready to fill this political vacuum. It is really not 
known whether strongly crystallized and socially supported political 
options exist. The authors of the above-mentioned CBOS report 
argued that basic political options in Poland were still in an embryonic 
stage and that one should view the Solidarity movement not only from 
its political aspect but rather as having "the leading-role" in the new 
political order from which in the future clearer political orientations 
will emerge (Staniszkis 1990a, p. 25). It would appear that many of the 
problems involved in filling the political scene still stem from 
Solidarity's emergence primarily as a moral protest against the 
deformations of socialism. It never had a crystallized political program 
because that was not its role. It was to a certain degree the child of the 
communist system and although it buried it, if found it difficult to 
discover its identity in this new phase when the system which created it 
no longer existed. I hold that Solidarity in moving from the "romantic" 
to the "political" phase did not have a conception of what aspects of its 
identity it should preserve and which it should change during these 
fundamental transformations. It was also unclear how society received 
these transformations and it could only succeed with its active 
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participation. Many people would doubtless like to see a clean moral 
force in Solidarity just as much as an effective actor on the political 
scene. Although these are not wholly contradictory expectations, the 
working out of political conceptions which are strongly grounded both 
on moral principles and interests is a difficult task. 
The period of functioning of the framework of "imbalanced 
dichotomy" caused legitimation problems. This framework signified 
the absence of political opposition which would also be legitimate. In 
such a situation criticism did not have an institutional expression, and 
as I wrote earlier, it had to inevitably be directed in a generalized way 
against the Solidarity Government. In this way "imbalanced 
(or-imperfect) dichotomy" provoked legitimacy problems for Solidari­
ty itself. When I write of "legitimate opposition" I want to emphasise 
that anti-Solidarity criticism directed from a communist position, 
although legal, was - and is - not perceived as legitimate by large 
groups in society. Another road still is not however fully shaped to 
a sufficient degree at the moment. A non-communist and 
non-Solidarity opposition is still rather weak in terms of program. 
Independently of the lack of clarity of Polish political structures and 
of the place occupied within them by Solidarity one has to say that this 
structure was very effective in coping with possible conflicts caused by 
the implementation of hard economic measures during the first phase 
of post-communism. The absence of divisions between Solidarity's 
trade union and political sections resulted in all conflicts becoming 
internal ones. Apart from the already mentioned negative aspects, this 
also had some good conseąuences. Since in this way the possibility of 
a new conflict of the "them and us" type was diminished because, after 
all, divisions were within the family (between us). The existence of 
common origins and symbolism meant that the Solidarity government 
not only expected support from the Solidarity trade union but also 
received it, passively at least. This mechanism worked during the whole 
first phase of post-communism, and also during 1991 and - to some 
extent - even in 1992. In sum, therefore, the amorphous and unclear 
structure has shown itself very effective in absorbing conflicts and in 
mobilising the mass electorate. Such results do not seem to have 
occurred in other post-communist countries. They are, admittedly, 
rebuilding the pluralism of political parties but these organizations 
have often failed to gain much support. 
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The next factor causing legitimation difficulties is that the program 
introduced by the Solidarity government did not have a clear social 
addressee, or more precisely, social forces which would become its 
main promoter and protector. In this way one should add to the 
previously discussed legitimacy problems on the institutional level 
those on the everyday organizational level although this remained one 
of the basic stabilizers. This stabilization was, however, based above all 
on obedient behavior, which as defined earlier, was endowed with 
legitmating belief. The stabilization was based to a lesser degree on 
active support stemming from the possibility of realizing one's own 
interests due to the introduction of the program. As W. Wesołowski 
observed "there are no bearers of the process of economic reforms 
definitely interested in its success. Neither a group of 'laborious 
Puritans' is emerging nor a set of devoted 'captains of industry.' Almost 
all strata of the working class are very confused about the future, and 
they are very silent" (Wesołowski 1990, p. 12). 
Solidarity grew out of the working class revolt and assumed its 
primary form as a trade union. It would therefore appear obvious that 
the main force promoting its programe would be the workers. From the 
beginning, however, this program, at least in its government version, 
can present a threat to workers' interests because of the pressing need 
for the restructuring and privatization of the economy which raises the 
possibility of unemployment. According to a March 1990 survey, 39 
percent of employees in state enterprises took the possibility of losing 
their jobs into account (it is unclear however what proportion of these 
were manual workers) (Gazeta Wyborcza 1990). Apart from that, 
workers, because of their invołvement in the existing economic and 
management structures where wages depended primarily upon the 
effectiveness of the political pressure exerted by the "large industry" 
class, could and still can effectively block change by using their trade 
union representatives directly for this purpose (Celiński 1989). For 
many activists of the last phase of strikes in summer 1988, as pointed 
out by P. Szwajcer, the new Round Table identity of Solidarity 
associated with compromise was unattractive (Szwajcer 1990). 
The possibility of a conflict between the revindication and 
pro-reform currents in Solidarity has been noted for some time. In 
1989-90, however, these conflicts found their outlets in some sort of 
institutional division between the two currents. However, the result of 
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the tension was inevitably transferred to the whole Solidarity movement 
hindering the legitimation processes of the ongoing transformation as it 
was not very clear what symbolism one cold appeal to. Solidarity could 
not however break free from its basic clientele, the workers, and at the 
same time proposed a program which aroused the feeling of threat within 
it. I consider this to be one of the basie contradictions of the first 
transitional period (1989 -middle 1990). The weakness of the trade union 
current within Solidarity was one of the consequences of this 
contradiction; as a result it was difficult to view the workers as the 
primarily promoters of the ongoing transformations, at least in the short 
term perspective. One should not forget however that a large section of the 
workers might still retain thememory of the summer 1988 strikes; after all 
it was thanks to them that Solidarity's re-legalization, and much more, was 
gained. Feelings of frustration could, on the other hand, be all the greater 
among the workers. I would say therefore that the mere fact that this 
group refused to go on strike is a significant indicator of programmatic 
support and that it was and still is difficult to expect any more. 
It was also difficult to see strong support for the program by the 
peasants. On the contrary, various peasant groups often demonstrated 
their dislike of government measures and pointed out the threat to their 
interests. 
The question of support for the changes taking place by representatives 
of the so-called intelligentsia stratum can be interpreted in various ways. 
A large section certainly supported the political transformation directed 
at building a civic state and society. But large groups of white collar 
workers, specialists and large numbers of intellectuals would appear to be 
feeling the threat to their material interests posed by basie aspects of the 
economic changes. Among these processes one did not see the slightest 
sign of the liquidation of the material deprivation of these groups (which 
was exceptional in Poland even when compared with other communist 
countries). No radical change in the material situation of the intelligentsia 
and specialist groups has been proposed till now. The Marxist dogma of 
the lesser value of so-called "non-material" production still seems to 
weigh over economic life in practice. On the other hand, the quite contrary 
myth of the marketization and economization of life (which has the same 
conseąuences) was and is present; again this type of activity is treated 
rather as a cost than as an essential investment for transforming Poland 
into a modern country. Opportunities were therefore being wasted for 
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turning representatives of this group into one of the main motors of the 
ongoing transformation. To sum up, this group has found itself in 
a rather schizophrenic situation from the very begining of 
post-communism (one to which, one may add in passing, it is quite 
accustomed); on the one hand systemic values move it to support the 
political changes while the threat to its economic interests inclines it 
towards caution in real support for the economic changes (despite their 
declaration in favor of it). This schizophrenia is also not a specific 
characteristic of the intelligentsia. Similar tensions also affect other 
groups such as the workers. The differentiated attitude of the first 
Solidarity government towards the intelligentsia certainly flowed from 
the fact that the so-called ex-nomenklatura group was situated within 
its ranks; the authorities did not work out their attitude towards it. 
That is why one heard such diverse postulates from various quarters 
ranging all the way from the total turnover of the administrative 
apparatus to its complete maintenance. In reality no differentiating 
mechanism in relation to these groups has been worked out with the 
aim of winning over its most valuable section, notably the industrial 
enterprise directors. Such initiatives as Senator Machalski's were 
somehwat exotic on the Polish political scene (Machalski 1990). 
Finally, let us examine quickly the argument that private 
entrepreneurs could become the group promoting the new 
transformations in the first phase. One should note at the outset that, 
even if this were possible, this was too smali a group to have a decisive 
impact on the outcome of the changes. But even this group, faced by the 
fiscal policy, lacked motivation to support the transformation. Apart 
from that not all of them had a developed pro-Solidarity ethos which 
would allow them to support the transformation on the basis of values. 
In sum, therefore, the program, whose authors enjoyed such 
enormous social support, did not have forces behind it who could 
become its main promoters.39 It is possible that this really was 
39
 According to OBOP findings in December 1989 (communiąue, "Nastroje społeczne 
w grudniu 1989 r.") confidence in the Senate, Sejm, government and Solidarity ranged 
from 72.1 to 76 percent. However it is elear from CBOS surveys in January 1990 that, in 
comparison with November 1989, general disquiet was growing as was the number of 
those foreseeing increased tension. This may have indicated certain difficulties in 
maintaining this level of support, CBOS communiąue, "Nastroje społeczne w styczniu 
1990 r." 
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a general-societal program, as it did not emphasise the interests of some 
selected group. Let us note that this program aroused certain groups, 
alas mainly in a defensive direction. It has mobilized and structured the 
interests antagonistic to it but its activities did not lead to the 
appearance of interest groups benefiting from this program during its 
first phase. The characteristic feature of this transitional period is that 
support for the program resulted more from the sharing of common 
values than the satisfaction of group interests. On the other hand the 
program's opponents integrated themselves rather on the basis of 
threatened interests than of values. The situation, in which supporters 
were united by values, and opponents rather by a community of interest, 
hindered the effective introduction of the changes.40 This made the 
dangers all the greater as the basis of the transformation program was 
the mobilization of political and economic interests. The above 
observations are yet another argument for the case that during the 
transition period systemic legitimation on the first level of the 
acceptance of general norms and of an emotional attitude towards the 
government was more important than legitimation on the second 
institutional level designed to produce rational methods of satisfying 
and resolving interests. 
Let us not forget that the difficulty of identifying the promoters of 
the transformation within traditional conceptions of the social 
structure (which I carried out in my examination of the attraction of 
change for workers, intellectuals, peasants, the nomenklatura, and 
private enrepreneurs) is not proof that forces supporting the program 
did not exist. During the last decade it turned out, more than once, that 
the traditional stratification concept of the social structure was 
inadequate to describe Polish reality. Nor can one rule out the 
possibility that a process of de-structuring the old order was taking 
place which could give birth to new social forces which would not fit 
into what have hitherto been the structural conceptions. In short, it was 
- and is - possible that these groups already exist, or have been 
beginning to form, but that we simply are incapable of naming them. If 
This phenomenon may assume two forms. Firstly, the supporting groups may 
mtegrate around values while the opponents would do so around interests which would 
give birth to social tension. Secondly, these same individuals are often inclined to support 
change because of their values even though this threatens their interests; such a situation 
would naturally give rise to tension on the individual level. 
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it appears that the support of the program because of values and the 
opposition to it because of interests has hindered the structuring of the 
forces promoting change then it does not follow that this will be so in 
future. Divisions and integration according to values may appear 
structural but it may emerge in the near future as the spine of new basic 
divisions in social structure around which interests will also 
concentrate. A Polish press commentator on economics observed that 
the first Solidarty government had to begin to offend specific sections 
of society, and not everyone as in the past - which was much safer 
(Jankowiak 1990). While agreeing with this diagnosis, I consider that 
the replacement of a program by which all gained and lost equally with 
an ideology by which some will gain and others lose will of itself signify 
the beginning of the end of the first transitional period. We are 
witnessing the first signs of this process which I will describe in the last 
chapter of my book. 
3.2.4. PROBLEMS OF THE IDENTITY OF THE NEW ORDER 
I have argued so far that the system in the first transitional 
post-communist period was legitimated mainly on the levels of basic 
normative principles and behavior. All the same, as I have just 
demonstrated, legitimacy problems emerged on the behavioral level. 
They stemmed from the difficulty of basing the program on the 
crystalized interest of some social group. However, legitimacy 
problems also appeared on the level of basie principles, although they 
were one of the major stabilising factors. 
It would appear to me that the legitimacy problems discussed up till 
now on the behavioral and institutional levels were connected with the 
fundamental legitimation gap concerning the basie principles and 
symbolism of the new order. The emerging social order, which in the 
transitional period did not find sufficient institutional supports and 
group interests promoting it, could only with difficulty be justified and 
symbolized by what has been Solidarity's symbolism and ideology. 
I will devote the last section of this chapter to this problem of the 
identity of the new order in the transitional period. 
The Solidarity government, by creating a social order based on 
political pluralism and a market economy with an emphasis on 
privatization, faced legitimation problems. The unity symbolism and 
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ethos was not particularly useful for validating such a program for 
a movement basing itself organizationally upon its trade union and 
strongly exhibiting "social justice - trade union" values. The tensions 
connected with this appeared within the Solidarity movement in the 
form of long running discussions on the subject of whether to divide 
into trade union and reformist sections or to organize around existing 
political options. The term "social market economy" used by Premier 
Mazowiecki in his January 1990 speech to the Sejm, although not 
defined exactly, may be understood as a attempt to reconcile these 
incoherent elements of identity in order to gain a clearer basis of 
legitimacy. 
The difficulties associated with legitimacy are therefore always the 
direct consequence of identity problems. The Solidarity movement, in 
my opinion, arrived at a crisis phase in what have hitherto been its 
forms of identity; the future of the systemic transformation in Poland 
depends upon the effectiveness of how it will cope with this stage. This 
identity crisis has several basic levels which I mentioned earlier but will 
now recapitulate. Firstly, there was the problem of validating political 
pluralism on the basis of the movement's unity symbolism and ethos. 
Secondly, there were the tensions stemming from the introduction of 
a market framework by structures growing out of the movement's trade 
union. Thirdly, there was the difficulty of moving on from the romantic 
to the political phase and of practizing politics in a movement based 
mainly on moral principles. 
In this way, therefore, the thesis on the identity problems of the new 
order constitutes a generalization of the arguments concerning the 
legitimacy problems on the institutional and social levels. These are, after 
all, features which are strongly bound together and one should examine 
their mutual relations. On the one hand, the absence of legitimating 
symbolism which can bear such a load hindered the undertaking of bold 
institutional "openings." On the other hand, the impossibility of finding 
new social clienteles and the difficulty of breaking free from old ones, or 
more precisely the difficulty of winning over part of the old clientele for 
the new program, created problems of social support for the program of 
change. This hampered the development of legitimacy. There are 
certainly more of these types of bilateral relationships. 
I consider that the analytical perspective of legitimation, or of 
identity associated with it, provides the most appropriate intepretative 
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framework. This is, after all, in its most general form of classical crisis 
of legitimacy and identity in the Habermasian sense. This depends 
upon the legitimizing principle being questioned by political practice. 
Just as state intervention destroyed the legitimizing principles of the 
private economy under capitalism, so in the post-communist period the 
program directed by the Solidarity movement could not find sufficient 
legitimizing support in its ideological inheritance. This resulted from 
the fact that Solidarity as a movement for change had a greater 
legitimacy potential when it grew out of the protest against the 
communist order. When this diminished, at least in its external forms, 
legitimacy problems appeared as discussed by Jadwiga Staniszkis. As 
mentioned earlier, she has identified a legitimacy gap after the 
disappearance of the communist party in Poland. This arised because 
Solidarity emerged more as a protest against socialist reality than as the 
desire for the building of a new order. It grew rather more out of the 
protest against the deformations of socialism than out of opposition to 
its very existence. Whereas after the collapse of communism it was not 
so much the deformations which were being put right as the very essence 
which was rejected. This also caused difficulties in building a positive 
legitimizing program for the political and institutional structures; in 
other words - in filling the previously mentioned legitimacy gap. 
The consequence of all this was a situation in which the 
transformation program did not have its own ethos and had 
institutional shortcomings while on the other hand Solidarity's 
traditions and ethos were no longer sufficient for the building of new 
institutions. A program without an ethos and an ethos without a program 
— that was one of the dilemmas of the first phase of transformation. 
Changes could not be based on the symbolism of the 21 Gdańsk 
Shipyard strike demands of 1980 while the symbolism of the Round 
Table was insufficient. All the same, as I wrote in the introduction to 
this Chapter, efforts were made to demonstrate the "continuity of 
legitimacy" by stressing that the Solidarity of the 1990's was 
implementing the program which grew out of the first Solidarity 
upsurge and inheritance of 1980. The program documents of the 
Second Solidarity congress pointed out that it had only after 1989 
become possible to fulfil the ideas of the Self-Managing Republic and 
the Address to the Working People of Eastern Europe which had been 
presented during the First Solidarity congress in 1981 (Sanford 1990). 
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All the same, the situation was characterized by a certain lack of that 
integrating element which Mira Marody (1987c) called the "collective 
sense," or more generally the sentiment of the sense and roots of the 
change in some coherent vision of the transformation. For many 
people there was no clear definition of what had happened in Poland. 
Was this the rejection of communism carried out in a spontaneous 
manner or was it a change in its form controlled from outside? Was this 
a change of the system or only a change in elites? It was unclear to what 
degree a return to capitalism was taking place and to what extent a new 
order was being built. K.T. Toeplitz expressed it most precisely and 
accurately in one of his weekly Polityka articles when he asked whether 
we were facing a revolution or a restoration. One can note that the term 
"capitalism" did not appear in program speeches in 1989-90. The talk 
was rather of moving towards the modern societies of the West, of 
parliamentary democracy and market economy, or as mentioned 
above, of the social market economy. But the general slogans of the 
market and democracy lost their integrating power and motivation in 
a situation when they were no longer the only way of expressing 
opposition to communism and have assumed an independent life of 
their own. The process by which these slogans are taking on a specific 
meaning will also be the process of the building of the identity of the 
new order. 
The old order produced powerful forces in the social structure and 
consciousness as well as in the real economic structure which one 
cannot change in a day. Their process of adaptation to the new order 
will certainly be more long drawn out than the speed of the 
transformation itself. The spectre and inheritance of communism may 
therefore still hover over Europe for a certain time. 
What is more important here is the inheritance than the ghost. Poles 
are resistant to the ghost, that is, against communist slogans and 
ideology. When I speak of the inheritance I mean that although we 
Poles have rejected "external communism," nevertheless "internal 
communism" has survived. Its legacy remains in several dimensions. 
Firstly, in the social consciousness, or rather subconscious, in the form 
of an attachment to certain arrangements which are often not even 
identified with communism. Secondly, it is an inheritance at the 
moment in the rules of organized activity which show themselves in 
such faults as the lack of public involvement, failure to accept the 
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settlement of disputes, and low regard for the law. Thirdly, this 
inheritance is present in the social structure in the divisions which still 
remain within it and the system of group belonging, the distance 
between them and convictions about the greater or lesser weight of 
individual groups (for example the devaluation of the role of the 
intelligentsia) which produces inadequate bargaining power by 
particular groups in facing up to the challenge of modernity. 
The forms of the communist inheritance described above do not only 
result from the ideological and official form of this system. What is 
often more important and more difficult to get rid of are the various 
informal mechanisms inherited from communism which were in effect 
moves away from it, facilitating the everyday functioning of society; 
one can cite the role of the whole informal sector and the high degree 
of permissiveness for various pathologies such as the black market. 
The communist inheritance is thus also the legacy of the social strategy 
of "coping with communism" which under conditions of building the 
new order may become dysfunctional and a hindrance to the trans-
formation (see chapter 2.2 and 4). 
The permanence of these phenomena cannot be explained solely by 
analyzing their political causes. Nevertheless, one of the oft-remarked 
features of communism was that in an order where politics decided 
everything there was hardly any real politics and political life. Communism 
was perhaps not as much a political as a cultural, organizational and social 
phenomenon. In any case without freeing oneself from its inheritance in 
these three spheres it is difficult to talk of a modern political legitimacy. 
Many roads may lead away from the transitional post-communist phase. 
One of those is the road towards political democracy and the market 
economy. The effective resolution of the emerging problems of legitimacy 
increases the chances of entering on that road. 
In concluding this discusion I cannot resist the observation that the 
dynamics of the transformation in Poland have been a continuous series 
of antagonisms. The system of Real Socialism created social forces 
which were to support it, but which turned against it and formed the 
Solidarity movement. This movement in turn created such a program of 
transformation that it could no longer find sufficient legitimation and 
social support in its own inheritance and traditions while it could not 
cut itself away from them, as this would also cause basic problems of 
legitimacy. These paradoxes will be analyzed in the last chapter. 
CHAPTER 4 
DYNAMICS OF POST-COMMUNISM: FROM PASSIVE 
POLITIZATION TO ACTIVE DEPOLITIZATION? 
4.1. INTRODUCTION: THE SELF-DESTRUCTION 
OF COMMUN1SM 
In the last chapter of this book I will analyze the dynamics of 
transformation. This chapter will summarize some of the theses on the 
nature of post-communism. The logic of its first phase, which was 
analyzed in chapters 2.2. and 3.2 was exhausted and the second phase 
has started. The crucial features of this logic presented in the earlier 
chapters are summarized and synthetized here. In terms of the 
evolution of the social strategies it was a move from active adaptation 
(the last phase of communism) through passive support (the first phase 
of post-communism) to the active depolitization (the second phase of 
post-communism). The last two elements of this evolution will be 
analyzed in this chapter. 
The study of this evolution will concentrate on three levels: the 
evolution of social strategies, the dynamics of social structure, and the 
dynamics of institutional structure. In this last section of the chapter 
I will try to propose a theoretical model of evolution of the institutional 
structure from the last period of communism to the second phase of 
post-communism. I will refer there to the concept of the fourfold 
system as a starting point. 
* * * 
After the initial, transitory optimism of 1989-90, when the societies of 
Central Europe were regarded as the source of radical change, the time 
for analyzing the limits to change has come. There is a growing number 
of studies of the limits of political and economic transformation in 
Europe. Among these studies, analyses of the "legacy of communism" 
as a constraint on transformation are very popular. 
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The starting point of this chapter is the thesis that the legacy 
of communism is only one element of the legacy of the past. 
We really do not know whether it is (was?) communism which 
is the central element of this history, that is, the element contributing 
most to our understanding of the constraints to transition. The 
opinion that communism is the strongest constraint on transition 
is at this point only a hypothesis, and I am not sure whether 
it is the best possible one. It may be that other elements of 
the past are more important (for example the lack of advanced 
capitalism in the pre-war period and other characteristics important 
in modernization theory). 
But even if we limit the scope of analysis to the legacy of 
communism (which is the topic of this chapter), we have to discuss next 
its over-simplified popular understanding, which is the idea that 
communism means stability, rigidity, and the rejection of change. My 
idea is quite different: the foundations of communism became turning 
points and eventually contributed to the collapse of the regime. More 
precisely my first thesis is that the main sources of change were built 
into the communist system. They enabled communism to develop, and 
finally to collapse in the first phase of transition. Communism created 
its own grave-diggers: the working class. 
However, the crucial element is the dynamics of the process of 
transition. Therefore, my second thesis is in line with the general idea of 
the book that the factors which were based on communist assets and 
contributed to the collapse of communism in the first phase, in the 
second one began to block further change. 
Additionally, during the communist era there were many informal 
mechanisms of modifications to and departures from the official shape 
of communism (the second economy, informal organizations, corrup-
tion, etc). They enabled normal life to exist under communism, and 
"domesticated" communism. These phenomena simultaneously 
contributed to the erosion of the system, and made it more deeply 
rooted in society and in real social interests. Also because of them, the 
collapse of communism was accelerated, but the second phase of 
transition would be endangered. This illustrates one of the general 
theses of my book that some sources of changes which contributed to 
the collapse of the fonner system are simultaneously limiting the 
transformation on the second phase of post-communism. 
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As a result we can say that one of the paradoxes of communism's 
collapse lies in the fact that both the core elements of communist 
regimes and deviations from it contributed to this collapse. Finally, due 
to the dynamics of the processes of transition, both of these kinds of 
phenomena (the intended shape of communism and deviations from it) 
can slow the second phase of change. The "communist assets" which 
were necessary for the breakdown of the old system may endanger the 
transformation to a new one. 
There are at least two consequences of these assumptions. The first is 
that the legacy of communism can be interpreted also as a factor 
contributing to systemic collapse, i.e., the main factor of change (at 
least in the first phase of transformation). On the other hand, the legacy 
of deviations from communism (informal mechanisms of coping with 
the system) can be interpreted as stabilizing factors, slowing the second 
phase of transformation. 
The second consequence is that the transformation process is 
a dynamic one and that the logie underlying its phases shifts. The main 
aim of this chapter is to identify the logie of different phases of 
post-communism and to show what were the main resources activated 
and mobilized in each of them. 
In this chapter, I reject two visions of transformation: the 
normative and the telelogical. According to the first framework, 
there is a transition from a rigid, centralized, and stable communism 
to a market democracy based on flexibility, decentralization, and 
uncertainty. However, in reality, it is not normative communism 
which collapsed, but real communism, embracing many informalities, 
and spontaneous decentralization. As a conseąuence, this is not 
a transition from normative communism to normative capitalism, 
but the collapse of "real communism" leading to - who knows 
where? 
The teleological vision of transition is based on the assumption that 
the transition has a goal - to build capitalism - and that we have to 
study how reality differs from this model of the future.1 David Stark 
1
 This understanding of the idea of transition is opposite to the classical one in which 
transition is understood as "transition from" (O'Donnel and Schmitter 1986). (I owe this 
remark to Schmitter). It is interesting to ask why this classical meaning was replaced by 
one in which the most popular form is the vision of "transition to democracy" (the 
so-called " T D " paradigm). 
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(1992) has shown that this picture is oversimplified and that the 
concept of transition should be replaced by that of transformation, 
which is less teleological. Similarly, Machonin (1992) proposes the 
concept of transformation as opening up more possibilities for 
sociological analysis. I also reject the teleological vision of transition as 
a single explanation, but do not reject it entirely. 
The period "in between," i.e., the real transitional period, has its own 
systemic logic and dynamics (Rychard 1991) and analyzing this logie is 
more sociologically interesting than analyzing deviations from a norma-
tive model of capitalism (see Giza and Marody 1992). This is why the 
concept of transition is not wholly satisfactory. The internal logie of this 
period is also the reason why I oppose, following Stark (1992), the idea of 
a "nonsystem" as a description of the transitional period (see Bunce and 
Csandi 1991). There is a "systemie" logie of this period and an analysis of 
its evolution during transformation is described in this chapter. 
However, my idea is that both concepts - transition, stressing the 
role of designed change, and transformation, stressing the role of 
spontaneous, non-goal-directed changes - are necessary and useful. 
They describe and explain different stages of change: different in terms of 
their logie, individuals' strategies, and structures. The dynamics of social 
change during the post-communist era can be interpreted as shifting 
between transition and transformation. 
4.2. VANISHING LEGACY OF COMMUNISM 
AND SOLIDARITY: FROM PASSIVE POLITIZATION 
TO ACTIVE DEPOLITIZATION OF SOCIETY 
The danger of analyzing communism as the source of collapse lies in the fact 
that, oversimplified, it can be taken to mean that communism collapsed 
because it was bad and oppressive, because it had to collapse, and would 
have collapsed without any external opposition. Instead, I am interested in 
how the internal dynamics of communism created and reshaped the forces 
which were both the source of change and of collapse. These resources were 
tapped by Solidarity and were behind the first "transitional movement." 
However, in the second phase of transition, these resources were 
exhausted, and are now being replaced by new ones. This dynamie is 
described in the present paragraph. 
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First, we must define in what sense these assets were of a specifically 
communist nature. There are three main features: (1) they were shaped 
during the communist, era; (2) they were intended to be the main 
supports of a communist system; and, finally, (3) they were used as 
tools facilitating the collapse of the regime. These three features in my 
opinion enable us to call them the resources which represent the legacy 
of the communist system. 
The most important resource which was used by the anti-communist 
opposition was the special social alliance between workers and re-
presentativeness of the intelligentsia, which has been analyzed by many 
sociologists. The frustration of the aspirations of these two groups, 
which were to some extent shaped by communism, created the social 
base for the Solidarity movement. The next resource which was 
mobilized was the moral integration of Polish society based on rejection 
of the communist regime. The legacy of the past was also to some 
extent represented by the form of the economic program adopted by the 
first non-communist government in Poland. The decision to establish 
a market economy was made "from above" and the main goals of the 
first phase of the economic transformation were defined in a "negative" 
sense (Rychard 1991): hyperinflation was to be avoided, demand was to 
be constrained. The legacy of the past was reflected in this in the sense 
that it resembled to some extent the implementation of 
communist-sponsored reforms. The history of the communist regime 
in Poland is the history of failed attempts at economic reform. Despite 
the crucial difference between these attempts and the radical changes 
which began in 1989, there are some similarities which I presented in 
the chapter 2.2: the economic program of transformation in Poland 
was designed and implemented from above. The next resource which 
was consistent with the form of the economic program was the type of 
social support and participation in the program's implementation. It is 
clear that Polish society never actively participated in the political and 
economic life of the communist regime. It tolerated, informally 
modified, or rebelled against it. Paradoxically, no active participation 
was expected from the society by the first non-communist government. 
Due to the restrictive nature of the program, passive tolerance was 
expected by the authorities, and not active participation as I pointed 
out in the previous chapters. There is an important difference between 
this passive tolerance and the passivity of communist times: the first 
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was based on moral support for change; the passivity of communism 
was based on lack of alternatives. The support for change was not, 
during the first phase of transition in Poland, based on activated 
economic and political interests; there were rather values which 
integrated Polish society, represented by the Solidarity movement, 
against the collapsing communist regime. Corresponding with these 
elements was also the type of political structure. Solidarity was acting as 
a single more or less united political force. There were no new party 
structures, nor a large socio-political movement. 
My thesis is that all these elements created a coherent socio-institutio-
nal system and that the consistency among these elements was the core 
feature of the logic of the first phase of transition. This consistency led to 
the achievement of the first transitional goals, especially in the economic 
sphere. 
The sociological sense of the collapse of communism and of the first 
phase of transformation lies in the fact that it enables us to verify some 
theses related to the nature of systemic change under communism. 
Staniszkis (1986) posed a thesis of "nontransformative rebellion." Her 
idea is that massive rejection of the communist regime paradoxically 
endangers the possibility of its transformation. This is, among other 
points, the result of the fact that protests against communism share 
some features with communism, that they are, in a sense, rooted in the 
old regime. The idea of the "communist assets" used as tools for 
systemie change, presented here, shows that the socio-institutional 
forces inherited from communism enabled systemie collapse, and that 
they were of a dynamie and transformative character. Staniszkis' thesis 
does not apply to the first phase of transition, because the rebellion was 
clearly of a transformative character. However, this thesis can apply to 
the second phase of transition during which the forces and mechanisms 
which promoted the collapse of the old system endanger the creation of 
a new one. 
The first phase of the post-communist transition lasted from the 
middle of 1989 (the elections of June 1989) to the middle of 1990 (the 
beginning of the presidential campaign). In the second half of 1990, the 
above-described assets were exhausted, paving the way to the second 
phase of transition. The moral-based passive support was decreasing, 
some differences of interests between workers and intelligentsia became 
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apparent, the need for restructuring and not simply stabilizing the 
economy emerged, and, finally, Solidarity was "diffused" and 
a multi-party political system started to function. The "old" social 
forces can potentially block reform: on the one hand, restructuring the 
economy through privatization is threatening workers in the large state 
enterprises, and, on the other, the process of forming new economic 
interests and institutions is very slow. This is a popular vision of the 
threats to transformation in the region as a whole and is shared by 
many students of the Polish situation too. However, I am of the 
opinion that this is an oversimplified picture of the current phase of 
transition. 
The political frustration of the society disappointed by the political 
fragmentation of the Polish parliament, by the unclear links between 
elites and masses, and, last but not least, by the lack of job security 
resulted in a withdrawal from political life. This is reflected in many 
indicators, among them low electoral turnout. In January 1992, 75 
percent of Poles declared medium or low interests in political life 
(CBOS). The great and growing majority of society is interested more 
in being effectively governed than in active participation in government 
(Poczucie wpływu na sprawy publiczne, 1992). Such data provoked some 
analysts to see Polish society as passive. 
I would like to take the opposite stance. In my opinion, Polish 
society was more passive during the communist period and during the first 
phase of transition than it is in the second phase. Low participation in 
formal "macro" politics does not mean passivity. On the contrary, 
there are many signs of new forms of social activity. I present some 
examples in this chapter. 
In the area of economic life, the growing number of private ventures 
should be mentioned. In the period between December 1990 and 
December 1991, the number of state-owned enterprises decreased by 
2.7 percent, while the number of private ventures increased by 25.1 
percent (Biuletyn Statystyczny 1992). These data show that besides the 
slow process of massive privatization of the state sector, the so called 
"smali privatization" is going much faster. New private ventures are 
growing much faster than the "old" state sector is restructuring itself. 
One reason for this are the problems with the program of mass 
privatization of the state sector which till March.1993 was not 
approved by Parliament. 
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There are also new social phenomena, mainly the growing differen-
tiation of the labor force resulting in an increase in the number of 
households with more than one source of income (Beskid et al. 1992). 
On the other hand, the professionally active part of society is decreasing 
(Ibid.). These two facts combined together create quite an interesting 
situation: there is a growing number of households whose members are 
working in the private sector and households combining different forms 
of employment with unemployment benefits. This shows the emergence 
of new types of divisions within the social structure. It also results in 
a very interesting phenomenon: that the social position of any given 
household is determined by a multitude of factors (Sikorska 1992). As 
a consequence, we can posit the simultaneous existence of parallel social 
structures: any given individual can be unemployed, while simulaneous-
ly retired and working part-time in the "second economy." This 
phenomenon more deeply differentiates the social structure. It is even 
difficult to say that right now there is one social structure in Poland. The 
process of "structural diffusion" or the existence of the parallel social 
structures was also present during the decline of communism. However, 
the difference is that during that time one "structure" was dominating, 
and now they are more diffused. Apart from differentiation in economic 
activity, the growing number of non-governmental organizations, 
among them many self-help groups, should be mentioned here. There 
are now about 4500 such organizations in Poland (Sufin 1992). 
New processes are also emerging on the level of institutional 
structures. Despite frequent changes in the political sphere (changing 
governments), all these governments continued to follow the main line 
of the economic program which was begun in 1990. "The Balcerowicz 
program without Balcerowicz" became a popular description of the 
situation. Additionally, these frequent political changes, some of them 
dramatic and conflictual, did not affect the economic situation. The 
political situation was getting worse but not the economic performan­
ce. These institutional phenomena were reflected in social conscious-
ness. According to data from the "Demoskop" Public Opinion 
Institute there is a growing discrepancy between the evaluation of the 
general situation of the country (which is worsening) and the index of 
consumer optimism (which is more stable) (Przegląd 1992). 
Data from CBOS also show that respondents' family situations and 
workplace situations are assessed as better than the political and 
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economic situation of the country and that this tendency is stable over 
time ("Nastroje społeczne we wrześniu '92" 1992). These results reflect 
the discrepancy between the perception of the macro-political situation 
and that of the micro-economic situation. 
"Economy better than politics, and micro better than macro:" this is 
the general impression that can be drawn from the results. This shows 
that there must be some mechanisms for making the situation on the 
micro-economic level better than the situation on the macro-political 
level. The "logie of macro" is not merely the reflection of the "logie of 
micro;" it has its own dynamie. During the communist era too 
macro-systemic challenges and obstacles were buffered and modified 
on the micro-level of social life. But there are some new elements in the 
situation. The fact that despite the worsening political situation, the 
economic one (and its perception on the micro level) is not getting 
worse shows that there is a beginning of an independent, internal 
dynamics in the economic system. If this hypothesis is true, it would mean 
that we are witnessing the first result of the transformation, as the 
weakening of political domination over the economy can be regarded as 
one of its main goals. 
We can hypothetize that during the first phase of post-communism 
the "passive-macro-oriented strategy" was dominant, and that during 
the second phase a new "active-micro-oriented" strategy is emerging 
(Rychard 1992). The dominant social orientation during the first phase 
was toward the state: it addressed both expectations and passive 
support. During the second phase of post-communism, the dominant 
social orientations are more active. They are also directed towards 
other social groups and individuals2. This is also reflected in the 
behavior of enterprises: there is a growing horizontal orientation 
corresponding to a decreasing vertical dependency on the state ad-
ministration. This phenomena is mainly present among smali enterp­
rises, while the bigger ones are still oriented mainly toward the state 
administration (Federowicz 1992). 
The evolution of the logie of different phases of post-communism 
means shifting from vertical to more horizontally oriented strategies. 
This is different comparing to the adaptation strategies under com-
2
 I owe this remark to M. Kofta who formulated it during my presentation of the first 
version of this chapter in the Institute for Social Studies, March, 1992. 
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munism, which I described earlier: they were oriented vertically toward 
the official system. This evolution reflects also the change from passive 
politization to active depolitization. I am of the opinion that the current 
depolitization can create new politics in the future. This could emerge 
from below, paving the way for the real emergence of a civil society 
in Poland. The popular view is that the history of Polish civil society 
is linked with the history of the Polish anti-communist opposition, and 
civil society was born together with the Solidarity movement. These 
are important elements which played their role in preparing the 
collapse of communism. However, the result was rather passive 
support for the first phase of transition, as I am trying to show. From 
this point of view, the present active depolitization is not necessarily 
an obstacle to the emergence of civil society; it can be a factor 
promoting it. 
The two phases of change described above illustrate the general 
thesis of this chapter on the relationship between transitions and 
transformations, and of the usefulness of both concepts. The first phase 
was of a "transitory" character: change was introduced mainly from 
above and "tolerant passivity" was a dominant social strategy during 
it. This covers the period between 1989 and the middle of 1990. Starting 
from that time more and more spontaneous processes from below 
began to emerge. This is associated with a withdrawal from official 
macro-politics, but, as I would argue, this does not mean passivity. This 
is a real transformative process in which planned and spontaneous 
phenomena are mixing with each other. The evolution "from transition 
to transformation" is also an evolution in terms of social strategies: 
from "state-oriented" to "micro-oriented". In the next part of this 
chapter I will try to pose some hypotheses about the structural results 
of the strategies described above. 
4.3. THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES 
I would like to start with some hypotheses on the emergence of social 
interests. The problem of the existence or nonexistence of interests 
during transformation has been widely discussed. The importance of 
interests lies in the fact that their existence is crucial for the creation of 
new social structures. In the disputes among Polish scholars, there are 
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a variety of positions. In order to clarify them, we can discern four 
hypotheses concerning interests in the transformative period: 
(1) There are no interests in Polish society because of the lack of 
structures which create such interests. This is a legacy of the communist 
period in which there were neither real politics nor real economics. 
(2) There are interests, but they are "hidden." This means that there 
are "objective" interests but social groups have not yet discovered what 
their interests are. People do not see the connection between their 
strategies and the functioning of the institutional system.3 
(3) There are interests, and they are known but these are the interests 
of the supporters of the old structures and order. The supporters of the 
new order are integrated on the basis of values and the supporters of 
the old one on the basis of interests. According to this hypothesis, the 
supporters of the old, non-market order are not only communists but 
also "average citizens" who were involved in the old system and 
accepted it, not ideologically but practically. Many Polish sociologists 
have noted that one of the crucial features of Polish communism was 
the fact that the majority of society simultaneously rejected and was 
implicated in it. Sometimes even the ways in which people tried to reject 
or modify communism (corruption, informal mechanisms) paradoxi-
cally strengthened it. This created the real network of interests which 
represents one of communism's legacies. According to this hypothesis it 
is very difficult for supporters of the new order, who are integrated only 
on the basis of values to destroy this interests-based network. Weak 
pro-reform values versus strong anti-reform interests is the most 
important dilemma according to this approach. 
(4) According to the last approach there are interests, which are 
known, and which are the interests of those who support a free-market 
economy; but these interests have not been socially legitimized. The 
reason for this is that the interest-oriented supporters of the 
free-market economy are not regarded as supporters of political 
democracy. Additionally, the sources of their market assets are 
perceived as socially unjust. The most important example of such 
groups are the former "nomenklatura" members who became 
businesspeople. The exact scope of this phenomenon is not known, but 
it raises much emotion and many disputes. There is still a tendency to 
3
 I owe this remark to David Stark. 
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perceive this way of building capitalism as "non-legitimate" but this 
tendency is decreasing. The origin of capital counts less and less as the 
beginnings of a new system are emerging. 
The four approaches described above can be used for explaining the 
first phase of post-communism. The difference between this phase and 
the second one is that now a fifth approach can be used. According to 
this, there are emerging interests oriented toward the micro-scale. This 
is connected with the general hypothesis on the evolution of 
orientations from a macro- to a micro-scale. These new interests are 
oriented toward localities, where there are new economic interests as 
well. Unfortunately, we still do not know how big is the group of 
people who built their businesses using former communist ties and 
succesfully transfered themselves from "apparatchiks into 
enterpreneurchiks," to use J. Tarkowski's phrase. 
The results of these processes are new divisions in the social 
structure. These divisions cut across existing structures. It is reflected in 
the process of creation of the "parallel social structures" which I have 
mentioned earlier. As a consequence, we can hypothesize two 
simultaneous processes occuring in the social structure. On the one hand, 
there are some signs of a dichotomous division between winners and 
losers in the transition process. On the other hand, there is the opposite 
process of the fragmentation of society resulting from micro-scale 
divisions and from the fact that the distinction between loosers and 
winners cuts across existing structures since many individuals 
simultaneously participate in various social structures. 
The consequence of these two processes is the fact that the probability 
of massive rejection of the transformation is relatively low. We can say 
that the first phase of post-communism was the last period of massive 
support (based on a massive rejection of the former communist order). But 
this means something more as well: the end of the era of massive support 
could also be the end of the era of massive rebellion. This does not mean that 
there will be no more protest. Fragmented forms, for example local strikes, 
can coexist with others, such as withdrawal from the official system an, 
increase in the number of informal arrangements, etc. These forms are not 
clearly defined, partly because of the fact that now the distinctions between 
the official and unofficial system are less clear than in the communist era. 
But this does not mean that these forms of protest cannot be dangerous to 
the stability of the whole socio-institutional system. Fragmented and 
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unclear forms of protest can be even more difficult to control and can 
incapacitate the system. 
The crucial feature of the newly emerging divisions in the social 
structure is the fact that the distinction between winners and losers is 
based on socially unclear rules. Many people see in their closest 
environment, among their friends and neighbors, that some people are 
suddenly climbing the social ladder while others are going down. The 
problem is that the rules underlying the processes of social promotion 
and degradation are not known. However, this is beginning to change. 
Some groups and individuals are learning what elements of their 
accessible assets can be transformed into various forms of social, 
political, and economic capital. On the other hand, there are groups 
which are slower in this learning process. I am of the opinion that one 
of the most important division within the Polish social structure right 
now is the "cognitive" one between these who know these rules and know 
how to implement them and those who do not. This is also one of the 
divisions which cuts across traditional social structures. Discovering 
and describing the social correlates of these divisions seems to be one of 
the most important tasks for sociologists. 
The problem of rules underlying the formation of new social 
structures brings us closer to the question of institutional structures. 
The description of the evolution of social strategies (from passive 
macro-oriented to active micro-oriented) enables me to propose 
hypotheses concerning the structural consequences of these strategies. 
The last part of this chapter will be devoted to the institutional 
conseąuences of this evolution. 
4.4. FROM A SYSTEM WITHOUT A STATE TO A STATE 
WITHOUT A SYSTEM? 
Among the many interpretations of communism was one according to 
which communism was not a "normal" institutional system but more 
a deviation, or deformation of some norm. Conseąuently, it can be 
assumed that communism had no internal sources for its dynamic 
because it was artificial and imposed on state and society. As a result of 
such reasoning, there is an opinion that the destruction of communism 
will result almost instantly in the recovering of the natural and normal 
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shape of society which still existed but was hidden under the oppressive 
armor of communism. 
However, the prolongation of the post-communist period has proved 
this approach to be untrue. Communism had its own sources of dynamic 
and its own logic of evolution. This logie finally resulted in its destruction, 
as I argued earlier. To put it briefly and not very precisely, though during 
communism there was no sovereign Polish state there was a system; there 
were institutional rules, imposed and oppressive but to some extent 
socially rooted, at least on the behavioral level. These rules were inefficient 
and unjust, but they existed. This was a system without sovereignty. 
Unfortunately, while under comunism there was a system without a state, 
now we can pose a question whether we have a state without a system? 
A positive answer to this ąuestion would be an oversimplification. 
There are three hypotheses about the nature of the institutional 
evolution from communism to post-communism. 
The first one is that there is a change from rigid and centralized 
communism to flexible and pluralistic market democracy. We can call 
this approach normative because it takes the ideological vision of the 
system as real. It can result in a "teleological" vision of the transition. 
The second hypothesis is that there was no any coherent system 
during communism, just as now, during post-communism there is also 
no such system. This approach could be called "from one non-system 
to another non-system." 
The third hypothesis is that both communism and post-communism 
were systems, but in a deeper sense. Communism had its own identity, 
which was different from its normative vision of itself. However, the 
deviations from the normative shape, and the many informalities and 
games embodied in communist institutions, do not mean that 
communism was not a system. It had its own deeper logie, its own 
dynamie, and its own mechanisms of reproduction (Mokrzycki 1991, 
p. 51). Analogously, during the post-communist period there is also 
a logie and a dynamie, despite the chaos evident at first glance 
(Rychard 1991). I identified part of this logie and dynamie earlier while 
describing the rules underlying the two phases of post-communism and 
the evolution from passive politization to active depolitization. 
The first approach is mainly found in non-scientific disputes and in 
fact reflects the "official" ideology of transition. At the intersection of 
the first and second hypotheses there is an approach represented by 
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Bunce and Csanadi (1992) according to which we are witnessing the 
change from the clear identity of communism to the unclear, chaotic 
period of a post-communist "nonsystem." David Stark (1992), in 
arguing with this approach, stresses the fact that during communism as 
well there was no clear identity but rather a multitude of contradictory 
meanings, and that now the problem is not one of an "institutional 
vacuum" but rather of organizational diversity. 
In my opinion the fact that real communism differed from its 
normative vision does not mean that it lacked institutional identity. 
The lack of a normative identity (or its erosion) does not mean the lack 
of an identity in a deeper sense. I think that this is the case with 
post-communism as well: it has its own identity and logie of evolution. 
This is why I advocate a third hypothesis. In the last part of this chapter 
I will present some hypotheses about the nature of the evolution of 
institutional identity between communism and post-communism. 
I would like to go back to the concept of a "fourfold system" as an 
analytical tool for the descripton of the "real" institutional identity of 
communism (chapter 3.1). According to this concept, real communism 
was a dispersed system. It had four main institutional elements: (1) the 
official system, which represented the normative shape of politics and 
economics and their main institutional rules (the domination of one 
political party, the prevalence of state-owned industry, etc); (2) the 
unofficial system, which represented the variety of informal ar-
rangements under communism; (3) the non-system, consisting of all 
institutional arrangements which were alien to the normative bases of 
communism, such as the role of the Catholic Church, private owner-
ship of land in agriculture, and smali, private businesses; and (4) the 
anti-system, which represented the anti-communist opposition. 
My thesis is that individuals and social groups could not fulfill 
all their needs in exchanges within any one of these systems 
(or subsystems). As a result, individuals compensated for their 
unbalanced exchanges with one system by means of exchanges with 
another one. For example, material needs unsatisfied by the exchanges 
with the official state sector were compensated either by exchanges with 
the unofficial one (the moonlight economy) or by exchanges with the 
nonsystem (the private sector). The need for information was compen­
sated for by exchanges with the anti-system (the underground press). 
As a conseąuence, a system which was unbalanced on the level of its 
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elements achieved balance on the level of the whole fourfold entity. 
Thus, the network of exchanges between individuals and among the 
four systems integrated the system as a whole. This network of exchange 
relations was the main source of the systems integrity and the main source 
of its identity enabling the whole fourfold system to survive, function, and 
reproduce itself 
In the last part of this chapter, I will try to adapt this model to 
describe the dynamic of transformation. What were the main elements 
of the institutional structure of Polish society during the first 
("transitional," according to the terminology adopted in this article) 
phase of post-communism (between 1989 and the middle of 1990)? 
The most important division was that between the new political 
structures (and, subordinated to them, the existing state-owned indust-
rial sector), represented by Mazowiecki's government and the old ones 
represented by the communists. Paradoxically, there co-existed with 
this division some cooperation and interlocking mechanisms between 
these two structures. This was due to the "Round Table Agreement" 
according to which both the communists and Solidarity were to share 
power. The most important division was between old and new, and no 
substantial division existed between politics and economics: these were 
the features of the institutional structure of the first phase of 
post-communism. 
In the second phase of post-communism (transformation), which 
started in the middle of 1990, the situation has been more complicated. 
The divisions between the elements of the institutional systems are 
unclear mainly because of the fact that those systems are not very 
developed. My hypothesis is that one of the most important distinctions 
during this time is the one between macro politics and the micro-level of 
everyday life. There is also a distinction between politics and the 
economy, which is a very important one, and new with respect both to 
communism and to the first phase of post-communism. I described this 
line of division earlier. To sum up, two lines of division seem to be most 
important when defining the institutional structure of the second phase 
of post-communism: the micro-macro line and the division between 
politics and the economic system, the latter becoming more autonomous. 
The evolution of the institutional structure from communism to the 
second phase of post-communism described above is illustrated in the 
following diagram. 
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Diagram 1. The evolution of the institutional system in Poland 1980-93 
To summarize the general features of the evolution described in the 
diagram: in both the communist period and the first phase of the 
post-communist period, the most important difference is between the 
communist and non-communist elements of the institutional structure. 
In both these cases, there is no institutionalized difference between 
politics and economics. In the first phase of post-communism, 
economics is still subordinated to the state, albeit to a new state. The 
difference between these two periods is that during post-communism 
"the systemic dispersion" is smaller, and instead of four elements we 
have only a dichotomous division. The evolution is from dispersion to 
dichotomization (but, paradoxically, with some degree of cooperation). 
In the second phase of post-communism, the division between the 
political and economic elements of the institutional system emerged. 
This division was present neither in communism nor in the first phase 
160 
of post-communism. There is also a second division, between the macro 
and micro spheres of life. This distinction was also present during 
communism (the well-known inconsistencies between public and private, 
official and non-official, for example) but during that time, there was 
a strong conflict between these spheres, while during the second phase of 
post-communism, there is merely a distinction. This is related to the 
problem of the evolution of rational strategies, which I will address later. 
The most important difference between this phase and the former 
two is the emergence of a functional division between the political and 
economic systems. The presence of functional divisions signals an 
evolution toward modernization, differentiation based on specializa-
tion emerges. This is something new: both in communism and in the first 
phase of post-communism the dominant divisions were of an ideologi-
cal or political character (old and new, "us" and "them"). The evolution 
from ideological dmsions to functional ones is the first important step 
toward pluralism. There is also an evolution in the direction of these 
divisions. The ideological divisions were vertical, between "us" and 
"them," while the functional ones are horizontal. As I pointed out 
earlier (chapter 3.1), the dominant orientation and frame of reference in 
the adaptative processes during communism were toward the state: the 
opposition to it helped in the self-identification of the individual and 
groups strategies. The orientations during the first phase of 
post-communism were paradoxically similar. The only difference was 
that not the opposition but support for the first non-communist 
government helped social identification. This has changed in the second 
phase of post-communism. Social orientations are getting more and 
more horizontally directed, toward other groups and individuals. To 
some extent, politics matters less and less. For all these reasons we can 
call the difference between the first and second phases of 
post-communism the evolution from dichotomization to pluralization. 
To sum up the nature of the processes described above, we can say that 
the evolution of the institutional system in Poland during the last two 
decades can be represented as a shift from ideological dispersion through 
political dichotomization to the beginnings of functional pluralism. 
These are only general hypotheses. The picture described here is 
certainly simplified. To make it more complex, we must stress several 
points. First, during communism in the period of a fourfold dispersed 
system, the borders between systems were more clear than they are 
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now. Second, during that time, there was one system which dominated 
the whole socio-institutional order: the official system. This is not the 
case in the present situation, in which there is no such dominating or 
prevailing system. Third, relations between the systems now are not as 
clear. As a result, the network of exchanges is also poorly defined and 
institutionalized. During communism the "terms of trade" were 
known, now they are not always known and this is the institutional 
aspect of the unclear social rules to which I referred earlier. 
Further elaboration of this model could provide a theoretical 
background for the verification of some theses on the dynamic of 
transformation. For example, Stark has proposed a thesis on the 
"...plurality of transitions in a dual sense: across the countries we are 
seeing a multiplicity of distinctive paths that differ in kind and not simply 
in degree; within any given country, we find not one transition, but many 
occurring in different domains -political, economic, and social - and the 
temporality of these processes are often asynchronous and their 
articulation seldom harmoniom" (1992, p. 7). We can adopt this thesis 
to analyze the temporality of the transitions of the different elements of 
the fourfold system. It is elear that some of these elements were 
transformed faster than others. 
The next analytical possibility is to study the mechanisms by which 
particular elements are transformed. Which elements of the fourfold 
system contributed the most to the emergence of the "new system" in the 
first phase of post-communism? Which elements of these systems 
affected macro-politics and which the micro-economy, and how? Some 
theses on transforming the political capital of the nomenklatura into the 
economic capital of the new market system can be also analyzed within 
the framework of this approach (Selenyi 1990). In the diagram I have 
drawn, arrows show the direction of these transformations, but these are 
only "hypothetical" directions and should be verified by further analysis. 
Institutional evolution during transformation also reflects changes 
in the relations between macro and micro rules of rationality. During 
communism, there was a conflict between these rules. Individual or 
group success was possible only by breaking or avoiding the 
macro-systemic rules (Rychard 1991a). Under communism, however, 
these macro-systemic rules of rationality suppressed the micro ones. 
In the first phase of post-communism the contradiction between 
these two types of rules of rationality did not disappear but was only 
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"frozen." People decided to submerge their own individual interests to 
the systemic rules. As in the communist era the macro-systemic rules 
were dominant. The difference was that during the first phase of 
post-communism, these macro rules were socially accepted, although 
more as values as than as interests. 
In the second phase of post-communism, the difference is that the 
dominant role is played by micro-rationality rules, while the macro 
ones are to some extent neglected or do not constitute as important 
a frame of reference for individuals as they did in the past. There is 
a chance that new macro rules may emerge from below, as a result of 
the interplay between different micro rules.4 
4.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter, I have tried to present some hypotheses on the evolution 
of post-communism. This evolution can be interpreted as a shift from 
passive macro-oriented politics to an active micro-oriented society. It is 
also a shift from transition to transformation, as I argued earlier. Both 
these concepts are needed to describe the different phases of change. 
Each of the phases of change has its own logic and dynamics. 
I described their three levels: social strategies of individuals, the social 
structure, and the institutional structure. My starting point was that the 
legacy of communism is one of both stability and of change. The 
theoretical framework which I proposed in the last part of this chapter 
lead to some hypotheses on the institutional effects of the evolution of 
social strategies and structures. The replacement of ideological 
4
 The present domination of the micro sphere does not mean that the contradiction 
has disappeared entirely; it reappears in certain concrete situations. One could be the 
campaign of decommunization. Then the question can emerge: if all communism is 
rejected, what will people do with their individual pasts? (I owe this remark to 
G. Kolankiewicz.) The consequence of this is that the more people are pushed to reject 
communism, the more they are delegitimating their own past. No one wants to regard his 
or her previous life as senseless. The psychological tension produced by this process can 
be reduced in at least two ways. First, the tendency to "reject the rejection" can emerge 
and result in a weak support for slogans of decommunization. Second, individuals can 
make an even stronger distinction between their daily life and the macro-system. This 
strategy can strengthen the discrepancy between the rules of rationality operating at the 
macro- and micro-levels. 
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divisions with functional ones seems to be one of the most important 
features of this evolution. 
I would like to end by saying that I hope the evolution from 
macro-politics to a "micro-society" will result, finally, in the creation 
of a new kind of politics rooted rather than imposed. This would create 
new institutional structures, based on new social forces. The process of 
social change seen from this perspective leads to a final thesis: that the 
most important transition or transformation lies ahead. 
When we adopt this more general perspective, we can see that the 
ongoing transformation and its two phases are only the beginning of 
the end of communism. The emergence of a new institutional order 
which will be the result of the network of micro strategies will be a long 
process. The crucial question here is whether the institutional system 
will be capable of encompassing these "new politics" as they emerge 
from below. If not, the result could be either social unrest, or the 
withdrawal from the sphere of politics by these new social forces. 
The other and opposite danger is that the current shape of post-
communism will become "fixed," and the transition frozen, which, since 
post-communism has its own mechanisms and logic of reproduction, is still 
a possibility.5 This danger is strengthend by the fact that implementation of 
the restructuring phase of transformation (privatization, new constitution) 
is taking place much slower than the first, that of stabilization. The first 
phase of post-communism was rather short. After its logic was exhausted, 
the logie of the second phase is emerging slowly. Additionally, some new 
post-communist interests groups have emerged and at least some of them 
may want to slow down further transformation. These are the reasons why 
I think that it is quite possible that the current phase of post-communism 
can be "frozen" and can reproduce itself. 
These are two contradictory hypotheses according to which everything 
is ahead of us - or everything has already happened. Between these two 
extremes lies the future of Poland's social and institutional systems.6 
5
 "When will it be better? It already was." This is the second hypothesis in the form of 
a joke. 
6
 I am indebted to David Stark, Valerie Bunce, and other colleagues for their comments 
to my presentations at Cornell University, which form the basis for this chapter. I would 
also like to thank doctoral students of the seminar on Political Sociology at the Graduate 
School for Social Research of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology for their remarks 
and comments. 
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